Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/6–648

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)¹

secret

[Washington,] June 6, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Beeley, U.K. Delegation
	Mr. Allen, British Embassy
	Mr. Bromley, British Embassy
	Mr. Henderson, NEA
	Mr. Satterthwaite, NEA
	Mr. Villard, S/P
	Mr. McClintock, UNA
	Mr. Kopper, NEA
	Mr. Merriam, NE
	Mr. Wilkins, NE
	Mr. Mattison, NE

Mr. Beeley called at his request for the purpose of having an informal and personal exchange of views on the current situation in Palestine and the future possibilities.

Principal points made by Mr. Beeley were:

1) It was considered of highest importance that the British and United States Governments keep “in step” on the Palestine question and avoid giving an appearance of disunity to the outside world.

2) That the cooperation in the last two weeks had been heartening. The British on their side had put extreme pressure on the Arab States to accede to the May 29 resolution. This pressure had been successful largely due to the reservoir of good will which the British had built up with the Arab States because of their attitude vis-à-vis the Palestine question.

3) The British, in obtaining Arab consent had made commitments with regard to their interpretation of the crucial question of immigration, particularly with regard to men of military age on Cyprus. They hoped that we would support them in their interpretation should the question be raised in the Security Council.

4) That as far as an eventual settlement of the Palestine problem went, the British believed that it might be possible to secure Arab acquiescence to the establishment of a Jewish State if there were boundary modifications particularly in the Negeb. This would enable the Arab countries to have a land bridge between their capitals. A Jewish State lying across their lines of communication had been one of the chief causes of concern to the Arab leaders.

5) That the British Government would not easily give up the idea of a Federal State, which they regarded as the most practical solution.

In reply to Mr. Beeley’s points, I made the following personal observations:

1) That in my opinion the position of the United States Government was such that it could not support any measure which did not provide for the establishment of a Jewish State substantially along the lines envisaged in the November 29 resolution. The Jews had, in fact, a state, and we had recognized it. We would probably follow a policy of continuing to recognize it unless the Zionists of their own accord merged it into some other entity.

2) If territorial modifications were proposed, such as the Negeb, we might find it necessary to ask for a quid pro quo such as the cession of Western Gallilee to the Jewish State. In any event, modifications would have to be acquiesced in by the Jews.

3) That with respect to point 3 which we substantially concurred with the British interpretation of the resolution, we wished to avoid if possible debate on that subject in the Security Council, and preferred to have Count Bernadotte rule on the question.

I also took occasion to raise with Mr. Beeley the question as to the attitude of the British Government in the event that a settlement was reached which gave southern Palestine to the Arabs. Would it be to their strategic advantage to have the Arab territory ceded to Abdullah? Mr. Beeley felt that it would be of definite strategic value, because of the possible port development at Gaza. As things stood at present, the British had no land connection from the sea to Transjordan.

I also asked Mr. Beeley what he thought the British attitude would be in the following circumstances: If warfare should continue in Palestine, it might become necessary for the United States to lift its arms embargo. With immigration and arms it was quite likely that the Jews would win. Extremist elements might push on into Transjordan (raids have already occurred into Transjordan). What would be the British reaction to such attacks? Mr. Beeley replied that the British Government would have no alternative under its treaty with Transjordan but to repulse such attacks.

1. Drafted by Mr. Mattison.