Clifford Papers
Memorandum by the Presidents Special Counsel (Clifford)
Palestine
Are there any technical obstacles to asking full action rather than temporary, tentative or provisional action such as we have taken to date?
(1) Exchange of full diplomatic representatives.
Several weeks ago Loy Henderson proposed to Eliahu Epstein that he ask his Government to request of our government an exchange of full diplomatic representatives; Henderson said that the United [Page 1118] States would undoubtedly take action favorably within ten days after receipt of such a request.1
About two weeks ago, after receiving the request,2 Loy Henderson handed Epstein a letter signed by the Under-secretary, stating that in view of the situation in Palestine, our government would not at present agree to an exchange of full diplomatic representatives. The letter suggested instead that working missions be exchanged—the very proposal that is now being urged on the President.
When Mr. Epstein presented reasons against the State Department’s decision, including the consideration that the Arab states would be encouraged to believe that our government was again of two minds and that if the Arab States continued to hold out for better terms than the UN decision of November 29, 1947, they might be able to make a better trade—Mr. Henderson was so disturbed he did not want the letter to be said to be actually delivered.3
Next day Mr. Henderson gave Mr. Epstein a substitute letter, also signed by the Undersecretary; stating that the request for exchange of full diplomatic representatives was under consideration, and suggested that in the meantime working missions be exchanged.
On Mr. Henderson’s own representations, it is plain that there is no technical difficulty about exchanging full diplomatic representatives. The reason for the change in attitude seems to be that Mr. Henderson or the British deemed it necessary to conciliate the Arabs.
On the other hand, the failure to arrange the exchange of full diplomatic representatives is an indication to the British and the Arabs that they may make some progress toward securing better terms if they only hold out.
Furthermore, one result may be that full acceptance of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, by the British and the Arabs, may not be accorded at the end of the four weeks cease-fire; that there may be attempts to extend the cease-fire period. So that there may be more bargaining, the situation would continue to hang fire, and the threat of a renewal of hostilities would remain to cloud the situation.
One further consequence of delaying the exchange of full diplomatic representatives may be that the President will not be selecting and sending forthwith a big calibre man of large reputation to represent [Page 1119] this country in Israel. Another danger is that a regular career officer, being first sent as a head of a working mission, will be gradually eased into the post of Diplomatic Minister when there is a full exchange.
A third consequence may be that through easing the situation along in this way and thereby having a career man as American Minister to Israel, Mr. Henderson’s hand will be strengthened and his hold on the situation will be further entrenched.
(2) De Jure Recognition
In the Loy Henderson–Eliahu Epstein conversation, Henderson asked whether the State of Israel would give up some territory in exchange for De Jure recognition.4
This is some indication that there is no genuine technical obstacle to De Jure recognition, but that some person or government is trying to use, for the purpose of trading territory away from Israel, the power and right of the United States Government to act as sound American policy, rather than as some other country’s territorial ambitions, may determine.
- Mr. Clifford’s memorandum is printed here as an indication of his thinking in June 1948, not as a primary source on Henderson–Epstein conversations in May of which he had no first-hand knowledge. The editors have found no documentation in department of State files on those conversations, and Mr. Henderson, in an interview with Department historians on January 12, 1976, stated that he had never made to Mr. Epstein the suggestion attributed to him here. Mr. Henderson also had no recollection of substituting one letter for another, as recounted later in Mr. Clifford’s memorandum, tad he denied the accuracy of the penultimate paragraph of the Clifford memorandum (see p. 1119).↩
- The request was made in a telegram of May 19 from Mr. Shertok, p. 1012.↩
- The only Lovett–Epstein letter found is that dated May 29, p. 1074. On May 27 Mr. Lovett had submitted to President Truman his proposed letter to Mr. Epstein and the President had approved the draft the same day; see pp. 1058–1060.↩
- See footnote 1, p. 1118.↩