Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–148

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] July 1, 1948.

Subject: Check List on Palestine¹

[Here follow first two paragraphs containing personal observations.]

1. Policy

a. long range: a peaceful adjustment

Of the many facets of this question with which we have been endeavoring to deal during your absence, the most important is that of overall policy. In an explicit sense, recent United States action in the Security Council regarding Palestine was covered by the policy position paper of May 22 approved by the President on May 27. However, Mr. Lovett, about the time when we introduced our Chapter VII resolution in the Security Council on May 17, had requested George Kennan on the Policy Planning Staff to submit to the National Security Council a paper which would, it was hoped, elicit from the Council renewed advice as to future United States policy regarding Palestine.

When I was shown the first draft of the Policy Planning Staff’s paper I was able to demonstrate to Mr. Kennan and Mr. Villard that it was subject to criticism from the UNA point of view. The upshot was that UNA was requested by Mr. Kennan to prepare two papers:

(1) on US policy in the Security Council in the event that the present truce in Palestine were breached,

(2) on a long-range possible modus vivendi for the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.²

The former paper was prepared by Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker and suggests that if war resumes in the Near East this government should be prepared to move into action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The paper of Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker has my approval. The second paper on the long range possible modus vivendi was written by myself and can be summarized in its concluding paragraph:

“In summary, therefore, a sensible territorial solution for the Palestine problem would be to re-draw the frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state, the remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to the outside world; the boundaries of the two new states to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and the United Nations; and the economic prosperity of the region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan.”^*

Both these papers were on June 29 submitted by Mr. Kennan without comment to Mr. Lovett for his criticism or approval. Mr. Lovett on June 30 requested me to send the memoranda to Secretary Marshall at Walter Reed [Hospital]. This was done today. I am told by the Policy Planning Staff that the papers have assisted their thinking, but that they do not at present intend to submit any paper to the National Security Council.

b. short range: action under chapter vii

I should like to add one word with respect to United States advocacy of action under Chapter VII. While I think that we should be resolute and live up to our responsibilities under the Charter, I do feel that as a matter of diplomacy we should not put ourselves in the position of becoming the self-appointed scapegoat for the Arab States. Recent telegrams from Cairo, Jidda, and Damascus indicate that the Arab Governments feel the necessity, under pressure of their public opinion, to resume hostilities after the end of the present cease-fire. I am convinced that these Arab Governments are looking for a way out of their present difficulty, since at least their commanding military officers know that they do not have the wherewithal to conduct a successful war against Israel. They will undoubtedly seek to claim vis-à-vis their own people that action by the United States (and this could easily be United States leadership in the Security Council under Chapter VII) was the reason why they have had to bow to superior force and have yielded a point vehemently desired by their own public opinion. In other words, they will seek to place the blame for their own bad judgments and emotion (which in statecraft amounts to bad judgment) on the United States.

As for the emotion of the Arabs, I do not care a dried camel’s hump. It is, however, important to the interests of this country that these fanatical and over-wrought people do not injure our strategic interests through reprisals against our oil investments and through the recision of our air base rights in that area, Accordingly, while there will be counsels on your staff for immediate and dramatic action by the United States under Chapter VII, I would suggest that we fulfill our responsibilities but without being in the driver’s seat.

(1) Sanctions.

In connection with possible action under Chapter VII, a series of meetings have been held, originally under my auspices and later under those of John Elliott in UNS, to explore the scope of economic sanctions should the Council decide to move in that direction under Chapter VII. The gist of very painstaking investigation on the part of the economic side of the Department is that, while Israel could be almost fatally injured by the application of economic sanctions, the Arab States would be hurt, but not vitally so, and would not, solely on account of such sanctions, be put out of the fight. Meanwhile it is generally assumed that application of economic sanctions by the United States, even in a universal framework of Security Council action, would result in reprisals with respect to petroleum and strategic bases.

(2) Binding Effect of Resolution of May 29.

