Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/5–848

Memorandum by Mr. Dean Rusk to the Secretary of State

confidential

[New York,] May 8 [7?],¹ 1948.

The fact that Mr. Moshe Shertok wishes to see you before his departure for Jerusalem is of considerable significance. There is a bitter debate going on within the Jewish Agency on the subject of the truce and the basic decision will be made upon Mr. Shertok’s arrival in Palestine. Moderate elements within the Agency such as Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Epstein and possibly Shertok himself strongly favor a truce. More extreme elements such as Rabbi Silver and Ben Gurion are pressing for the immediate establishment of the Jewish State by force if necessary.

It is believed that our proposed Articles of Truce (Tab A)² will be the subject of Mr. Shertok’s visit. The following comments on specific articles are furnished for your background in preparation for this talk:

Articles 1, 2 and 3

Articles 1, 2 and 3 are based upon a truce resolution already passed by the Security Council (Tab B)³. There does not appear to be any serious difference between Jews and Arabs on these three articles although the application of certain phrases will undoubtedly lead to minor issues before the Security Council Truce Commission. For example, the definition of “fighting personnel” in Article 2 may cause trouble since the Arabs will attempt to interpret that as meaning personnel of military age. In Article 3 the Security Council resolution includes a prohibition of the “acquisition” of arms by either party. The Jews have pointed out that this does not prevent the indirect acquisition of arms by the Arabs via the Arab States and also that Jews can acquire arms indirectly for the use of the Jewish Agency. Since the essence of the truce problem is to prevent the importation of arms into Palestine, the present Article 3 is restricted to importation.

Article 4

Article 4 represents an attempt to reconcile (a) the demand of the Jews that invading Arab bands be expelled from Palestine and (b) the demand of the Arabs that large numbers of illegal Jewish immigrants be expelled from Palestine. For the purpose of the truce, Article 4 would leave it to the Security Council Truce Commission to determine that those who have been guilty of certain acts contrary to the truce may be either expelled from the country or placed in custody in Palestine. Obviously this may become difficult to apply, but in major cases it will be useful to have agreement to such a principle.

Article 5

Article 5 is the most important single article because it attempts to deal with the problem of statehood. The Jews wish to organize and declare an independent Jewish State on May 15. The Arabs are determined to fight against such a Jewish State and are fearful of any move which would appear to implement partition. In addition, the Arabs can be expected to proclaim a state for Palestine as a whole which will seek the assistance of the neighboring Arab States to maintain it against the Jews. This assistance from the Arab States will take the form of direct military intervention, at least by Transjordan. The present wording of Article 5 has been carefully drawn to recognize existing Arab and Jewish authorities in Palestine in such a way as not to prejudice (at least in theory) a final political settlement. The application of the terms of this article to certain local situations in Palestine will prove to be difficult and will give the Security Council Truce Commission a substantial negotiating problem. However, it is believed that the present draft (a) permits the Jews to exercise the authority which they already are exercising in Jewish areas and (b) by dealing with existing authorities as “Temporary Truce Regimes” postpones the problem of recognition of permanent Jewish and Arab authorities until the future government of Palestine can be negotiated further.

Article 6

Article 6 contains a single prohibition against the proclamation of a sovereign state by either Arabs or Jews in a part or all of Palestine. This provision appears essential since such a proclamation on either side would be treated as an immediate casus belli by the other.

Articles 7, 8 and 9

These articles deal with certain minimum administrative arrangements which appear to be essential if the truce is not followed by some provision for a government of Palestine. As they now stand, they do not appear too controversial as between Jews and Arabs.

Article 10

Article 10 represents a standstill in existing legislation, subject to changes specially authorized by the Security Council Truce Commission. In a disturbed and disorganized situation such as can be expected beginning May 15, there is considerable value in maintaining existing laws in order to stabilize the enormous complex of individual and commercial rights and obligations required by the community. However, the maintenance of existing laws raises the difficult question of land purchase and land tenure. The Jews will wish to amend these laws in one direction, the Arabs in the other. On balance, the Arabs would prefer the status quo. If Mr. Shertok objects to Article 10, you should tell him that we believe Article 10 could be negotiated further without upsetting the possibility of a truce.

