Forrestal Papers
Draft Diary Entry for April 4, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
eyes only
At 2:00 P. M., I met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Gruenther and Dean Rusk to consider the number of troops which would be required to support a temporary trusteeship in Palestine, including any necessary control of the borders. Mr. Souers, Mr. Symington, and General Norstad1 were also present, together with the principal planners of the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The meeting was the outgrowth of a specific request from Mr. Lovett for such an estimate, such estimate to be based upon the assumption that the following two conditions were met: First, that the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agreed to cooperate by abstaining from further violence (i.e., a truce between the responsible elements), and second, that the United Kingdom agreed to share in the undertaking.
Mr. Rusk explained the State Department’s proposed course of action, including the fact that Senator Austin would be called upon on 5 April 1946 to indicate generally the type of trusteeship which the United States had in mind. While Austin would not be required to make any definite commitments as to troops, and his meeting with other members of the Security Council would be merely tentative and exploratory, he could not conscientiously present and support the trusteeship proposal unless the U.S. was prepared, if the two conditions specified above were met, to furnish troops. He stated that the program being advanced had to be examined in relation to possible alternative courses of action. If we did nothing, it was likely that the Russians could, and would take definite steps toward gaining control in Palestine through the infiltration of specially trained immigrants, or by otherwise capitalizing on the widespread, violent civil war that would be likely to break out. Moreover, the slaughter of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jewish residents would present difficult questions for the United States, In the event of such developments, the United States might be forced to intervene, and intervention under those circumstances might require a substantially larger force than the force required simply to support a trusteeship. He also pointed out that the presence of our forces in Palestine might be advantageous from a strategic standpoint, and would give us the opportunity to construct bomber fields in the Middle East.
Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that a completely effective truce was impossible in Palestine. Even if the [Page 798] responsible elements should agree to terminate hostilities, there was little chance that the extremists on either side would feel bound by the commitments of the responsible agencies. For this reason, any determination of the forces required had to take into account: (a) the possibility of extensive violence by irresponsible groups, and (b) the possibility that the truce, itself might, under such circumstances, break down. To meet the first of these contingencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a minimum of approximately 104,000 troops would be required. Subsequent developments might well indicate that this force could be greatly reduced, but the extent of such reduction would depend upon the general effectiveness of the truce. It would be unwise, however, from a military standpoint, to start with a lesser number in the optimistic anticipation of such developments. On the contrary, the presence of the larger number at the outset would in itself be an important factor in permitting such developments to take place. The Joint Chiefs felt that the particular type of operation was one which required almost exclusively ground troops rather than any substantial air components. They also appeared to agree with Rusk that the United States might be faced with a worse situation in the Middle East if it failed to support the trusteeship proposal. In the event that the truce itself should break down, then the number of troops required would have to be significantly increased—perhaps doubled or tripled.
It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs should prepare and submit a memorandum for the President2 which would reflect the number of troops required to support the trusteeship under the conditions indicated above, the cost of providing a United States contingent and the effect of doing so upon (a) our reserve, and (b) the necessity for further increases in our total forces. In general, it seemed to be the view that the deployment of substantial forces to this area would be desirable, provided that such forces were available. In this connection, it was suggested that the British might undertake to hold the fort alone pending the augmentation of our forces following the adoption of selective service, gradually reducing the number as we became fully able to assume our share of the task.