501.BB Palestine/4–1948
The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: In view of the position to be taken by the United States in the General Assembly with respect to Palestine, as discussed with Mr. Lovett yesterday afternoon, I believe it is desirable to consider the concrete consequences of this action in terms of our, future course of action elsewhere. Every future decision must take into account the potential deployment of troops to that area, and I believe it may be helpful to all of us to outline briefly the results as I see them.
The United States commitment to undertake a proportionate share of the burden of providing the police forces required during a truce and temporary trusteeship in Palestine, is going to affect materially our ability to use military forces for any other purposes for a substantial time to come. Based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate as to the number of troops required to support this truce and trusteeship, and assuming the United States would have to supply, as would probably be the case, approximately 50 per cent of such forces, fulfillment of this commitment will probably require the deployment of approximately 50,000 men. This number represents substantially our entire present ground reserve, both Marine and Army. In other words, there will be no troops available for deployment to any other area, at least until such time as the strength of our total establishment has been [Page 833] replenished through the operation of Selective Service, provided a Selective Service law is enacted. For at least six months, the United States will have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve.
It should also be brought out that the logistical support of such troops will require a great deal of work within the zone of interior. This in turn may seriously affect our ability to carry out existing and projected programs of military assistance. Moreover, the acceptance of this undertaking will result in substantial additional costs to the National Military Establishment. These will in turn require the submission of a further supplementary budget of a size which cannot now be determined, or the reduction of other current military activities.
I bring out all these points because I feel that it may now be desirable to review the United States policy in such areas as Italy, Iran, Greece, China and Turkey, and its proposed policy with respect to Western Union. Since these policies are partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of the United States position on Palestine may render these policies meaningless.1
Sincerely yours,
- An “Excerpt from
Minutes of Meeting of United States Delegation to Second Special
Session of the General Assembly, April 19, 1948, 9:30 a. m.” cites
Mr. Rusk as stating that “the United States was not going to buy
into a war between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine. The United
States had no troops to be used in such a war, and, if it had such
troops, they would not be used in Palestine. A war in Palestine was
beyond the military possibilities of the United States. The scale of
warfare there would commit absolutely all of the strategic reserves
of the United States, and such a commitment was impossible for the
United States to undertake. He re-emphasized repeatedly that the
United States was not going to buy into a war in Palestine.
“Therefore, every effort should be made to put across the Security Council Truce, and to make it effective. The United States would, and all other United Nations members should be persuaded to put all possible pressure on the Arabs to preserve the truce. This was fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine Question.” (IO files, US/A/M (Chr)/79 Add. 1)
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