501.BB Palestine/3–2448: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
us urgent
1067. Embtel 1218 March 24. Dept regrets that FO has instructed Cadogan to tell USDel UN that while HMG sympathizes with motives US Govt in making further attempt to avert civil war Palestine it is not possible for HMG to depart in SC from its neutral attitude.
Dept suggests Ambassador Austin’s statement Feb 24, his two statements March 19 in SC particularly latter and See’s statement March 20 in Los Angeles re Palestine1 clearly indicate constructive line which USGovt is following in UN in endeavor to prevent strife in Palestine and to create conditions under which it might be possible for Jews and Arabs in Palestine to reach agreement by peaceful means.
The President made statement March 252 on Palestine which further confirms constructive line USGovt is following at UN.
Statements by President, Secretary and Ambassador Austin to which reference is made, as well as official statements of HMG at UN and in London do not indicate, in Dept’s opinion, nor could such contention seriously be maintained in press, that “State Dept and FO together have been concocting settlement unfavorable Jewish State.” It would appear on other hand that future support by HMG in SC for measures proposed by USGovt to prevent strife in Palestine and make agreement possible would be in accord with HMG’s traditional policies and would meet with favor in world press.
While Dept realizes necessity for immediate interim arrangements for Jerusalem and holy places it is suggested that it would be difficult to make any arrangements for Jerusalem without at same time considering [Page 766] arrangements for Palestine in its entirety, as became apparent when TC considered Jerusalem regime under partition plan. FonOff (Embtel 1191 March 233) tacitly admits this fact by indicating that Jewish population of Jerusalem can be throttled by steps taken elsewhere in Palestine.
During recent years many proposals regarding possible trusteeship agreements have been given consideration publicly and privately. Dept feels certain HMG has constructive suggestions in this respect. Dept has given thought and study to this matter and stands ready informally to discuss draft agreements with HMG for purpose of developing most acceptable type of trusteeship agreement in light of present conditions.
Dept believes any discussion re trusteeship must of necessity take into consideration the following three types: (a) Single administering power; (b) Two or more administering powers; (c) UN as administering authority.
Dept does not consider first two as feasible under present circumstances because of political and military difficulties but believes that trusteeship with UN as administering authority would meet with greater approval in the UN and with greater success in Palestine. All types of trusteeship would in any event provide for governor general with broad powers acting within framework of trusteeship agreement under TC.
Trusteeship with UN as administering authority might provide that governor general could call on one or more powers, such as principal allied and associated powers of World War I, to furnish emergency forces under specific circumstances either in event local forces were not adequate for maintenance of internal law and order, or to maintain integrity of Palestine against external aggression.
Governmental administration would be detailed in trusteeship agreement to provide early working basis for independence.
Financial cost of such trusteeship, including security forces for maintenance of internal law and order would be borne by peoples of Palestine. Financial cost of security forces for maintenance of international law and order, should such be required, would be borne by members of the UN supplying them, or possibly pro rata among all members.
It would seem to Dept that informal discussions by HMG with responsible Brit leaders along lines of foregoing would dispel fears that the UN or any of its members were attempting to tie HMG up in new [Page 767] agreement which would merely be a continuation of present Mandate.4 Repeated to USUN as 167.
- Regarding the Secretary’s statement of March 20, see editorial note, p. 748.↩
- See telegram 337, March 25, to Cairo, p. 759.↩
- Not printed; it advised that the “Palestine Government foresees that Arabs may cut Jerusalem water supply which would be disastrous to Jewish quarter.… If and when electric power lines are similarly cut, Jerusalem sewage pumps will stop. Combination of both may make Jewish part city untenable for inhabitants in short time.” (867N.01/3–2348)↩
- An
Embassy officer discussed the substance of telegram 1067 with Mr.
Beeley on March 27. The latter was reported to have said that the
“new factor in Palestine situation to be evaluated was Arab and
Jewish reaction to President’s statement quoted Department’s 1050
March 25 and President’s replies to question at press conference.
Beeley feels that Arabs ‘who have shown themselves in principle
ready to talk trusteeship’ will interpret expression President’s
personal faith in partition and in immigration 100,000 as revelation
‘true purpose’ behind US trusteeship proposal and allege on strength
President’s remarks that US Government is maneuvering via
trusteeship secure both partition and immediate immigration 100,000
Jews.”
The officer “urged that neutral attitude HMG re constructive US proposals is making task US Government infinitely harder and asked Beeley to say frankly what would persuade HMG to emerge from its unhelpful passivity.” Mr. Beeley replied that the British Cabinet “would not alter its attitude unless it were made ‘absolutely clear … that US Government recognizes that any British participation in implementation US proposals would not take the form of provision of British forces.’” (Telegram 1248, March 27, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/3–2748)
Telegram 1050 was a repeat of 337 to Cairo, p. 759.
↩