Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/4–1348: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

New York, April 13, 1948—5:50 p. m.

431. For Rusk from Knox. Following is gist of statement made at private meeting in USUN offices of members of SC April 12. (Gromyko present for first time: all other SC members present. Secretariat represented by Sobolev; SYG Lie absent.)

Austin opened meeting stating he noticed news statement in press that USUN responsible for fact no news released concerning these private meetings. This was not a fact. Parodi replying, agreed that Austin had stated accurately the understanding regarding release of news. “We are all in agreement,” Parodi said, “that each delegation can say what it wants to the press but no delegation will state what the views of other delegations might have been.”

Austin then stated that he hoped delegations had specific ideas concerning the truce. These ideas, he emphasized, would be entirely informal and not binding on their governments. He outlined his idea of the truce as follows:

(a) The truce in Palestine should be a “standstill” arrangement.

(b) The truce should be operative until the GA sets up a new governmental arrangement to replace the mandatory power.

(c) The truce should maintain the status quo without making any political decisions.

(d) The truce should provide that the inhabitants of Palestine, namely, the people who are now there should be able to live comfortably without fear of violence. For example, there should be no threat to them of a break in water supplies, food provisions or the means of carrying on their customary peaceful livelihood. There should be no interventions from outside during the period of the mandate except with the approval of UK.

(e) Neither side is to import arms or material or people. The existing status quo of military organizations on both sides is to be kept static.

(f) There is to be no political action, by either side unless said action is approved by the constituted power, that is, by the UK during the period of the mandate and until the GA inaugurates the next government of Palestine.

“These ideas,” Austin added, “are for members here present to consider. They may be changed if members so desire. Their main objective is tranquility.”

[Here follow observations by various Representatives, particularly with respect to the question of immigration and as to whether the United Nations Palestine Commission would be the appropriate agent of the Security Council to supervise the truce in Palestine. Views of Ambassador Austin then follow.]

[“]We must be sincere. We have heard the Syrian reaction to use of Palestine Commission to observe the truce.¹ This is a reasonable and natural reaction. I am inclined to favor Lopez’ idea that we set up a commission of observation, but one that obviously and clearly to everyone will not be trying to put across any political settlement. Therefore, I think the commission should not be the Palestine Commission. This is no reflection on Palestine Commission which has another frame of reference. The truce is an entirely different matter. Furthermore, the Palestine Commission is a part of the GA recommendation and the Palestine Commission should be here in New York for the special session.”

[Here follow further views of various Representatives.]

At this point Gromyko intervened for the first time. He objected to such meetings “behind closed doors.” He thought them without justification. He thought the truce was important. More important was the fact that a decision (the truce) of the SC was being ignored. This meant, he thought, that SC resolution was not strong enough. “Every-body knows who is responsible for violence in Palestine.” Continuing, Gromyko said that US had expressed interesting ideas but overlooked who was responsible for the trouble in Palestine. UK took part in these meetings but the UK was either unable or unwilling to keep order in Palestine.

He thought that the question of Palestine should now be discussed in open session of SC; since the SC resolution was being ignored SC should find out who was ignoring it and if necessary carry out more effective steps. Someone might perhaps be embarrassed by an open discussion; maybe for that reason itself it would be better to have an open discussion.

Syria and Colombia denied that private meetings in any way were out of order.

Following the meeting, Colombia told certain members privately that there would be a meeting of some drafting experts at Colombian delegation offices, April 13, 10:30 a. m. for purpose of writing a truce proposal. All members of SC were welcome but those specifically invited to attend (and who accepted) were US, UK, France, Canada, China and Colombia.² [Knox.]

Austin

1. Faris el-Khouri, the Syrian Representative at the United Nations, had asserted earlier in the discussions that the Commission had been appointed to establish partition and that its members were pro-partition.
2. Mr. McClintock’s memorandum of April 13 to Mr. Lovett noted that a draft resolution “was the product of a five-hour session today in the offices of the Colombian Representative to the Security Council, who consulted with Representatives of the US, UK, France, and Canada. This paper will be submitted to the other members of the Security Council at an informal meeting of tomorrow morning in Ambassador Austin’s office. On the whole the paper seems to cover most of the points which were cited in the Department’s instruction to Ambassador Austin contained in Deptel 208 last night” New York, in telegram 433, April 13, summarized the session (501.BB Palestine/4–1348).

   In a marginal notation to Mr. Rusk on Mr. McClintock’s memorandum, Mr. Lovett said: “I am doubtful about #4.” Paragraph numbered 4 of the draft resolution read: “[The Security Council] Appoints a Truce Commission consisting of the Chief Consular Officers of those members of the Security Council which have Consulates in Jerusalem to assist the Mandatory Power in supervising this truce.”

   In a memorandum of April 14 to Mr. Rusk, Mr. McClintock noted Mr. Lovett’s request to Mr. Rusk to clear the text of the draft resolution with Mr. Clifford. A marginal notation indicates that this was done (501.BB Palestine/4–1448).