501.BB Palestine/4–2348
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
In event the United Nations is unable to bring about a truce in Palestine and is unable to agree on interim governmental machinery for Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15, the present fighting in that country will undoubtedly increase and conditions of anarchy will prevail. It now appears that the Members of the United Nations at the Special Session in New York are anxious to make some sort of an arrangement for the protection of Jerusalem and surrounding Holy Places, not only for religious and humanitarian reasons but also in the hope that a nucleus of international control in the Jerusalem Area might at a later date be extended to the rest of Palestine.
At the present moment it is uncertain whether the General Assembly will go along with the United States suggestion of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine, whether some other form of interim governmental machinery will emerge or whether the General Assembly will do nothing at all. As this uncertainty is continuing, the Department has prepared a trusteeship plan for the Jerusalem Area which may be introduced at the United Nations as soon as it is considered desirable to do so.
This agreement is brief and contains only an essential grant of powers to the Governor-General for the emergency period.
A draft agreement for this purpose is attached as Tab A.1 Your attention is called to the following considerations:
Territorial Scope
It is believed that the Jerusalem Area should include not only the present municipality of Jerusalem, together with the surrounding [Page 854] villages and towns but should also include the area of Palestine between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean and should include the ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa and the airport at Lydda in order to prevent the inland isolation of Jerusalem and its environs and to provide access to the sea and the outside world. (See map attached Tab B2 and Explanatory Notes Tab C3).
Security Forces
The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility along with other Members of the United Nations which may be selected by the General Assembly for the provision of police forces which will be required to maintain interim law and order in the Jerusalem area, which would include the City, its environs and the area between them and the coast. (If no other Members of the United Nations are willing to undertake their share of such responsibility, the United States, as a last resort, would if authorized by the United Nations, assume this task on behalf of the United Nations. It is contemplated, however, that such action as the armed forces might take would be preliminary and of limited duration pending the establishment of a United Nations administration and the recruitment of United Nations security forces for the City of Jerusalem and the area between it and the coast.)
Financial Aspects
Apart from extraordinary security expenditures, Palestine as a whole has been financially self-supporting. It has been estimated that the City of Jerusalem, under the provisions of the resolution of November 29, 1947, would have been virtually self-supporting, but only because it was entitled to receive from 5 to 10 percent of the custom receipts of Palestine under the economic union. Since it may be impossible to make a similar provision in a special arrangement for protecting the Holy Places, particularly if the rest of Palestine is in a disordered condition after May 15, there will undoubtedly be a deficit in the ordinary administration of the territory in addition to the expense involved in the maintenance of outside security forces.
It would seem most feasible to separate the expenses of administration from those of providing outside security forces. The United Nations as a whole could provide financial support for the administration of the territory while the expenses of security forces could then be borne by those Members of the United Nations which supply forces. Possibly a plan could be worked out by which part of the money thus supplied by the United Nations could be recoverable from the future revenues of Palestine after a final settlement for the territory as a whole has been reached.
[Page 855]Administrative Measures
During the initial period of the establishment of control over the area, it would probably be necessary, because of the likelihood of considerable disorder, to combine in the military commander both military and civil powers of administration. This could be accomplished by having him appointed as Governor of the area. He would thus be free to act in time of crises without being delayed by the necessity of consulting a civilian administrator. It would not be desirable, however, to prolong such a concentration of authority in a territory under United Nations control, any longer than necessary. Therefore, after a relative condition of order has been established, the civilian administration should be separated from the military commander and placed in the hands of a civilian Governor.
Legal Basis
The provision of a firm legal basis for the actions of the United Nations in this case would seem particularly important because it appears inevitable that the use of armed forces will be required. Probably the most satisfactory legal basis would be obtained in the use of the United Nations trusteeship system. This would, in the first place, provide a clearly legal means of transition for changing the status of the territory. Moreover, by the designation of the United Nations as the administering authority, the trusteeship provisions of the Charter would not only create an obligation on the part of the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the territory, but also provide justification for United Nations action in fulfilling its obligation.