Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/6–148

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] June 1, 1948.

On June 1, 1948 Mr. Epstein informed me that he had received a telegram from Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv in which the Provisional Government of Israel accepted the Security Council’s request for a cease fire of May 29.¹ A copy of the text of this telegram as taken down over the telephone is attached.

Mr. Epstein said that he had been instructed by Mr. Shertok to request the support of the United States Government for Israel’s acceptance of the Security Council’s cease fire on the basis of the five assumptions; contained therein.² I told Mr. Epstein that I would communicate with my superior officers and would communicate with him later.

The attached text was subsequently discussed by Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer³ and Mr. McClintock with Mr. Lovett. On instructions from Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer and Mr. McClintock I telephoned Mr. Epstein that the Department regarded Mr. Shertok’s telegram of June 1 as an acceptance of the Security Council’s resolution of May 29 and that, with regard to the five assumptions contained in that telegram, the Department considered such interpretations for determination by the United Nations through the agency of the UN Mediator, the Security Council Truce Commission or the Security Council itself.

Mr. Epstein asked me if we would support their interpretation of the Security Council’s resolution of May 29 in the United Nations. I told him that it seemed to me on the basis of the information I had already given him that this question could not be answered at this moment, as it remained to be seen what action the United Nations would take with regard to the assumptions as stated.

Mr. Epstein told me that two main considerations had dictated Israel’s acceptance of the Security Council’s resolution of May 29: (1) Israel’s desire to act in accord with international public opinion, and (2) Israel’s desire to cooperate with the United Nations in its handling of the Palestine question.

1. For text, see SC, 3rd yr, No. 78, p. 2.
2. The assumptions as furnished by Mr. Epstein comprised:
   • “1. That ban on import of arms into territories Arab states enumerated in resolution should apply also to deliveries arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign powers within these territories.
   • “2. That during cease fire armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond areas controlled by them at commencement of cease fire and that each side will be entitled maintain the positions in its military occupation at that time.
   • “3. That freedom of access to Jerusalem will be insured for supply of food and other essentials as well as for normal civilian entry and exit.
   • “4. That any attempt by parties concerned to stop or impede normal transport of goods consigned to Israel and other states concerned will be regarded as an act of armed force.
   • “5. That while provisional government is ready comply with injunction that persons of military age admitted during cease fire should not be mobilized or submitted to military training, its freedom to admit immigrants regardless of age will not be impaired.”
3. Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.