867N.01/5–2248
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Summary of a Telegram From the Foreign Office Reporting a Conversation on Palestine Between Mr. Bevin and the United States Ambassador in London on the 22nd May
On the 21st May, I sent a message to Mr. Douglas that I should like to see him on the morning of the 22nd May to discuss further the question of Palestine, and, in particular, our grave concern at the increasing divergences of American and British policy on this question.
2. In the course of a long talk with Mr. Douglas this morning (22nd May), I said that we had made great progress with the United States over the questions of ERP, the Brussels Treaty and security measures for Europe. We were perturbed at the possible consequences of a continued drift apart. I said that changes in United States policy and some of the initiatives taken had left us bewildered and frustrated. Although His Majesty’s Government had not felt able to agree to certain of the United States proposals, they had brought heavy and successful pressure to bear on the Arab Governments to withhold action until the 15th May in spite of constant Jewish provocation. On [Page 1035] the 14th May, we had been insistently urging the Arab States to agree to the United States truce proposals. But the immediate de facto recognition of the Jewish State by the United States Government had cut the ground from under the efforts which we were making, not entirely unsuccessfully, with the Arabs on the basis of these United States proposals.
3. United States recognition of the provisional Jewish Government was followed by the sudden introduction into the Security Council of the United States resolution proposing action under Article 39. If we agreed to the American proposal, we should be opening the door to Soviet intervention in the Middle East, and since no other powers were, so far as we knew, prepared to participate in consequential action, the result must be to discredit still further the United Nations.
4. I felt strongly that the implications of the present situation and of any remedial action in the United Nations designed to meet it needed to be very fully and carefully thought out. Palestine was a question of deep concern to the countries of the Middle East, to Pakistan and to other countries with Moslem inhabitants. American policy was antagonising these nations and making them feel that considerations of justice and fair dealing were being subordinated to electoral pressure from the Zionists in New York. All the facts unfavourable to the Arabs were being emphasised and none of the facts unfavourable to the Jews. Take the case of Jerusalem, the High Commissioner had succeeded in securing the agreement of both parties to a cease-fire for eight days and the agreement of the Arabs to a truce. The Jews had refused a truce and had then proceeded to break the cease-fire. That was the reason why fighting was now taking place in Jerusalem, and who could justly blame the Arabs? The Jews had occupied Jaffa and Acre, both of them Arab cities, as well as a large part of Western Gallilee. These facts were overlooked or concealed. His Majesty’s Government were trying to hold the balance even to prevent international action which would be as unjust as it would be unwise. But for this they were being abused and threatened.
5. I made it plain to Mr. Douglas that His Majesty’s Government would not abandon the line which they believed to be right. But I was genuinely concerned at where all this was leading. The attitude of the whole Moslem world, and American and British interests in the Middle East, were at stake. I appealed for measured discussion between us of all the issues involved before matters proceeded further.
6. Mr. Douglas said that he fully agreed that it was most important that we should discuss and weigh together the whole range of political and strategic questions involved before either of us took further action, and said that he would inform his Government of my views.
7. We have therefore agreed to supply Mr. Douglas with an appreciation [Page 1036] of the position in relation to defence and of likely developments arising from the Palestine situation throughout the Middle East, India and Burma. He will discuss this with his Government, and it has also been arranged that he should meet myself, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff here on this matter on the 25th May.
8. I earnestly trust that the United States Government will respond to our plea, and will suspend any further attempt to invoke Article 39 of the Charter or to raise their arms embargo pending the proposed joint review of the whole situation.1
- In an attached memorandum of May 24 to Mr. Lovett, the Secretary of State advised that he had read to President Truman the summary of the British Foreign Office telegram, “together with related documents particularly Douglas’ message and his views. The President approves the proposal of Mr. Bevin in paragraph 8.” In a marginal notation, Mr. Humelsine stated that he had read the Secretary’s memorandum to Messrs. Henderson, Hickerson, and Rusk and that “Action already had been taken at the time of my reading on the para. 8 proposal toy Mr. Henderson.” Ambassador Douglas’ message and views are contained in his telegrams 2213 and 2225, both dated May 22, pp. 1031 and 1032.↩