501.BB Palestine/6–2348: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)
us urgent
419. Dept has given urgent consideration to your telephonic advice that SYG Lie has telegraphed Count Bernadotte regarding latter’s suggestion that he hopes to demilitarize Jerusalem and will need an armed UN guard numbering 1,000 men to be available by July 9.1 You [Page 1139] report that Lie has suggested that he feels that Bernadotte’s request should be submitted to SC for its recommendation and has so informed Bernadotte.
We do not feel that Bernadotte’s purpose would be served by SC debate of this question. The Soviet faction would be given an opportunity to make long speeches and to insist that their nationals be recruited as a proportion of the proposed armed guard and this Soviet tactic would very probably result in other members of the Council failing to vote for any recommendation to Bernadotte, thus leaving him in a more negative position than before.
On the contrary we feel that sufficient authority now exists in Para. 6 and 7, SC resolution of May 29, in GA resolution of May 14, and in Section B(a) of the UN budget for 1948, for SYG at Bernadotte’s request to recruit and pay for the police forces Bernadotte has in mind.
We feel it is of utmost importance that there be no confusion between UN guard which SYG would like to create2 and concerning which he has had informal discussions with Secretary Marshall, and the police force for Jerusalem desired by Count Bernadotte. You may tell SYG that we are giving sympathetic consideration to his UN guard proposal but would prefer to view it on its own merits and not in light of the complex Palestine problem.
It would be extremely helpful for Dept to have more explicit knowledge of details of Bernadotte’s plan. Clearly it would not serve our interest if any considerable number of Soviet or Soviet satellite nationals made up Jerusalem force.
We assume Bernadotte’s plan is based on achieving agreement of parties on demilitarization of Jerusalem. If parties could further agree on source and composition of armed guards so much the better. Arabs and Jews might agree, for example, each to supply 500 men to Jerusalem force.
Sent USUN with request foregoing be imparted to SYG and that latter transmit our views for info of UN Mediator on Rhodes with comment that US as member of Truce Commission is naturally concerned in these arrangements and desires to be of utmost help.3
Repeated for info and action if Bernadotte in that vicinity to Jerusalem as 639, Haifa as 167, Cairo as 853.
Repeated to London as 2364, Paris as 2243, Brussels as 959.
- Count Bernadotte, in a message to Secretary-General Lie dated June 20, gave his views that the truce was under control and that both parties would be careful not to break it. Since he felt it impossible to obtain an agreement before July 9, his tactics would involve trying to gain time and to make vague proposals rather than firm ones, lest their rejection result in the ending of the truce. The Mediator advised that he would concentrate on attaining agreement on demilitarizing Jerusalem and the Holy Places, for which he would require at least 1,000 armed guards (telegram 809, June 23, 5:54 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6–2348).↩
- For documentation on this subject, see vol. i, Part 1, pp. 29 ff.↩
- New York reported, on June 25, that action had been taken on 419 and that the United Nations Secretariat had indicated general sympathy for United States views and would communicate them to the Mediator (telegram 821, 501.BB Palestine/6–2548).↩