867N.01/4–2648
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)1
| Participants: | Asad al-Faqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia |
| Mr. Henderson, NEA | |
| Mr. Merriam, NE |
The Minister called by appointment at his request. Referring to Prince Feisal’s desire to have a quiet talk with me in New York, the Minister said he hoped that I would be able to go to New York for this purpose. He said that the Arabs were not convinced that the United States really wanted trusteeship. If it did, the United States would have been using its influence in support of trusteeship far more than it had. He intimated that if the Arabs were convinced that the United States wanted trusteeship, the Arabs would quite possibly support it if their fears on the key problems of immigration, land sales, and duration of the agreement could be set at rest. He thought that a talk between Prince Feisal and myself would help the Arabs to make up their minds.
I said that I wanted very much to see Prince Feisal but up to the present time I had simply been unable to get away. I hoped to be able to do so in the near future.
I pointed out that the problem was very different from what it had been last fall. We were unwilling to press trusteeship in the absence of Arab and Jewish acquiescence. Neither the United States nor any other country would undertake any responsibility with respect to trusteeship if it would have to be imposed. Our difficulty was that the Arab and Jewish positions were still far apart. I asked if the Arabs had been in touch with any moderate Jews such as Dr. Magnes.2 The Minister indicated that they had not.
[Page 860]The Minister said he felt that if the Arabs were convinced that the United States was serious about trusteeship, and if their principal fears could be overcome, there was a good chance that, with United States and Arab influence and support, trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.
He entirely agreed with my remark that the Near East would be ruined if peace was not established in Palestine, and expressed grave fears over Communist designs. He was convinced that the Communists wanted to create chaos and that if things went badly for the Arabs the Communists would supply them with arms in order to keep the fighting going.