501.BB Palestine/4–3048
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)1
I had twenty minutes at four o’clock this afternoon with the President on the subject of a prospective truce in Palestine. The President opened by saying that he wanted the full story and wanted to know what he could do to help the situation. He said that he did not wish to approach the matter from the point of view of personal political considerations but wished to get the matter settled. He paused at this point and I remarked that an immediate truce in Palestine seemed to me to be our fundamental objective. He said “Yes, that is the thing. We are trying to stop the fighting.”
I then outlined to the President the course of the informal negotiations which have been going on in New York. I told him that it had become apparent that there were sound reasons why both the Jews and the Arabs needed a truce and that we had become convinced in New York that it was possible to get agreement on a great many points which would go into a truce. I described briefly the successive steps of the conversations and pointed out that immigration developed as the substantial bar to an agreement. I then indicated how we proposed to handle it, namely, by getting the parties to agree to let the Security Council Truce Commission make the actual decisions on immigration during the period of the truce. I told him that we would need to tell [Page 878] the parties in identical language at the time of signing the truce how we would proceed as a member of the Security Council Truce Commission to handle immigration. We would emphasize that security and public health considerations would govern immigration and that full provision must be made for them before their entry into the country and that during the truce immigration should be of a compassionate nature (families and women and children), and that the truce should not be used as a cloak for a change in the military position of either side. The President interrupted at this point and said “absolutely, that is fundamental”. I then added that the proposed line of action on immigration should include a statement to the Jews and Arabs that we would be prepared to admit up to 4,000 displaced Jewish persons per month.
I told the President that there was a sharp difference of view inside the Jewish Agency, that men like Dr. Groldmann and Shertok (and according to my information Jewish leaders in Palestine) were inclined to take a moderate view and to consider that a truce was necessary. On the other hand, extremists like Dr. Silver made up a formidable war party which complicated our task considerably. I then said that one of the serious obstacles to our negotiations was the suspicion which had developed on both sides as to just what the United States was after. I told him that the Jews suspected us of trying to trap them into trusteeship against their wishes and of trying to trap them into a continuance of British authority in Palestine. On the other hand, the Arabs were afraid that we were trying to lure them into an enforced partition. I said that I had indicated informally to both the Jews and Arabs that if they had some such truce and then decided that they did not want a trusteeship but would join in working out an alternative provisional government, there would be no great difficulty in meeting their agreed wishes in that respect. I added that we had received hence [hints?] from both sides that there might come a time very soon when it would be necessary for the United States to move in strongly and push the wavering parties into a final acceptance. The President said that he would be glad to do everything possible to help out in such a situation and that he wanted Secretary Marshall to know that he (the President) was ready to take whatever steps the Secretary thought would hasten the completion of a truce. The President said he wanted to give the United Nations every possible support in bringing about this truce and was prepared to go the limit.
I then told the President that he should consider the possibility that the Arabs would accept the truce and that Jews would not, and that that might create difficult problems for him. He replied that “if the Jews refuse to accept a truce on reasonable grounds they need not expect anything else from us”. I added that I had been given the impression by leaders of Jewish opinion in New York that American [Page 879] Jews were for the most part insisting strongly on a truce as a next step. I told the President that the Department would be in touch with him immediately if his own intervention were required to complete the negotiations.
The President then asked specifically if there was anything that he could do at the moment. I told him that we must remove the element of suspicion from the minds of the parties. He said “I understand that General Hilldring’s appointment2 may have caused some complications”. I said, yes, that had been questioned, particularly since the announcement had come just after a very long and highly successful meeting between ourselves and the heads of all of the Arab Delegations. I told him I wanted to be able to be absolutely clear with the Arabs and the Jews on the future course of our policy. The President said our policy will not change. We want a truce. Tell the Arabs that our policy is firm and that we are trying to head off fighting in Palestine. Remind them that we have a difficult political situation within this country. Our main purpose in this present situation is to prevent a war. He expressly stated his concern over the Russian aspect of the situation. He ended by saying “go and get a truce. There is no other answer to this situation. Good luck to you and let me know if there is any way in which I can help.”
- Carbon copies of this memorandum, filed with the original, bear the initials of Secretaries Marshall and Lovett.↩
- John H. Hilldring accepted appointment on April 28 as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Palestine Affairs. He advised Secretary Marshall, on May 26, that he was unable to take up these duties “for reasons of ill health”. For the Department’s announcements of his appointment and of his declination of appointment, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9 and June 6, 1948, pp. 618 and 751.↩