Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–148: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

New York, July 1, 1948—4:16 p. m.

837. Following supplements and continues our 831, June 29 [30], on the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

D. Basic Factors

1. In evaluating the mission’s views as set forth in No. 831, the Department may find useful the following analysis of the basic factors we have had in mind, in formulating those views.

2. Considering Palestine alone as a single factor, the prevention of further fighting and establishment and maintenance of peace in that country are first of all essential to the maintenance of peace in an area including not only the Near and Middle East but the Moslem, world of North Africa and Southern Asia. Second, the establishment and maintenance of peace in Palestine could be the key to the progressive political and economic evolution of Palestine and the Near East. Third, the UN is deeply involved in the Palestine issue. While we do not agree with the prophets of doom who hold that failure of the UN to settle the Palestine question would ruin the organization, there is no question in our minds that such failure would deal a very heavy blow to the prestige and effectiveness of the UN. Conversely, a settlement of the Palestine question under UN auspices would greately enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the organization.

3. The Palestine question cannot, however, be considered realistically as an isolated problem but from every point of view (political, strategic, and economic) the vital importance of the many complex ramifications of this question must be borne in mind in considering the future settlement. The most immediate and direct influences concern, as noted above, the Near and Middle East and the entire Moslem world.

4. US interests. Although the various interests of the US involved in the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine may seem obvious, it seems wise to review them briefly as we understand them.

(a) Since the attainment of our other objectives in Palestine and the Middle East depend upon the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in Palestine these are the most immediate and vital of our interests. For this reason it is to our advantage to support the efforts of the UN fully. In a broader sense it is to our interest to support the prestige and effectiveness of the UN.

(b) From the political viewpoint it is to our advantage to minimize to the greatest possible extent Russian infiltration and influence in Palestine and the Middle East. This point is dealt with in somewhat more detail in paragraph 6 below.

(c) From the strategic viewpoint we assume that Palestine, together with the neighboring countries is a major factor presumably in any future major conflict this region would be of vital importance to US as a potential base area and with respect to our lines of communication. Presumably also the oil resources of the area are considered vital. It is our feeling that this last point may not perhaps have been dealt with adequately and frankly enough in official and public discussion of the Palestine question.

(d) From the economic viewpoint it is probable that with the exception of oil our trade and other economic relations with Palestine and the other Near East countries are not directly of any substantial importance. Indirectly, however, the economic stability and developing prosperity of Palestine and the Middle East area under peaceful conditions could make a very substantial contribution to the economic recovery of the world generally and thus contribute to the economic welfare of the US. With respect to oil, we recognize that the oil supply from the area is of great importance in the European recovery program. Were it not for this factor, however, and the strategic importance of oil, we should probably not allow the economic importance of this commodity to condition our judgment substantially with regard to Palestine.

5. UK interests. The basic factors influencing UK policy towards Palestine are similar if not wholly identical with ours. For this reason it is essential that both governments maintain the closest possible relations in developing a concerted policy with regard to Palestine and a common front in dealing with this matter diplomatically and in particular in the UN. In doing so, however, we must recognize the necessity of planning our policy on a very long-range basis since it is obvious that our interests in the area will continue for an indefinite period and since it is equally obvious that it will take a long time before real stability can be achieved. For this reason we feel that although no risk is involved in the foreseeable future the US must envisage the eventual possibility of changes in the British Government or even in the British political structure which might make it difficult for us to maintain a common policy with them and at the same time fully protect our national interests. Moreover, although the British position with the Arab states is at the moment stronger than ours, it is obvious that the UK is basically, perhaps regrettably so, not in a position to exercise as much long-range influence and leadership with regard to Palestine and the Near East as the US. This factor, we feel, may become more important even in the near future and the demand by other governments for US leadership in the area which is already substantial, as we see it here, will increase. Meanwhile, the British are probably better informed and have a better “feel” for the Palestine problem than we do, despite traditional long-range Arab-world thinking of permanent FO staff. For all of these reasons and because of the complexities of the problem and our vital interest in its peaceful solution, the Department probably has in mind the necessity of developing at the earliest a long-term, comprehensive (political, strategic, economic, cultural), program for Palestine and the Middle East.

6. USSR interests.

(a) It is our impression that the influence of the USSR in Palestine and the Near East is not at present very substantial. It is certain that they have virtually no influence within the Arab Government, not only because of the fear of those governments of communism, but also because of the attitude of the USSR towards partition and the state of Israel. Moreover, as indicated in conversations here with Asil and Fawzi, although there are some individuals in the Arab countries inclined towards communism, for religious reasons, as well as because of the low economic and cultural level of the masses of the population of the Arab countries, it is not apparent that communism has any substantial following among the masses. On the other hand, there are apparently a substantial number of Communists in the Irgun, the Stern Gang and other dissident groups. Beyond that the Soviet Union, through its support of partition and prompt recognition of Israel, must be considered as having a substantial influence with the PGI. The Communist influence is, of course, capable of substantial expansion through whatever diplomatic and other missions the Soviet Government may establish in Israel.

