Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/5–2548: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, May 25, 1948—8 p. m.

2267. Embassy’s 2213, May 21 [22].

1. Further evidence British Government shares my concern re gulf widening between US and British over Palestine was calibre group assembled by Attlee and Bevin this morning at latter’s private residence for secrecy purposes (Embassy’s 2225, May 22, paragraph 7). Besides persons named above, present were Secretary State for Commonwealth Relations, Minister Defence, Lord Tedder of Air Ministry, Vice-Admiral Sir J. Edelston of Admiralty, Lt. General Templer of War Office, Major General Hollis of Ministry of Defence, Sir Orme Sargent and F. K. Roberts of Foreign Office. I was accompanied by Lewis Jones. Purpose of gathering was to make available to USG through me latest British views re political and strategic aspects Palestine problem.

2. Re strategic implications, Tedder said that strategically Palestine is not problem Arabs vs Jews but one of geography since Palestine is not only part of Middle East bridge between east and west, but also between Asia and Africa. British Chief of Staff believe Middle East is “other foot” of defense of UK and western Europe and that this also true with regard to USG vis-à-vis USSR because trans-polar route is “inadequate” and not likely be decisive. Tedder said Middle East oil is vital militarily both in peace and war. Speaking for British Chief of Staff, Tedder said that Moslem ideology is one of world’s strongest, embracing as it does area from Casablanca through Pakistan into Indonesia. British Chief of Staff believe Moslem ideology capable of being worked up along anti-western lines because of Palestine and if this happens it will constitute almost insuperable military problem. Tedder said that military criteria for Palestine solution were first, that it must not be one which would open Palestine to Soviet influence and, second, not be one which will alienate Moslem good-will towards US and UK. It is plain USSK wants to be in Middle East for same reasons US and UK wish to keep USSR out.

3. Re sanctions, Bevin said it is susceptibility Middle East countries to Soviet influence which in large measure caused him to take such a firm stand against UN sanctions. Few people seem to remember far-reaching difficulties experienced with 1935 sanctions against Mussolini which proved that there is no such thing as “half-sanctions”: i.e., if applied to Middle East countries we could not hope to continue to get oil from these countries or to continue oil development and pipeline programs considered so vital militarily and for recovery of Europe. There is no doubt in his mind that very least Moslem states would do would be to ignore sanctions and this would in itself tend to pit west versus east. Bevin said Iraq offered excellent test re results sanctions. Iraqi Government is already tottering and has asked British Government for funds pay current expenses. Effect sanctions on Iraq (stopping oil royalties and oil exports) would be to topple Iraqi Government into chaos. Bevin had hoped that by this time in conjunction with USG large irrigation project in Iraq along lines TVA would have been started. Palestine has stopped this project because any funds or support given Iraq at this time would result in accusations this done to help fight Jews. If Iraq in which Communists already have strong foothold should be pauperized by sanctions it would be wonderful opportunity for USSR to intervene. British military intelligence recently reported secret offer by USSR to back Iraqi currency with gold loan.

4. I inquired where British Government thought Pakistan stood on Palestine question and was told that mainspring Pakistan is Moslem faith. Pakistan who regard themselves as leaders Moslem world, are showing not only solidarity with Arabs but also disturbing tendency to strengthen ties with USSR. It is not unlikely Pakistan token force may be sent Palestine and GOP would certainly not apply sanctions. Interestingly enough Palestine is one of few issues on which GOI and GOP see eye to eye.

5. Regarding Iran, Bevin said that Azerbaijan incident had already shown Iran’s susceptibility to Soviet machinations. He thought Iran which as UN member would be called upon to apply sanctions would not comply and would be drawn into any Moslem anti-west orientation and in this event would serve as door to Soviet expansion.

6. Regarding Turkey, Bevin expressed view that if Arab countries are driven to adopt anti-west attitude, this coupled with Iranian weakness would do what Turks have always feared most—encircle Turkey—which “would then become a satellite”.

7. Regarding military sanctions, Tedder said flatly “these were impractical” and Attlee asked “who would do it?” Bevin said speaking for himself, he was not willing advise UK take part in military sanctions. He understood USG unwilling to take leading role military sanctions: If this were true “military sanctions would be left largely to USSR”.

