858.646/8–3048: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden
646. 1. Further discussions in Dept and AEC re our Swedish policy on atomic energy have developed following agreed views:
- a.
- Safest place for Swedish uranium is in the ground.
- b.
- At this time AEC more interested in gaining info concerning Swedish Atomic Energy program than in taking any steps now to secure Swedish uranium.
- c.
- However, volume Swedish applications to US for equipment useful in field of atomic energy exceeded only by those from Canada. A few are items of the sensitive type. While recent Swedish application for large vacuum diffusion pump has been withdrawn, magnitude of other applications and fact that application was originally made for this item raises questions concerning purpose of Swedish program.
- d.
- Although we have oral commitment by Unden 1945 that Sweden would inform US of her resources and production uranium-bearing materials, it is felt more desirable at this time to raise questions submitted below on basis of gaining info for US in order that proper action may be taken on pending applications for equipment related to atomic energy activity.
2. In view of above, Dept desires Emb approach Unden near future along following lines:
This Govt has received many requests from Sweden in the past months for certain equipment that is normally utilized in connection with atomic energy research and development. The importance of the [Page 749] subject of atomic energy, particularly from the standpoint of the security involved, requires this Govt to weigh carefully all requests for equipment. The US desires make decisions on the release of equipment on the basis of a reasonable judgment as to the nature of the activity in which the equipment is to be utilized. It would help this Govt, particularly on the pending applications for equipment and for such other applications that may be transmitted in the future from Sweden, if the US had certain info in reference to the Swedish atomic energy program. Info along following lines would be most helpful:
- a.
- What is purpose of Swedish Atomic Energy Program? Atomic weapons? Production of power? Production of fissionable materials? Research?
- b.
- What is rate of progress on planned program, particularly on extraction of uranium from shales? What processes of extraction are employed or contemplated and what grades of materials obtained?
- c.
- Is Sweden obtaining uranium above planned program needs? If so, what disposition of stocks contemplated?
- d.
- In view reported Soviet activity in development of Esthonian oil shales, are Swedish technological secrets adequately guarded?
3. Dept informed by British Emb that Dr. Sterky, member of Swedish AEC will visit London in Oct and intends raise question whether UK and Sweden might exchange info on:
- (a)
- Protection of civil population and troops.
- (b)
- Engineering info on piles.
As to (a) British plan to provide such declassified info as is already available from public sources. Re (b) they plan to state they are unable to comply.
4. UK has suggested, and Dept concurs, that UK Ambassador Stockholm act with Emb in approach to Swedes and be kept informed of developments.
5. For your info only:
- a.
- In making approach to Unden: (1) Emb may wish to acknowledge fact that Sweden has indeed given considerable publicity to atomic energy activities. Info thus available, however, not deemed sufficient. (2) If Emb has not already done so in connection with circular airgram Aug 16,1 it may wish to express appreciation to Sweden for past cooperation in taking action to prevent export of sensitive items to USSR. (3) Dept not prepared to entertain approach by Sweden for reciprocal exchange of info, nor can favorable action on pending applications for equipment be guaranteed in exchange for Swedish replies to questions posed.
- b.
- AEC and Dept have candidate scientific attaché for Stockholm presently awaiting AEC clearance. However, subject of assignment will be covered by separate instruction.