(b) It would seem to us that the Soviet Union would have two main objectives; first, to counteract so far as possible the political, strategic, and economic advantages of the US, UK and other western powers in the area; second, to establish the influence of the Soviet Union greatest possible extent. A very important factor in our minds is that the decline of US influence and the growth of Soviet influence in Palestine and the states of the Arab League would undermine our policy of supporting Greece, Turkey, and Iran against Soviet aggression.

(c) There are three methods whereby the USSR might extend its influence. First by hindering or, should the occasion arise, preventing by veto the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine; fighting between Jews and Arabs might be resumed with resultant chaos, and benefit to the USSR. Second, through its consistent support of the partition plan and its early recognition of Israel, the USSR is in a position to extend its influence through that state. This could be a very serious factor if the PGI should at any time feel that its vital interests were threatened by the mediator’s proposals or by inadequate or inconsistent support by the US. As a corollary the Soviet Union may, of course, be expected to continue efforts to extend its influence through dissident groups in a position to take advantage of any sign of “weakness” on the part of the PGI. For the moment it is somewhat difficult to see how the Soviet Union might extend its influence further through the Arab states. On the other hand, it is perhaps not at all unlikely that in certain of these states the success of Communist agents or fellow travelers might increase substantially if existing governments are overthrown as a result of developments in the Palestine situation wholly unacceptable to those countries.

7. Israel. In our view a fundamental factor to bear constantly in mind is that we are no longer dealing with a political movement spearheaded by the Jewish Agency but rather with a new state established after a long struggle and despite great difficulties. This is no longer a speculative proposition but a hard political reality that neither we, nor the British, nor the Arabs, nor anyone else could escape even if they wanted to

(a) The new state of Israel is in very strong political position. Externally it has been recognized not only by US but also by USSR. New state is also externally in strong political position in UN. Not only was partition plan approved last November, but [by?] a two-thirds vote, but this plan has not been superseded and it is at least extremely doubtful whether UN could take any action which would impair status of Israel. Internally PGI appears to be in very strong, well-organized position. It has dealt very effectively with recent Irgun affair at Tel Aviv. More important than this single affair is indication that PGI has courage and will to deal firmly with Irgun and other dissident elements.

(b) Israel is also in strong military position, perhaps stronger than they thought they might be. From point of view of numbers, organization, discipline and efficiency they are more than a match for most of Arab states put together. Abdullah has only very effective force on Arab side and effectiveness of this force is almost undoubtedly due to British elements. Israel has been successful in holding its own positions and beyond this has established effective control of western Galilee.

(c) Evidence available to us indicates that PGI fully recognizes responsibilities which go along with statehood. It is our impression that they desire to live as a good neighbor with surrounding Arab states and that they are willing and able to discharge their role as a responsible member of international community and in due course of UN. In contrast on whole with Arab representation they have shown dignity and strength in UN. There is no reason to believe they will not be willing to make concessions, even substantial ones, in interest of a peaceful adjustment of future situation of Palestine.

(d) If in process of negotiation PGI is pushed too hard to accept arrangements, intolerable from their point of view, [it] seems clear that this will increase its difficulties in dealing with Communist-inspired dissident elements and will also force it to rely more extensively on Russian support. From our conversations here we judge that PGI is aware of disadvantages to it of too close an association with Soviet Union and of risk of coming under Communist domination through a combination of internal and external pressures, thereby losing in fact if not in name, the independence which Jews have long struggled for and finally attained.

(e) On other hand, we feel it is reasonable to assume that PGI recognizes that greater advantages would be, gained from a closer association with US and other western powers, principal advantages in this case being maintenance of real independence and opportunity to continue its political and economic evolution under peaceful circumstances and continued financial assistance from US.

(f) If in effect Israel is thrown into arms of Soviet Union it could become a force operating to very great disadvantage to US, UK and other western powers, and to Arabs.

(g) On other hand, Israel, if fairly treated, could become a force operating to our own advantage and to advantage of Arab countries.

8. Arab states.

(a) Arab countries are also relatively new states participating in international affairs on their own responsibility for a very short period. From a political viewpoint, both domestic and international, they are relatively immature. From economic and cultural viewpoints they are relatively underdeveloped.

(b) The immaturity of Arabs is revealed in blindspot which prevents even more moderate Arabs from recognizing existence of Israel as a political fact. Because of this blindspot the more extreme Arabs seem determined to continue their efforts to eliminate the Jewish state. While admitting that Arabs might continue a form of guerrilla warfare for many years against the Jews, it seems axiomatic to us that Arabs could never eliminate Jewish state which, failing support from US and other western countries, could get support from Soviet Union, and the eastern European countries. Moreover, even more moderate Arabs who consider themselves “realistic” and are therefore prepared to recognize existence of Israel are nevertheless apparently holding to line that Jews might be brought to agree (if there were sufficient pressure by US) to a drastically reduced territory and impaired sovereignty. We consider that even this moderate Arab viewpoint is unrealistic because we do not feel that Jews will accept any substantial reduction of territory without compensation, nor any impairment of their sovereignty. Furthermore, we doubt whether US would be likely to bring any pressure at all to bear upon them to these ends.