8. Bevin said Arab states now fighting in Arab Palestine are in “state of desperation” which could rapidly be converted to the “anti-west movement which we fear”. He had felt impelled during recent weeks to be “fair” (Embassy’s 2182, May 20¹) lest Arab tie with west via UK be severed.

9. Tedder expressed opinion that Jews, whose forces are numerically superior by about four to one and who are better armed, are likely win first phase fighting although that does not mean that “in matter of years Arab guerillas cannot wear down Jews”. Fact is neither Arabs nor Jews can get on without one another and “if we can hold the ring” best hope is fighting stalemate in which both sides will face necessity of living at peace with one another. What Tedder feared was repetition of civil war in Spain during which both sides were supplied with arms by different sets of outside powers.

10. Bevin said most important objective at moment is achieving cease-fire (Embassy’s 2251, May 25) and he thought next 48 hours might give opportunity to grapple with Palestine situation. Tedder said it would be extremely difficult for Arabs to establish effective cease-fire quickly. Bevin said this was true particularly with regard to Iraqi and Syrian volunteers. He thought cease-fire orders would be obeyed by armies of Egypt and Transjordan. However, Arabs are wary regarding Jewish promises since Jerusalem cease-fire was broken by Jews. What would make Arabs accept cease-fire order “almost certainly” would be statement by Jews that their cease-fire will include Irgun and Stern gang and that Jews for duration cease-fire will not permit immigration or will at least limit it to women and children (paragraph one, Embassy’s 2251, May 25). On first point it is likely USSR will endeavor incite Stern gang to break cease-fire; on second point Arabs know majority new Jewish immigrants are fighting men and ask rather naturally “if Jews bring in fighters by sea, why should we not do so by land?” Bevin hopes USG would urge the Jews, possibly through Weizmann, to make immediate statement this sense and said for his part he would advise Arabs not to set strict condition as price acceptance cease-fire.

11. I emphasized depth of resentment in US re presence in Arab Legion of British officers who are popularly believed in US to be actually leading Arab Legion contingents in Jerusalem fighting.

12. Bevin said result of this meeting, he hoped, would be to lay foundation for US and UK working together re Palestine “which must be moved to sphere where it can no longer poison US–UK relations”.

13. I said that I thought it would be helpful for British officers to be withdrawn from all participation in Jerusalem fighting and asked for precise information on this subject.

In reply representative British Chief of Staff stated that there was one regiment Arab Legion involved in Jerusalem fighting. He drew distinction between 30 British officers plus four or five enlisted men seconded to Arab Legion and soldiers of fortune of British nationality such as Glubb Pasha. Latter stated not to be under British Government control any more than were American soldiers of fortune in South American revolution. (While drafting this telegram I was advised that latest Foreign Office information is that no British officers in Arab Legion are engaged in fighting old city Jerusalem). Until today there was one volunteer British officer and one other British officer in Arab Legion in new city. These two are being withdrawn and Kirkbride at Amman has been instructed make every effort ensure Abdullah will withdraw all British officers (whether regular or volunteer), from Jerusalem area. Regular British officers, according Tedder, have in any case standing orders to leave their Legion units from moment units enter Jewish part Palestine, which has not occurred despite presence Jewish forces western Galilee and other Arab areas.

14. It is clear that Bevin hopes that considerations which emerged from this meeting will be kept in view by both US and UK in shaping their future policies re Palestine. Bevin feels that if agreement can be reached on assessment basic factors, US and UK will be at least half-way towards alignment of their policies.²

Douglas

1. Not printed.
2. Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, forwarded his reflections on the meetings discussed in this telegram, stating that “genuine hope of US–UK cooperation in solving Palestine problem exists only if neither government is so carried away with emotional factors as to back either one or other side for military victory. Peace in Palestine, not a sweeping victory by either Arabs or Jews, should be common US–UK objective. … we need a truce between the US and the UK under which both governments undertake to deal with two sides in Palestine on same objective footing and in close collaboration.” (Telegram 2304 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5–2748)