An ancillary issue has been a debate within the Department as to the possible binding effect of the resolution of May 29. Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker strongly believe that this resolution, although adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter, is legally binding upon all members of the United Nations. Other officers of the Department, including Mr. Hay den Raynor,³ feel that such is not the case and that it would be unwise for the Department to crystallize a position in favor of the thesis that Chapter VI resolutions are binding on all members. Mr. Sandifer, in light of these doubts, has not yet submitted a final memorandum on the point to Mr. Lovett. On the whole, I am inclined to think that, in light of our publicly announced willingness to forego the veto under Chapter VI, we would be wise not to firm up a policy that all resolutions adopted by the Council under Chapter VI were legally binding upon States members.

2. Policy With Regard to Extension of Truce and Cease-Fire

We have for sometime felt that Bernadotte would be wise not to attempt to get a black-and-white solution for the Palestine problem before the termination of the present cease-fire which ends on July 9. Various governments and people have not succeeded in four decades in finding a compromise on the basic issues between Arabs and Jews and it is hardly to be expected that Count Bernadotte will be able to achieve this miracle in four weeks. Rather, we have indicated to the British, the Secretary-General and to Bernadotte, himself, our feeling that he should content himself at this moment with an extension of the truce and cease-fire. We hope that the agreeable habit of refraining from mayhem and murder will become increasingly popular, and that both sides can be persuaded to extend the truce for, if not for an indefinite, at least a more prolonged, period than the present four weeks. Whether Bernadotte will succeed in this effort is problematic. The Jews apparently desire an extension of the truce, which involves automatic Arab suspicion as to whether continuation of the cease-fire is in their interest. If the truce could be spun out until the end of the year there might be good reason to hope that pressure of economic interest, to say nothing of other factors, would lead the way to some arrangement between the Jews on one hand, and certain Arab leaders, such as Abdullah on the other, along the lines of the paragraph quoted above. Bernadotte’s proposals, attached, might lead to such a result, despite initial refusals on both sides. However, there has been too much public talk; the auspices are bad, and I am not optimistic.

3. Jerusalem

a. demilitarization

The fate of Jerusalem is a special case. On the whole, so far as a long-range settlement is concerned, thinking in the Department, in the Foreign Office at London, and also apparently at Lake Success, is in favor of an international regime for the Holy City under the United Nations. This, however, would necessarily be part of the long-range solution. From the aspect of immediate interest, Count Bernadotte has in mind securing the agreement of the Arabs and Jews to the demilitarization of the city by July 9. Presumably this would mean that the forces of the Hagannah and the Arab Legion would retire from Jerusalem, as well as—and this is of great importance—the irregular forces on both sides, including the Stern and the Irgun.

b. a united nations armed guard

Bernadotte then proposes to fill the vacuum by a 1,000 man United Nations armed guard. He has formally requested through Secretary-General Lie that the governments of the three members of the Truce Commission, Belgium, United States, and France, furnish equal contingents of this guard. We have told Mr. Lie that as a government we are not prepared to order regular forces of the military establishment to such duty but that we have no objection if Lie, employing his powers as Secretary-General, employs 333⅓ American citizens for such purpose. The French Government, in a telegram received June 30, has indicated its readiness to make available 335 Gardes Republicaines for the Jerusalem duty, but have agreed to our formula for recruitment. No reply has yet been received from the Belgians.

We have twice officially stressed to Mr. Lie that there should be no confusion between the special armed guard for Jerusalem and Lie’s project for a United Nations palace guard. I am personally convinced that the Secretariat, under the urging of Abraham Feller, has been promoting the Jerusalem guard idea, using Bernadotte’s name as cover, with the dual intent first of improving the position of the Jews in Jerusalem and, second, of forwarding Lie’s pet project for a United Nations guard. I am certain that the latter idea requires careful, if sympathetic, study, and that it should not be developed in connection with the infinitely embroiled Palestine problem.

