Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/5–248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

top secret

[Washington,] May 2, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Beeley, British Foreign Office
	Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs
	Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

On this Sunday morning, Mr. Beeley, who works on Palestinian affairs in the British Foreign Office, accompanied by Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy, came in to see me at the British request. Mr. Fraser Wilkins was present during the conversation.

Mr. Beeley told me that his call, of course, was not of an official nature; that he had come down from the British Delegation in New York merely because he did not want to leave the country without having a chat with me; and that any idea or opinion which he might express during our talk should be considered as his own, not that of his Government. I have known Mr. Beeley fairly well for several years and am convinced that what he said to me was personal, and that in talking with me he was not carrying out any instruction of the British Government. Nevertheless, I shall try to set forth my impressions of some of the views and opinions of Mr. Beeley, based on my conversation with him, since they may aid in obtaining a better understanding of British policies.

Certain Impressions Obtained From Conversation With Mr. Beeley

1. Mr. Beeley indicated that in his opinion trusteeship would have been the best way to prevent the Palestine situation from developing into open warfare which might engulf the whole Middle East. The decision of the General Assembly last fall, however, has encouraged the proponents of the Jewish State to such an extent that he does not believe that the Jews would now agree to any trusteeship which did not state definitely that it was merely preparatory to the establishment of a Jewish State. It was, therefore, too late to attain trusteeship without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of either Jews or Arabs. It was too late because, in his opinion, the Jewish community would not consent to such a trusteeship, and the United States or any other Western Power would not be willing to fight the Jewish community in Palestine in order to impose by force a trusteeship. The Jewish community in Palestine can afford to take a strong position since it is confident that no western country would be willing to oppose the Jewish community by force.

2. He also believed that the chances for a truce were not very good. The British Government, in his opinion, would welcome a trusteeship of a neutral character provided it was acquiesced in by the Jewish and Arab communities. It was not, however, coming out in favor of such a trusteeship for two reasons:

(a) It felt that there was little chance of such a trusteeship being attained; and

(b) Its support of such a trusteeship would be certain to arouse greater Jewish opposition to it.

3. He believed that the chances for the Jews and Arabs agreeing voluntarily to a truce were unfavorable. Nevertheless, the British Government was doing everything possible to bring about such a truce. It had to move cautiously in this respect also in view of Jewish suspicions.

4. In any event, the mandate would be terminated on May 15 and the British Government would consider that after that date its responsibilities so far as Palestine is concerned would be the same as those of any other member of the United Nations, with the single exception that it must take steps to protect British troops in the process of withdrawal from Palestine. The British Government, in case there was no truce, could take no responsibility for preventing the entry into Palestine by land or sea of arms or immigrants. The British Government would probably permit the Jews in Cyprus to leave for Palestine.

5. In case no truce comes into effect, it was Beeley’s opinion that on May 15 or 16 the Zionists would announce the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. They would justify their announcement on the resolution of the General Assembly last November, but would not necessarily consider that the boundaries or the terms set forth in that resolution were binding upon them. In other words, the Zionists would probably take the position, although they might not announce it, that the limits and form of the new Jewish State would be determined by developments.

6. It was Mr. Beeley’s opinion that upon the announcement of the establishment of a Jewish State, the armies of the Arab countries would invade Palestine and that there would be extensive fighting between Jews and Arabs. It was his opinion that for some time at least the Jews, strengthened by recruits entering by sea, could withstand and possibly defeat the poorly organized and badly equipped Arab armies.

7. As a result of the fighting between Arabs and Jews, a number of developments were possible, including:

(a) The reaching of an understanding between Arabs and Jews which would result in the partition of the Arab portions of Palestine among various Arab countries and the tentative recognition by the Arab countries of the existence of a Jewish State.

(b) The hostilities becoming a long-term war which would gradually sap the energies and security of the whole Middle East and which would poison relationships between the Middle East and the Western world.

(c) A decision on the part of the United Nations that the Arab States, by invading Palestine, were guilty of aggression, and a consequent intervention of the United Nations for the purpose of halting the aggression. Such intervention might eventually lead to a breaking up of the present political structure of the Middle East. It would be impossible to prophesy what the Middle East would look like from a political, economic and social point of view after stabilization had again been effected. It is probable, however, that there would be no stabilization except under some kind of a powerful dictatorship.

