501.BB Palestine/5–1148: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
628. From Ross. Following are my notes on further telegram Beeley has received from Foreign Office on status of negotiations here. This telegram is based on comparison in London of two alternative draft texts.
Foreign Office considerably more negative today than yesterday on question of trusteeship, and greatly prefers resolution along lines Anglo-Canadian text. UKDel instructed to concentrate on securing approval of resolution along lines Creech Jones proposal in simplest terms. Much of telegram detailed and now out of date so will record in memorandum. Principal points to note here are:
- (1)
- Foreign Office feels great advantage in building on the existing Truce Commission.
- (2)
- Foreign Office cites objection to Anglo-American draft as not providing means of isolating conflict and preventing means of penetration (Russia). To meet this defect UK instruction suggests adding new point running as follows: “To take all practical steps to secure observance of SC truce resolution 17 April and with this object to seek advice and assistance from other powers as it may be necessary.”
Hopkins (Canada) also feels strongly need of some provision, regardless of form of GA action which will provide opportunity of assistance re Russian penetration and isolating conflict, if needed, outside of SC framework, and handed me following formula in separate conversation this afternoon:
“The Commission (administering authority) may seek advice and assistance in the exercise of its functions from any member of the UN (state) willing to provide such advice and assistance.”
In conversation with Beeley, referred to above, I told him we expected our instructions this afternoon and we would want to work very closely with them in developing program we might, be able to agree upon.
I told him I wanted to say a few things very frankly on a personal basis and made clear I
I said very unlikely we would approve trusteeship but for reasons somewhat different than UK Government’s views. Principal difficulty was improbability success of truce efforts before May 15; this difficulty resulting from very noticeable stiffening Jewish attitude resulting, in [Page 971] turn, from temptation they obviously reveal to play with Abdullah idea.1
Second reason, I said, for probability we would not push Trusteeship idea further was that before we made our original trusteeship, proposal three or four weeks ago we had asked the British if they would be willing to participate in necessary implementation and had got what must be described as flatly negative response. Show of cooperation by UK during past three or four days and indication of participation in effective action by naval patrol, etc., must be described as eleventh hour effort but too little and too late. Time at present was too short to permit working out details of such cooperation. For this reason, approach, I anticipated we would be getting in our instructions this afternoon, would be a very simple one and I hoped our close cooperation over past few days could be continued. [Ross.]
- Jerusalem reported, on May 10, that a spokesman for the Jewish Agency “hinted broadly that there was an understanding with Abdullah whereby Transjordan forces would occupy areas allotted to Arabs under partition plan. He said that the Jews and Abdullah got along well and that they placed little stock in bellicose statements Abdullah, pushed by Arab states, was making.” (Telegram 585, 867N.01/5–1048)↩