Office of the Historian

501.BB Palestine/5–2748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret   us urgent
niact
London, May 27, 1948—7 p. m.

2312. Following is summary instructions sent by Bevin to Cadogan this afternoon:

1.
While disappointment Arab reply suggests possibility constructive development. Bevin impressed by view apparently held by some Arab leaders that it would be easier for them to agree to cease fire or to negotiate if they were faced with overwhelming UN pressure. Cadogan authorized make statement following lines:
2.
While disappointing Arabs have not accepted SC cease fire resolution Arab reply nevertheless is in conciliatory language and merits careful consideration. Point re SC resolution April 16 is valid and pertinent because this resolution has been broken by all parties concerned. Jews and those who recognize their claim to set up state have offended against provision that no political action should be taken to prejudice positions of either community. Arabs have broken provisions against bringing fighting men into Palestine. Jews have probably done same. HMG has always felt situation must be looked at as whole and that it is unfair to seize on last of series of developments and deal with that in isolation.
3.
Concluding passages Arab reply constitute request to SC to suggest settlement terms for dispute as SC is entitled to do under Article 37.
4.
SC cannot put forward proposals in 24 hours or while actual fighting continues. Object must be to bring fighting to end and create [Page 1066] conditions in which proposals for settlement can be considered. Therefore SC should make renewed effort to secure cease fire and should at same time instruct mediator and truce commission to be ready to use their good offices between two parties both to ensure observance of cease fire to begin discussion of proposals for final settlement.
5.
Cadogan instructed suggest, in order to secure cease fire, it now seems necessary to incorporate some conditions and undertakings going beyond May 22 resolution and leading more directly to search of final settlement. He should say at same time that in view failure of previous recommendation under Chapter 6 HMG recognizes that if present proposals are unsuccessful Chapter 7 will have to be invoked. The SC Resolutions should therefore be cast somewhat in following form:
6.
Preamble showing resolution is without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either party.
7.
Calling for cessation of acts of armed forces and for cease fire.
8.
Calling on both sides to give undertaking not to bring fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine.
9.
Calling on all members of UN and on both sides to refrain from bringing war material into Palestine.
10.
Calling on both sides to be particularly careful re cease-fire Jerusalem and to protect Holy places.
11.
Instructing mediator to verify whether above provisions were being observed and for that purpose to appoint military observers responsible to himself.
12.
Instructing mediator as soon as cease-fire is in force to make contact with both parties in concert with truce commission with view to making recommendations to SC about eventual settlement for Palestine.
13.
Calling on all concerned to give greatest possible assistance to mediator.
14.
Cease-fire would be stated to last say four weeks by which time mediator would report progress to SC.
15.
SC would give short time-limit for replies to this resolution and if it were not accepted SC would consider matter under Chapter 7 with view to determining which party was the aggressor and considering imposition of sanctions. Resolution ends.
16.
Cadogan authorized to announce in SC following decision re British treaty obligations to Arab states:
a)
HMG making immediate arrangements withdraw 21 seconded British officers from Arab Legion in Palestine. HMG has no control over 16 officers not seconded and therefore not subject British instructions.
b)
Re Transjordan subsidy, next quarterly installment due July twelfth. HMG will review situation before that date in light UN decisions.
c)
Re supply war material, if it were decided in pursuance resolution proposed above or independently, that there should be general embargo which would effectively prevent supply of arms to Jews and Arabs alike in Palestine. HMG would be willing to join in such action and stop such small deliveries which HMG’s at present making to Egypt, Iraq, and TJ in completion of existing contracts.1
Douglas
  1. Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, opined that “Bevin’s instructions to Cadogan go as far as we can expect British Government to go in establishing its neutrality toward Palestine” and that “USG should do no less to establish our own neutrality”. He then recommended that “in formulating our policy for use in SC today we should not lightly reject, tout should make every effort to accommodate our position to the British proposal which seems to me to be first important milestone on road ahead for genuine US–UK collaboration on this problem”. (Telegram 2313, from London, 501.BB Palestine/5–2748)↩