Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/2–1348

Handwritten Notes by Mr. Robert M. McClintock¹

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Drastic Step

1. At this juncture it would be a drastic step to admit that our advocacy on Palestine for years past and our recent championing of partition, was a mistake.

Need for New Situation

2. Therefore, any change in policy should be based on a new situation: clear evidence that refusal of Arab population, or of Arab Govts, or U.K., to cooperate makes plan unworkable. Or, failure of UN members to join in carrying out resolution. For example, SC may not have 7 votes in favor. Basically, we must be convinced that state of affairs in Palestine creates a new situation which forces us for a review of the position.

No Change in Present Policy

3. Meanwhile U.S. Palestine policy is as set forth in terms of GA resolution. We should try to carry out terms as well as possible.

Arab Aggression

4. Arab Aggression—let there be no mistake that we shall back down under it. If Arab States aggress we shall treat them as we have aggressors against Greece.

Arms Embargo

5. Arms embargo—have obligation under Charter to do nothing which would threaten peace, and under international law not to get into gun-running business. However, will cooperate if Commission and Mandatory agree to arm militias.

Alternate Plan

6. Alternate plan imperative if new situation arises, including readiness use U.S. forces. Trusteeship²

1. Prepared for “Meeting with National Security Council Friday, February 13, 1948”.
2. Mr. McClintock prepared additional handwritten notes, also undated, but presumably after those printed here, which read as follows: “National Security Council

   “1 Difficult to change course

   “2 Can’t send troops

   “3 Politically difficult

   “4 Don’t want Russians to send troop[s].”

   The two sets of handwritten notes have been filed together.