8. Mr. Beeley said that it was his opinion, based on conversations with British legal advisers, that if there should be no truce, Palestine would be a “no man’s land” on and after May 15 and that in case the Arab population should invite the Arab countries to send armies into Palestine, at least into those areas in which the Arabs are in the majority, the United Nations would have no justifiable grounds for charging that the Arab countries had violated the principles of the United Nations.

9. Mr. Beeley said that, in his opinion, the only hope for preventing the situation in Palestine, in ease no truce could be achieved, from developing in a manner which would threaten the security of the whole Middle East was for an arms embargo to be proclaimed by the United Nations against Palestine and all the Arab countries. Great Britain, in spite of its treaties, could, he believed, join in enforcing such an embargo if the United Nations should request it. He believed the Arab countries at present could not spare enough arms unless they could obtain more from without to offset the arms already in the possession of the Jews.

10. It was also his personal opinion that if the United Nations could find a way out, its best course would be to encourage the partition of Palestine between the invading Arab forces and the Jews. Such partition, of course, would be only a temporary measure since it was clear that whenever the international situation would permit, the Jews on their part would endeavor to extend their state, and the Arabs on their part would try to overwhelm the Jewish State. It was likely, therefore, that Palestine for many years to come would be a breeding ground for international bad feelings.

During my talk with Mr. Beeley, speaking on a merely personal basis and making it clear that I in no way was representing the views of the Department of State, I pointed out that:

1. I was inclined to feel that it would be difficult for the United States to regard the invasion of Palestine by armies of the Arab countries either before May 15 or after as other than a violation of the principles of the Charter. It seemed to me likely that the United States would press for action in the Security Council in case of such an invasion.

2. In my opinion, any kind of development which would permit the entry of Russian troops into Palestine would be disastrous, but also any kind of development which would result in seriously undermining the influence and prestige of the United Nations would be disastrous. It was difficult for me to understand how the United Nations could maintain its prestige if after it had considered the problem, that problem could have no permanent solution and would be solved only on a temporary basis as a result of fighting between Jews and Arabs.

3. I would not be frank if I failed to point out that in our endeavor to prevent the situation in Palestine from becoming a serious threat to world peace we had not received the degree of cooperation from our British friends which we considered ourselves entitled to expect. Even though the British might believe that they had grounds for resenting certain statements and activities on the part of the American Government or American citizens with regard to Palestine in the past, they should, nevertheless, realize that in view of the critical international situation, this was not the time to permit old grievances to influence present policies. We might also have grounds for criticizing past British actions in or with regard to Palestine. We have felt that since the breakdown of order in the Middle East would be disastrous to world peace and particularly to Great Britain and the United States, and since, for the most part, the policies of our two countries in the Middle East pursued a parallel rather than a conflicting course, the British should consider it to be in their own interest to cooperate with us in our efforts to find some peaceable way out of the Palestine muddle. We have noted with regret that instead of cooperation, most of our suggestions have been greeted with official reticence or unofficial sneers. We could not continue indefinitely to carry on alone. We might soon be compelled to take the position that we had done everything in our power to prevent further bloodshed and violence in Palestine; that we could do no more; and that it was up to Great Britain, which as the Mandatory Power was in great part responsible for the present situation in Palestine, to assume the lead in finding a peaceful solution for the problem.

Mr. Beeley said that he did not think that it was quite fair to say that the British had greeted our suggestions with “unofficial sneers”; that although some of the British newspapers had taken a derisive attitude toward American efforts, those papers had not reflected the views of the British Government; that the British Government felt that particularly during the last three months the United States Government had been making sincere although sometimes hesitating efforts to meet the Palestine situation; that the British Government had failed to take a more positive attitude because of its feeling that in view of Zionist propaganda and of Arab suspicion, its support of any plan might do more harm than good; that the British Government felt British-American cooperation in the Middle East was imperative; and that once the mandate was terminated, the British Government would feel more free to give a fuller extent of its cooperation to the United States Government and other governments in working on the Palestine problem.

L[oy] W. H[enderson]