867N.01/2–948: Airgram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State
A–36. Continuation of A–35.
III. The Arab Situation.
Since the report under reference, the principal development has been the influx of uniformed and trained Arabs, principally from Iraq and Syria. These men are said to head for the Tubas area, where they are immediately assigned to various groups already operating in the country. These groups have been identified in the Western Galilee, Ramleh–Lydda–Tulkarm, Jerusalem and Hebron districts. They have carried out several fairly large attacks on Jewish settlements, and have made persistent raids on trains in the Tulkarm area.
It is generally believed that the Arabs have gone so far as to set up areas of command, with Fawzi Kawukji in charge of operations north of a line from the Jordan to Nablus to the sea, and Abdul Kader Husseini in control of Arab units to the south of that line. These men are both experienced guerilla fighters. Coordination of the two is said to be in the hands of Ismal Safwat of Iraq.
[Page 610]With respect to the train raids, official figures indicate that the following amounts of foodstuffs were captured in this manner by Arabs between December 1 and 28:
- 120 tons wheat and barley
- 30 tons rice
- 190 tons flour
- 15 tons sugar
- 20 tons oranges
- 43 cows
In addition to the foregoing, the official list also adds the following items acquired by Arabs in the same manner:
- 100 tons of wood
- 190 tons cement
- 220 bags of mail
- 100 tons miscellaneous goods.
Official figures for January have not been published, but it is expected that they will at least equal those above. In fact, on January 30 the Food Controller of the Palestine Government found it necessary to issue a warning of serious suffering from food shortage if these raids continue.
Arab markets are glutted with food supplies. Ordinarily, a large part of Arab produce found its way to Jewish markets. Poultry, fresh vegetables and fruit are particularly abundant, though it is generally difficult to approach Arab markets in Jerusalem. The Consulate General has commenced obtaining food supplies from the Bethlehem market, which the French Consulate General has been doing for some time.
Manufactured products generally, and pharmaceuticals in particular, are not in plentiful supply in the Arab areas.
In Jerusalem, the Arab grip on the Old City remains firm. They hold all gates leading in, and “only armored British convoys get through with food for the 1500 Jews who have been cut off practically since the U.N. decision. The Arabs must also be considered in control of all roads leading from Jerusalem. The Nablus and Hebron roads are not, of course, used by Jews, though the British occasionally take a convoy along the latter route. The offensive nature of the Arab position on the vital Jerusalem–Tel Aviv highway can easily be seen by the conditions besetting the Jews who wish to travel on it: they must be in armored buses, which must travel in groups escorted either by British or Jewish armored cars.
A good deal of information is received on the alleged Arab intention to stay clear of the British, and to date it must be said that the Arabs have avoided giving battle to British units when the latter have intervened in settlement raids or highway ambushes. With armed bands [Page 611] coming into the country at a steady pace, however, it remains to be seen whether Arab leaders can direct and control the energies of their followers to the extent they might desire. Even as it is, British troops are frequently held up by Arabs and their arms removed, and with the increase of Arab manpower, large-scale clashes with the British may become unavoidable.
While rumors of internal Arab dissension are, as usual, to be heard, we agree with the view Messrs. Clayton1 and Beeley recently expressed to an officer of the Embassy at London, that no Arab approaches the Mufti’s stature in the eyes of Palestinian Arabs. He is the central figure on the Arab stage, and, as in other days, his organization shows itself to be ruthless in the pursuit of its aims. However, it is obvious that a great deal of Arab internal dissension exists, which may possibly weaken Arab action.
Insistent demands for more men and money often appear in the Palestine Arabic press, these demands frequently being coupled with the rhetorical question as to whether the Arabs of surrounding countries wish to see their Palestinian brethren go under in the face of the combined assault of Jewish men and money—aided by alleged British favoritism.
But whatever their dissatisfaction, Arab attention is mainly riveted: on the activities of their guerrillas. They see and hear of the arrival of units from the surrounding states. They have food in their markets and their young men, if unemployed, may join the “National Guard”. The clamor in the Jewish press concerning alleged “sabotage” of the U.N. decision by influential American and British officials encourages them. The prospect of U.N. intervention seems remote. They know of, and count on, U.S.–U.S.S.R. dissensions to block such intervention and thereby enable them to come to grips with the Jews.
(Section IV, “The British Situation”, contained in A–37.2)