Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/4–2248

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] April 22, 1948.

In a little more than three weeks, unless some change can be effected in the situation, the British will abandon their mandate and will relinquish responsibility for law and order in Palestine. There is no necessity to enlarge upon what is likely to happen in the Middle East if the British wash their hands of Palestine before some kind of arrangements can be effected for the maintenance of law and order in that country.

The National Security Council decided some time ago, after considerable deliberation, that the security of the Middle East was vital to the security of the United States.¹ The developing situation in Palestine threatens the security of the United States and world peace. Any kind of an international arrangement which we may effect for preserving world peace on a basis which would be compatible with the security of the United States is lacking in substance so long as the cancerous Palestine situation continues to develop unchecked. We are not likely to make much headway in the atmosphere of indecision and confusion which envelops the United Nations at the present time unless Palestine is tackled by us at once dramatically and energetically as one of our most vital and urgent international problems.

The present policy of the United States Government with regard to Palestine is two-fold: 1) The United States will act on the Palestine question only as a Member of the United Nations. The United States will accept no unilateral responsibility and will take no unilateral action in this situation. 2) The United States is now supporting the Security Council’s call for a truce in Palestine and believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established by the General Assembly which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15 and which would be without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement for Palestine.

In dealing with the Palestine problem through the United Nations we must face this problem on at least four fronts:

1. We must persuade the more moderate Jews in this country to break the hold which a minority of extreme American Zionists now has on American Jewry so that Jewish leaders in this country, instead of continuing to push Palestine Jews into an extremely nationalistic position, will endeavor to impress upon them the importance of assuming a reasonable and moderate attitude of cooperation with the Arabs.

2. We must make the Arab leaders, particularly those of the Arab League and of the Arab countries, understand that unless they on their part are willing to adopt a conciliatory and reasonable attitude of cooperation with the Jews, the security and prosperity of the whole Middle East will be gravely threatened.

3. We must sternly insist that Great Britain and other democratic powers join us wholeheartedly and energetically in an effort to find a peaceable way out of the Palestine impasse and point out to them that our failure in this respect may well undermine the security of the Western world.

4. We must impress upon both Republican and Democratic leaders, including Presidential candidates and members of Congress, the gravity of the Palestine problem and endeavor to gain their cooperation in seeing that the Palestine problem is no longer to be treated as a football of domestic politics, but as a matter seriously involving the security of the United States.

Recommendations:

A procedure along the following lines is recommended, subject, of course, to the approval of the President:

1. That you suggest to the Secretary that as soon as he can do so without seriously risking the success of the Conference, he leave Bogotá, announcing that he is returning to the United States to devote a major portion of his time and energy to the Palestine problem.

2. That the Palestine problem again be considered by the National Security Council as a matter of urgent national importance and that a firm, clear-cut decision be taken with regard to it which meets with the approval of the President and the Secretary.

3. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary have a conference or a series of conferences with leaders of Congress and the two political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics and to give it its rightful place as a dangerous and difficult international problem. The support of these leaders for the decision taken by the National Security Council should be solicited.

4. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary call a conference of the outstanding leaders of the Jewish Community in the United States in order to obtain their support for our policy as developed by the National Security Council. Their cooperation should be requested to the end that the Jewish Community in the United States do its utmost to prevail upon the Jews in Palestine to adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude. The influence of Americans of Italian origin exerted in the Italian elections is an example of what might be done along this line.

5. That he talk both in Washington and in New York with representatives of the Western Powers in order to obtain their cooperation with regard to Palestine and that he send personal messages on the subject to Bevin and other key persons.

6. That he impress in personal conversations upon representatives of the Arab countries in the United States the fact that the Arab world will face political and economic disaster if the Palestine situation develops into mass fighting, and that unless the Arabs adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude, such fighting involving an increasing number of peoples and nations is likely to take place. These talks should be followed up with appeals to key Arab leaders abroad. These appeals should be of a friendly but stern nature.

7. Every effort should be made to explain through the press, radio, public addresses, etc., our position to the American people and to gain public support. We should abandon our present defensive attitude and take the offensive in a confident and courageous manner, calling upon all loyal citizens to back up the policy of the Government in an effort to achieve bipartisan support.

L[oy] W. H[enderson]

1. See letter of November 24, 1947, from the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, p. 623.