PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947–1948.
Memorandum by the Undersecretary of State (Lovett) to the Secretary of State
I forward the attached memorandum1 on the subject of Palestine from the Policy Planning Staff with concurrence in their recommendation that the course which this Government embarks upon should be cleared with the National Security Council after careful consideration. (You will recall, in this connection, that you presented the memorandum outlining the course of action now being followed in the Security Council to the President when you were accompanied by Mr. Rusk, and that the President approved the procedures being followed.2)
I am unable, however, to join the Policy Planning Staff in the views expressed in their January 19 and January 29 papers on this subject insofar as they state that “this Government should not take any action which would bring us into a conflict with the British over the Palestine issue”. I would gladly agree if the policy were to join the British when they are right and oppose them when they are wrong. I cannot believe that the United States should give the British an implied warrant to take any course of action they may choose, however irresponsible, provocative, or unjust. I feel that this Government should endeavor to [Page 1022] cooperate fully and loyally with the British and that it should try to reach agreement on a parallel course of action wherever possible, but I think that it is of at least equal importance that this Government pursue a course which it feels to be just and in keeping with the obligations we have undertaken as a member of the United Nations. If this brings us into conflict with the British, I think we should face up to this fact and not join them in actions we feel to be improper merely to avoid the conflict.
I agree fully with the Policy Planning Staff that major responsibility for the maintenance and security of a Jewish state in Palestine should not be assumed by this Government. It is my understanding that the present policy of this country is to act only as a member of the United Nations and, as such a member, to undertake only its pro rata share of any obligation accepted by the United Nations, and then only if other countries do likewise.
It is hard for me to follow a line of reasoning which suggests, by implication at least, that “a process of disintegration in the United Nations” is initiated by the United Nations carrying out its primary functions—to maintain international peace and security. It would seem to me to be equally logical to suggest that, if the United Nations does not exercise its appropriate functions in the preservation of international peace and security, it seals its own doom.3
- Supra.↩
- See the initial paragraph of Secretary Marshall’s memorandum of May 17 to Mr. Lovett, p. 1007.↩
- Marshall S. Carter, in a memorandum of May 25, transmitted to
Secretary Marshall the memoranda by Messrs. Kennan and Lovett,
noting that “the Policy Planning Staff has been recording its deep
apprehensions over the Palestine policy for about the last six or
eight months.” A marginal notation by the Secretary states: “I read
this and agree with Lovett.”
In a memorandum of June 3 to Secretary Marshall and to Mr. Lovett, George H. Butler cited a meeting of the Policy Planning Staff the day before, when “It was agreed that we should begin immediately to develop a paper on Palestine and its overall policy implications, particularly with respect to the Middle East, for submission to you and eventual clearance through the National Security Council.” The memoranda by Carter and Butler are filed in the Policy Planning Staff papers, PPS Files, Lot 64 D563, Near and Middle East, 1947–1948.
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