Certain division chiefs of your staff have approached me with a draft telegram to New York to the effect that, if Lie has difficulty in recruiting the American contingent for the Jerusalem police, this government will “assign” 350 men to Lie’s force for Bernadotte’s use. I told them that I could not assent to such a telegram since I felt it was unwise policy for this government to order men of its armed forces to serve in Jerusalem as members of a United Nations guard; and that from the public relations point of view it would be highly unwise for this government to order American troops for duty in Palestine, If any of these men were killed the public reaction might not be favorable, whereas no one could object if free American citizens volunteered for such hazardous duty as private citizens. I mention this merely because I shall not be here next month and the idea may recur.

c. jerusalem and the red cross

Continuing with respect to Jerusalem, I should note the fact that the International Red Cross has two successfully operating zones of refuge in the city and has informally requested our support for a project to create a third zone on Mt. Scopus, taking in the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University, both of which are American-endowed organizations. I told the President of the International Red Cross, Mr. Ruegger, who called on me, that we favored this idea but suggested that he make his own arrangements with Hadassah and Dr. Magnes in New York City.

The International Red Cross has refused Bernadotte’s request to supervise the entry of food convoys into Jerusalem and to this extent has not acted as was contemplated by the Assembly’s resolution of May 14. There has been some initial ill-feeling between Bernadotte and the Red Cross, due more to domestic politics inside the International Red Cross than to the Palestine situation. These difficulties, I am happy to report, have now been ironed out.

d. the truce commission

The Truce Commission continues to function in Jerusalem and will assume a very important role there if Bernadotte succeeds in demilitarizing the city. Although I have not seen any direct statement to this effect, the telegrams from Jerusalem have left the distinct impression in my mind that the Belgian and French members of the Truce Commission are timorous and indecisive, while young Burdett, during the time he acted as our Representative, was much more forthright and courageous. Burdett has now been replaced by a superior in the person of an experienced Foreign Service Officer, John Macdonald, our new Consul General in Jerusalem. Macdonald, who was recently our Consul in Bombay, was given a thorough briefing in the Department before he went to Palestine.

4. Haifa Oil Refinery

The British, Jews, Arabs and French have all evidenced a decided interest in getting the Haifa oil refinery going again. We supported a démarche by Mr. Bevin to Bernadotte, suggesting that if both the Arabs and Jews agree it might be useful to place the oil refinery under the Mediator’s auspices for the time being. We have stressed, however, that since Haifa is an integral part of the state of Israel Bevin’s other idea for an international regime over the city could only be contemplated if there were advance agreement by the Government of Israel. We feel, on the whole, that it would be unwise to establish another international city at Haifa. We likewise indicated our view that the production of Haifa should not be used to increase the military potential of either side. Haifa, in my opinion, offers a unique opportunity for practical cooperation between the Arabs and Jews, since one side controls the crude oil and the other the refining capacity, while both sides need the final product. If an agreement can be found on Haifa the habit might spread to other areas.

5. Export of War Material

The Department has given strict compliance to the terms of the resolution of May 29 so far as sending war material to the Near East is concerned. On June 11, in a circular telegram to all Missions, we called the attention of all governments with which we have diplomatic relations to the need for strict compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the Council’s resolution. We have had close liaison with the British on this subject and have even got the Foreign Office to agree not to send civil aircraft and spare parts to the Near East for the initial period of the truce. After July 9, if either government feels that it is necessary to send spare parts for civil aircraft to that area we feel that such exports can be accomplished, provided there are adequate safeguards that the spare parts will not be used for military purposes and that the Mediator has been informed of the contemplated shipment.

A more difficult problem has been to prevent renegade Americans from flying American aircraft to Israel, in some cases purchased by the Irgun or Stern gangs, and in others, by the Provisional Government. This is a complicated subject but the details may be had from John Elliott and Mr. Hamilton of MD, whom I have asked to follow this subject.

The Czech Government, despite its obligations to comply with the resolution of May 29, has actively conspired in gun running by air from Prague to Palestine. It is regrettable to report that the aircraft used in the operation apparently are American. Thus far it does not seem apparent that Mr. Steinhardt, our Ambassador to Prague, has been successful in doing anything to suppress this traffic.

