501.BB Palestine/4–1548: Telegram
The United States Representative of the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
urgent
449. [For] Rusk from Ross, Ambassador Austin, Jessup1 and I called on Chaim Weizmann on his invitation late yesterday afternoon and had a very interesting talk with him for about three-quarters of an hour. Weizmann said he had tried very hard but could not understand the reasons for the “switch” in the US position. Was it fear of the Arabs? Was it oil? Or was it fear of Russia? He said there was no reason whatever to fear the Arabs. They were woefully weak. The Arabs could do nothing with their oil except sell it to the US. Did we fear they would sell it to Russia? If so, what would the Arabs do with Russian rubles? Were we afraid that the Jewish state would be dominated by Russia? There was no possible occasion for such fear. Bolshevik agents had tried very hard in the 1920’s to get a foothold in Palestine and had failed miserably. Weizmann went on to say that the Jews were confronted with all extremely difficult psychological problem. They were granted independence in November and independence was withdrawn in April.
Assuming that there were no two-thirds majority in GA for trusteeship, the Jews would have the legal, and if not the legal certainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish the Jewish state.
In response to our questions and comments, he said that the Jews had absolutely no fear of the Arabs and he elaborated on this by indicating that the Arab states were so disorganized and weak as to constitute almost the military factor of zero.
We made it clear that we felt such action by the Jews would be a mistake from their point of view.
[Page 824]The Senator turned the conversation to the positive side and asked whether the Jews did not feel that their welfare would be far better if trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly.
This led to a discussion of essential Jewish requirements as Weizmann saw them. If trusteeship would include three essential points for the Jews, namely, immigration, land settlement, and economic development, it was wholly conceivable to Weizmann that trusteeship might be beneficial to the Jews, and also provide an opportunity for cooperation of the closest kind between Jews and Arabs, ending in due course to an agreed political settlement.
Weizmann, of course, undertook no commitment with regard to the foregoing but it was clear that his mind is rubbing strongly in this direction.
We did not discuss the question of possible US aid but we did discuss the possibility of UN assistance with particular reference to the specialized agencies, such as the FAO, the World Bank, and the WHO.
In concluding our conversation, the Senator indicated that he would like to deal in his Assembly opening statement with the question of economic development and Weizmann promised to have Eban, who was with us, send us material on economic development projects.2
- Philip C. Jessup, a representative of the United States at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly.↩
- Acting Secretary of State Lovett transmitted a copy of telegram 449 to President Truman in a memorandum of April 21, which stated in part: “The most interesting part of this telegram is found on the second page, where Dr. Weizmann suggests that a trusteeship which would include immigration, land settlement and economic development might provide an opportunity for an agreed political settlement between Jews and Arabs.” (501.BB Palestine/4–1548; Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s File)↩