501.BB Palestine/5–2648: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
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326. There are three possibilities with regard to the response of the Arab Govts to the SC cease-fire order of May 22, the extended dateline of which terminates at noon, EST, today:
- 1.
- Affirmative response to cease-fire order.
- 2.
- Qualified acceptance of cease-fire, predicated on conditions laid down by Arab Govts.
- 3.
- Flat rejection of cease-fire order.
If Arab States accept the cease-fire there is obviously no problem and Ambassador Austin’s remarks will be congratulatory. However, if, as seems more probable, Arab Govts seek to attach conditions as prerequisite to their complying with cease-fire order, following line of action is suggested:
If conditions attached to compliance with cease-fire seem possible of negotiation with Jewish authorities you should urge on Council that it today propose to Arab Govts that their conditions not be regarded as prerequisite to observing the cease-fire order but that ceasefire take effect immediately while their conditions are negotiated out with Jews as basis for more extended truce. This would seem well within purview of SC resolution of May 22, which calls upon all govts and authorities, without prejudice to rights, claims or position of parties concerned, to abstain from hostile military action in Palestine. You should urge in strongest possible terms that there is a duty on both parties to this conflict to prevent further bloodshed and to make possible reestablishment of peace in Palestine. Reference should also be made, in discussing conditions of cease-fire to permit negotiation, to the useful functions of SC Truce Commission and the UN Mediator who is empowered, under Paragraph 1(a) (iii) of GA resolution of May 14, to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.
If either Jews or Arabs reject foregoing proposal this would be regarded as further refusal to comply with SC cease-fire requests.
If Arabs Govts flatly reject the SC cease-fire order, problems of very grave importance arise. Although you should make no reference to the fact, Council will then be confronted by question whether it should seek to impose cease-fire under threat of sanctions, presumably commencing with those measures outlined in Article 41.
Dept requests your best estimate of disposition of other members of SC to vote such sanctions. For your secret info Dept is giving intensive [Page 1055] study to this problem. We do not, however, desire to see action taken in this regard until we know (a) whether Council will in fact vote for universal sanctions to be applied by all members of UN against parties failing to observe cease-fire order and (b) sufficient time is had to safeguard American citizens residing in Near East. Dept does not favor the imposition of unilateral sanctions.1
In consequence of foregoing considerations, should Arab response be flat refusal of cease-fire order, you should state that this presents a new and serious development in the Palestine situation upon which you must consult immediately with your govt. For your info we would, in light of President’s recognition of State of Israel, consider that an Arab agreement to observe cease-fire, on condition that State of Israel be regarded as non-existent, was an outright refusal of cease-fire order.
- As originally drafted, this sentence continued as follows: “per se, but, of course, relaxation of our arms embargo would, if decided upon by the President, be regarded by the Arabs as a unilateral sanction and would have immediate and grave repercussions upon US interests in Arab area”. These words were deleted by Mr. Lovett.↩