6. Immigration

On Memorial Day we received an urgent request from Mr. Bevin to give him our definition of “fighting personnel” and whether or not this included men of military age. Our Niact 2015 to London of May 31, which I drafted under Mr. Lovett’s direction, provided a definition which was successful in assisting the British to swing the Arab Governments to accept the truce. The essence of our definition—and this applies to the entire truce, and not merely to the question of immigration—is that during the period of the truce neither side shall increase its military potential. Subsequently, on June 7, Count Bernadotte, in a note to the parties, defined his common-sense interpretation of “fighting personnel” and the problem of the immigration of men of military age. We have accepted his definition and have instructed our shipping and passport authorities to see that it becomes our rule of thumb with regard to the travel of American citizens to the Near East and the travel of aliens from this country to that area.

7. The Loan of United States Observers and Equipment to the United Nations Mediator

At Count Bernadotte’s request we promptly sent twenty-one military observers to be attached to his staff to implement Article seven of the truce resolution. So far as the American observers were concerned they were divided equally between Navy, Army and Air Force. Subsequently, at Bernadotte’s request, we sent 10 more officers. The French and Belgian Governments have matched our contingent. In addition, Count Bernadotte has a staff of five hand-picked Swedish officers. His Chief-of-Staff and leader of the military observers is Colonel Bonde, with headquarters at Haifa. Bernadotte’s representative in Jerusalem is Colonel Brunsson.

In addition to the military observers we have provided Count Bernadotte with four airplanes, three destroyers for naval patrol, and a complete installation on Rhodes of wireless communications equipment. Likewise, three Navy doctors have been assigned to Bernadotte’s staff.

8. Cooperation With United Kingdom

Thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Douglas and to a considerable change in position by Foreign Secretary Bevin, plus a certain amount of missionary work at home, a new “entente cordiale” has been established with Great Britain in respect of the Palestine problem. It is important that these cordial and intimate working relations be continued. We have officially concurred with Ambassador Douglas’s suggestion, derived from the British Foreign Office, that he be the main line of communication with the United Kingdom; secondary channels being maintained with the British Embassy here (Denis Allen and Bromley), and the United Kingdom Delegation in New York. There is a good working arrangement to pool news and views on Palestine.

9. Relations With the Provisional Government or Israel

At the President’s request, Mr. James Grover McDonald has been appointed his Special Representative to the Provisional Government of Israel. He will sail for England on July 14 but the Foreign Service Staff, headed by Charles Knox, will fly to Tel Aviv this Sunday. They are scheduled to reach the Jewish capital on July 8. Mr. McDonald, as you probably know, is a professional Zionist. He plans to take with him a personal assistant, not yet named, of whose devotion to the Zionist cause there can be little doubt.

The Provisional Government of Israel is keenly anxious that its representative in New York, Major Eban, be seated by the Security Council not as the Representative of the Jewish Agency but of the Provisional Government of Israel. Since we have recognized Israel we must agree with this view, but have pointed out to New York that the spokesman for the Jews of Jerusalem should not be the Provisional Government of Israel and that, accordingly, the Jewish Agency may still be a useful organization to be heard. Our policy in this problem is set forth in Department’s telegram to New York #438, of June 30.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 10, consisting of personal observations.]

1. Mr. McClintock furnished copies of this check list to Messrs. Lovett, Satterthwaite, and Ross and to William Sanders of the Office of United Nations Affairs (his memorandum of July 2 to Mr. Rusk).
2. See Mr. Meeker’s memorandum of June 22 and Mr. McClintock’s memorandum of the following day, pp. 1127 and 1134.
3. It is interesting that there are a number of points of similarity between this suggested solution and the proposals made to Arabs and Jews by Count Bernadotte this week. I attach a copy of these proposals. I feel that Bernadotte has been statesmanlike and that his suggestions may contain the kernel of common agreement. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.