Article 11

This article is second only to Article 5 in importance since it deals with immigration. In principle the Arabs want no immigration at all, and the Jews want full Jewish control of unrestricted Jewish immigration. During the course of negotiations, the Arabs indicated a willingness to “acquiesce” in a monthly quota of 1500 since that is the present arrangement under the mandate explained as a part of a general standstill. The Jews would not accept a figure substantially lower than 4000 per month. By Article 11 the parties would agree to accept the authority of the Security Council Truce Commission to deal with this question on the theory that immigration alone is not worth the impending warfare. Nevertheless, it will be necessary for the United States, France and Belgium to indicate both to the Jews and Arabs the basis on which the Security Council Truce Commission expects to deal with immigration. Our formula on this is as follows: The Security Council Truce Commission will concern itself only with a monthly quota of 1500 as a continuation of the status quo. The Truce Commission, the Jews and the Arabs, however, are aware of British determination to move 18,000 to 20,000 Jews from camps in Cyprus to Palestine over the course of the next few months. Our suggestion is that the Security Council Truce Commission not interfere with such British plans, but leave to the British the question of making their own peace with the Arabs and the Jews on the manner in which the move from Cyprus is carried out. This would give the Arabs a chance to accept a status quo in principle and submit to the British evacuation of Cyprus as a step involved in the liquidation of the mandate. It would give the Jews from 4000 to 6000 immigrants per month during the course of the truce, depending upon the duration of the truce.

Article 12

This article has two purposes: (a) to emphasize the protection of the Holy Places, and (b) to open the way for special arrangements for the City of Jerusalem. Apart from the Holy Places, the Jerusalem problem is serious from the standpoint of the Jews because there are approximately 100,000 Jews in that city who are surrounded by Arabs and are in the position of hostages. A substantial Jewish military effort would be required to maintain and protect the Jews in Jerusalem. Hence, the Jews are most anxious for some international arrangement which would relieve them of this burden. For your own private information, our interest in special arrangements for Jerusalem are based not only upon public interest in the Holy Places but also upon the support which we are obtaining from large and influential groups of American Jews for a truce effort which includes some arrangement for Jerusalem.

Article 13

This article merely provides three Arab and three Jewish representatives to constitute a Palestine Truce Council to assist the Security Council Truce Commission in carrying out its functions.

Article 14

This article on the duration of the truce is fundamental to the acceptance of the entire scheme by both sides. By its terms, the truce (after a minimum of three months) can be terminated on thirty days notice. This would provide four months for further negotiations on a peaceful settlement. The short duration of the truce is unfortunate since it may be terminated just before the next regular session of the General Assembly and the American elections. Nevertheless, both Jews and Arabs have raised objections to an arrangement which extends over a longer period because each has a number of reservations about the truce and wishes the right to terminate it if its terms become onerous.

Special Note: One point which seriously worries the Jews is the possibility that the Arab States (not bound by the truce) may use the period of the truce greatly to improve their military position while the Jews are prevented by the truce from continuing their own preparations. Shertok will probably want some assurance on our attitude on this question. We do not believe the Jewish fears will materialize. It is more likely that Arab interest in military intervention in Palestine will decline after May 15. However, we have told Shertok that if the truce were signed we would watch developments very carefully and that if we found either side engaging in activities which would upset or abuse the truce, we would take the matter up with other governments and in the Security Council.

General

We have already impressed upon Mr. Shertok the importance we attach to the truce and have made the following points:

1. The United States will make every possible effort to bring about a truce in Palestine in order to stop the fighting and save life.

2. The United States Government considers the Articles of Truce as now drawn to be fair and equitable and is prepared to back these articles in every appropriate way.

3. If a truce is not agreed, we believe that the situation with respect to Palestine will constitute a threat to international peace and will urge the Security Council to take the necessary action to remove that threat to the peace. In connection with such Security Council action, the United States will direct its own policies and conduct in support of the Security Council decisions.

4. If the truce is agreed, we shall support compliance and will oppose violations. If we discover that either party, or outsiders, are taking advantage of the truce to create military advantage for one side or the other, the United States will vigorously oppose such attempts.

5. The United States has no hidden purposes in connection with this truce; we shall act as a member of the Security Council Truce Commission with complete impartiality and in accordance with the terms of the Articles of Truce and the directives which the Security Council may give to the Security Council Truce Commission.

1. A carbon copy of the memorandum, now filed with the record copy, is dated May 7. The editors are of the opinion that the date on the carbon copy is the correct one. Presumably, the Secretariat, on May 8, retyped for the use of the Secretary the carbon copy sent by New York to the Department and gave it the later date. The record copy, dated May 8, bears the Secretary’s initials.
2. Tab A, which bears the heading “Third Provisional Draft; Articles of Truce for Palestine,” dated May 6, 1948, is similar to the draft embodied in the circular telegram, supra.
3. Tab B, not found attached to the source text, was presumably the text of the Security Council Resolution of April 17, p. 827.