867N.01/6–1548
The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
No. 503
Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith as of possible interest a memorandum of a short conversation1 between Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, and Secretary Ireland relative to Palestine questions.
It may be observed that Azzam Pasha, in common with many Arab leaders, is probably more optimistic concerning the military achievements of the Arab states than the facts merit and that he, therefore, quite apart from any political motives, stresses beyond reality the military advantages lost by the Arabs in accepting the truce. On the other hand, it would appear that the activities of the Arab Legion, particularly at Jerusalem, and their stout resistance between Latrun, and Wadibab, and that the advances made by the Arab troops surprised even the most realistic of the military leaders of the Arabs, to the extent that the various reverses and failures to achieve original objectives as in the north are now forgotten. Nevertheless, according to several independent observers the initial initiative of the Arabs at Jerusalem is not likely to be regained, should fighting be renewed after the truce, so that the Arabs have in reality lost military advantage, which is balanced by the fact that the truce came in time to save the Arab Legion from impending ammunition shortage. It must also [Page 1115] be pointed out that the military communiques, usually couched in extravagant terms, together with eulogistic comments thereon by the press have greatly stimulated the Arab masses to believe in the invincible quality of their troops.
In his conversation Azzam Pasha did not go into detail as to the reason why the Arabs accepted the truce beyond the fear of being labelled aggressors, a reversal of an earlier attitude (Embassy’s telegram No. 471, May 52). It has been reliably learned, however, that in addition to their reason Abdullah’s insistence on a truce, supported by Egypt and Iraq, turned the tide against the demands of Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia that fighting continue. Tewfik Abdul Hoda Pasha, Transjordan Prime Minister, is authoritatively related to have silenced the Syrian demands that truce be rejected, with the argument-ending statement “I suppose you Syrians want to fight the war in Palestine to the last Trans Jordanian”. Thus while Trans Jordanians’ desire for a truce, augmented by the shortness of supplies of ammunition calculated on June 10 to exist in seven days supply and by Abdullah’s desire not to fritter away his army, his principal defense against his antagonists in the Arab world, it would also appear that the British pressure exerted at Amman and at Cairo also greatly influenced Arab acceptance of the truce.
One interesting detail, which cannot be fitted into the picture of negotiations for the truce as usually reported, is the statement made to Secretary Ireland by Mr. Ralph Bunche, of the staff of Count Folke Bernadotte, that Count Bernadotte had received notes, about June 5 or 6, from the Lebanon, Syrian, Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Governments stating that Egyptian representatives had been authorized to act on behalf of these governments in consultations with him. In view of the role played by the representatives of the individual countries in agreeing to a truce and in subsequent conversations in the Arab League Committee meeting here it would appear that these notes are no longer effective. On the other hand should Mr. Bunche’s account of the existence of these notes be accurate it would seem to point to a grouping of Arab states under the egis of Egypt against the Hashimis and to contradict a rumor current in some circles that Saudi Arabia and Egypt have recently been drawing apart in their foreign policy.
Azzam Pasha’s expressed pessimism as to final results to be achieved by Count Bernadotte may also be of interest to the Department. His further views as the period of truce progress draws to a close will be reported as they become available.
Respectfully yours,