(c) It is clear from Arabs we have talked to here that they recognize threat of Communist infiltration and growth of Soviet influence. We do not feel, however, that they have an adequate appreciation of this risk in terms of a possible open door through Israel if because of Arab intransigence it is impossible to work out a fair and equitable peaceful adjustment acceptable to Israel.

(d) More moderate Arabs we have talked to here recognize the intelligence and ability of Jews but on whole Arabs have been accustomed for so long to look upon Jews as root of all evil that it is difficult for them to see contributions for good that Jews might make politically, economically, and culturally to welfare of Arabs. This is, of course, a very difficult and complex psychological problem, but worth emphasizing, we feel, since prospects of a peaceful settlement would be substantially advanced if even a small number of Arab leaders could be convinced of desirability from their own viewpoint of adopting a positive rather than a negative attitude towards Israel.

9. Other states. A large number of other states have a very substantial interest in Palestine problem. Greece, Turkey, Iran and even Afghanistan on basis of conversations with their representatives here, while taking on whole a pro-Arab view, are concerned lest failure to settle Palestine issue, impair their position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. As a Moslem country Pakistan has strongly supported Arabs. As Asiatic rather than Moslem countries India and China tend to support Arabs. Among western powers France has a particular interest because of large Moslem populations under French sovereignty; on other hand, as reflected by their representatives here, course pursued by French Government is one of moderation and objectivity with a rather strong humanitarian flavor. Western powers generally feel that US–UK cooperation is essential in peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation but on whole the policy and influence of US is most important factor. Western powers are keenly aware, as reflected by their representatives here, of risk of Communist infiltration. This is particularly true of Canadians who on whole follow British line, consider our influence probably greater but that most essential factor is US–UK cooperation.

10. United Nations. As indicated paragraph 2 above, the prestige and effectiveness of UN are deeply involved in Palestine question. UN thus constitutes a factor somewhat apart from individual and group interests of member states. Various aspects of UN factor are discussed below.

(a) On debit side, UN was first invited to deal with Palestine question in winter of 1947. Despite effort devoted to question for more than a year in a special session of Assembly, through a special commission, in 1947 regular session of GA, in another commission, in SC, and finally in another special session of GA, the UN failed to devise a peaceful settlement of issues acceptable to the parties, or, alternatively, an enforceable solution. Result of this failure was withdrawal of mandatory on May 14 leaving a political vacuum. This vacuum was partially filled by proclamation of Israel, which might be described as an extra-legal act, and by outbreak of violence and hostilities on a serious scale.

(b) On credit side, SC established a Truce Commission and laid down basis for a truce, and recent special session of GA arranged for appointment of a mediator who has been able to bring about cessation of hostilities and to organize apparently effective machinery for supervising truce. Finally, mediator has initiated discussions looking towards “peaceful adjustment of the future situation.”

(c) Prospects of a peaceful settlement could be seriously impaired if UN is resorted to as a propaganda forum by Russians, Arabs or anyone else bent on preventing settlement. For this reason we are inclined to feel that it would be desirable, so far as possible, to deal with question of peaceful settlement through mediator and diplomatic channels.

(d) On other hand, question of demilitarization of Jerusalem and extending truce will presumably have to be dealt with in SC in immediate future and in this connection it may be difficult with Manuilsky in chair to avoid dealing with substantive issues involved in future settlement.

(e) We must also envisage that unless substantial progress is made towards future settlement between now and September, whole Palestine question may be projected into Paris GA with resultant confusion if not complete breakdown of mediation effort. On the other hand, if the mediator is successful before September in getting the principal parties to agree on future settlement, possibly in form of treaty between Israel and Transjordan, he would presumably report this agreement to GA at Paris. It is difficult to see how any serious objection could be Raised to such an agreement and GA might well put its stamp of approval on it, rescind the November 29, 1947 resolution, and approve admission of principal parties, Israel and Transjordan, to membership in UN. Parenthetically, this procedure might be helpful to those Arab Governments, if any, which could not “agree” to settlement envisaged in advance but might “acquiesce” in such settlement if approved by GA. Procedure envisaged in this paragraph would, of course, be ideal culmination of UN’s efforts to deal with Palestine problem. Although agreement between two parties between now and early September may seem unlikely, the objective is clearly worthwhile enough to warrant every effort to attain it. In our view it could be attained if US Government is prepared to assume rather more leadership than at present and if we formulate promptly a comprehensive, although tentative plan, as a basis for discussion and agreement with UK. We might then take up with the secretariat question of communicating to mediator basic elements of such plan which would influence joint support by our two governments with parties of ultimate proposals.

Jessup