Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/5–2748

Memorandum Prepared, in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs¹

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Effect of the Repeal of the Arms Embargo To Permit Aid to Israel

In the opinion of United States diplomatic and military observers in the Near Eastern capitals, repeal of the United States arms embargo in favor of the Jews would be regarded throughout the Near East as a virtual American alliance with the Jewish war effort and an American declaration of war against the Arab States. Such a move would immediately evoke hostile and violent mob reactions against the United States and irreparably damage American-Arab relations. It would result in the destruction of American tactical and strategic security throughout the entire Near East, and would lead ultimately to the loss of the American stake in this area.

The specific effects of repeal of the arms embargo would be the following:

(1) The security of United States Government officials and American citizens in the Arab States and in Arab-occupied areas of Palestine would be in jeopardy, making evacuation of American citizens advisable prior to or immediately following repeal.

(2) United States Government property, American educational institutions, oil installations and other private property in the Arab States and in Arab areas of Palestine would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction to the lifting of the arms embargo. In Egypt, American investments might eventually be excluded entirely.

(3) Although the Governments of the Arab States would endeavor to maintain the security of their local Jewish communities, it might be impossible to control local reactions, particularly in the event of Arab military reverses arising from the lifting of the embargo. Expected attacks on local Jews might spread to anti-foreign demonstrations as well.

(4) Popular hatred of the United States Government and people would be general, intense, and probably lasting in Lebanon. In Egypt, the United States can expect no further political or economic concessions as a result of United States de facto recognition of Israel, and this attitude would be intensified by repeal of the arms embargo. Syria, which considers that an “act of aggression” against the Arabs has already taken place, would shift the major blame to the United States if the embargo were lifted. In Transjordan and Arab-occupied areas of Palestine, the initial reaction against the United States and its citizens would be extremely violent.

(5) The attitude of the Arab States and of Palestinian Arabs towards the United Nations and the Western world, currently one of disillusionment and cynicism, would be intensified if the arms embargo were repealed. Since the United Nations and the United States positions on Palestine are generally regarded as synonymous, the United States could be expected to bear the major blame. Eventually, this would either lead to repudiation of the West, as in Syria, or the consolidation of the British position at the expense of the United States, as in Transjordan and Arab areas of Palestine.

(6) The effect on the preservation of law and order would be to prolong hostilities in Palestine; to jeopardize public security in Lebanon and to provide a powerful weapon for local demagogues in Syria; to endanger American lives and property in Palestine; and to increase the possibility of anti-foreign, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian violence throughout the Moslem world.

1. Transmitted to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison) in a memorandum of May 27 by Mary E. Hope of the same Division; it summarized telegram 598, May 25, from Cairo and telegrams 599 from Cairo, 214 from Beirut, 326 from Damascus, and 751 from Jerusalem, each dated May 26. These telegrams were sent in reply to a Departmental circular telegram of May 24, 1 a. m., which had requested appraisals of the six factors covered in the memorandum.