867N.01/5–548
The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Secretary of State
immediate
G96/80/48
Dear Mr. Secretary: When we met on the evening of the 3rd May1 you expressed to me the very strong hope that Mr. Bevin would accept the emergency proposals to secure a truce in Palestine which were put to both Jews and Arabs on that day by the United States Delegation to the United Nations. In particular, you hoped that Mr. Bevin would agree to the extension of the Mandate for ten days.
I informed Mr. Bevin immediately of what you had said. As you will no doubt already have heard from Mr. Douglas, Mr. Bevin, while viewing these efforts with all sympathy, feels unable to depart from the date already set for the termination of the Mandate. He has asked me to explain to you the cogent reasons which have impelled His Majesty’s Government to take this decision.
If His Majesty’s Government were to agree to an extension of the Mandate even for a short period, they would be accused by the whole world of double-dealing and the fact of their having sent reinforcements to Palestine would be held as evidence that they never intended to keep to the date of the 15th May. Moreover, if the Jews and Arabs knew that His Majesty’s Government were to be responsible for another ten days, they would no doubt seek to spin out the talks for the extra period and matters would be no further advanced. In Mr. Bevin’s view, it is only by confronting both sides with a definite deadline that even the present willingness to negotiate has been achieved. If the date [Page 907] were now to be changed (and this is in any event precluded by the recent Palestine Act passed by Parliament in the United Kingdom that advantage would be altogether lost.
A telegram from the High Commissioner at Jerusalem indicates that, in addition to the possibility that the retention of British troops in Jerusalem might prejudice the efforts for a truce now being made there by the International Red Cross on the basis of the withdrawal of all troops by the end of the Mandate, considerable difficulties from the military point of view would also attend an extension of the Mandate. In the first place, communications with Jerusalem are daily becoming more difficult and the roads are mined. Secondly, the troops in Jerusalem, being entirely dependent upon oil, are only just able to maintain themselves until the 15th May as the railway is out of action and military oil tankers have left the country. Thirdly, a later departure would raise serious administrative problems, including the deferment of the release of troops. Fourthly, the army would be faced with a serious refugee problem with which they would be unable to cope.
In all these circumstances Mr. Bevin feels compelled to maintain the position he has taken, as defined in his speech to the House of Commons on the 4th May, a copy of the relevant portion of which I enclose.2 But if His Majesty’s Government were asked by the United Nations and by both Arabs and Jews to provide local security for premises in Haifa, for example, in which the negotiations could be continued after the 15th May, His Majesty’s Government would be quite prepared to consider it, since they do not want to impede last-minute efforts to secure peace in Palestine by whatever means.
The difficulties which I have outlined are, in Mr. Bevin’s view, very real, and I should like to emphasise that they are in no way enumerated with a view to discouraging the efforts which the United States Government is making to secure a truce. On the contrary His Majesty’s Government wish these efforts every success.
Yours sincerely,