Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

661.009/8–1648: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions Abroad ¹

secret

Washington, August 16, 1948—12:50 p. m.

Subject: Prevention of Export of Atomic Energy Materials and Equipment to Soviet Countries²

Reference is made to various communications between the Dept and certain of the posts listed at the close of this airgram pursuant to which (a) Emb London and US authorities in Germany have taken steps to secure establishment of controls similar to those used in US to prevent export or trans-shipment of atomic energy materials to countries and areas under Soviet domination and (b) Stockholm and Bern have been instructed regarding specific cases of this nature.

Dept, in collaboration with AEC, has also taken steps to encourage establishment of controls over export of these materials from Canada, Japan, South Korea and Brit Occupation Zone of Germany. Assurances have been received from UK and Canadian Govts that suitable procedures will be initiated and it is expected that US occupation authorities in Japan and Korea and US and UK authorities in Germany will be able to secure reasonable degree of control in their respective areas.

The use of diplomatic channels to secure control objectives in field of atomic energy has been considered in the light of contemplated activities of ECA. As indicated in Dept’s recent cable of July 26 (sent London as 2793, repeated to other OEEC capitals)³ US contemplates seeking by negotiations through US Special Rep under EC Act (Harriman)⁴ cooperation of all participating countries with respect to export to Eastern Europe of items important to the war potential of the USSR, envisaging establishment of controls similar to those now in effect in US, pursuant to powers vested in Dept of Commerce under the Second Decontrol Act of 1947.⁵ In connection with consideration of the broader program, the question was of course raised as to whether atomic energy materials should be included. As a result of discussions between representatives of the Dept and ECA, ECA has expressed its concurrence with Dept’s view that approaches to Govts of OEEC countries looking toward establishment of suitable controls over export of atomic energy items should be made separately through diplomatic channels. This view based primarily on belief that since control of such materials is of high security interest both to US and to such countries, and also since monetary value of materials is not likely to be an important factor in their foreign trade, use of ECA leverage, or any appearance of its use, is neither appropriate nor necessary. It is agreed that Dept (acting on behalf of AEC) will keep ECA fully informed and consult from time to time on activities re AEC items.

In order to achieve similar cooperation of all friendly countries capable of supplying materials of usefulness in Soviet atomic energy development, it is desired that the posts numbered 1 to 6 designated for action at the end of this airgram, initiate discussions with the Govts of the countries of respective assignment to ascertain 1) the extent to which these materials are produced or capable of being produced in each respective country, 2) whether any significant orders for delivery to Eastern Europe are now pending, 3) what supervision or controls either informal or official are now exercised over export of these items, and 4) whether it may be desirable to offer technical assistance of USAEC to delineate specific items of importance in atomic energy field. Depending on the outcome of these initial discussions as reported to the Dept, the various Officers in Charge will be instructed as to further required action. Posts 7 through 15, for whom this airgram is sent at this time for info and comment, will be instructed by the Dept at an appropriate stage regarding necessary action. Issuance of these instructions will be governed by various conditions including need for action and the availability of AEC technicians re 4) above. Meanwhile any comments or information pertaining to the subject under reference will be of interest to the Dept. France considered special case and Dept solicits views of Emb Paris regarding the advisability of making initial exploration of the subject through reliable French officials.

The following lists indicating items of atomic energy usefulness and current US policies with respect to export of such materials, have been prepared by the AEC in collaboration with Commerce and other Departments concerned with export controls and ECA has been informed of composition of lists per agreement referred to above. These lists are transmitted herewith for the guidance of the Officers in Charge in connection with the contemplated discussions with other govts. For purposes of this airgram, its provisions apply to all countries and areas under Soviet domination including Northern Korea, North China and Manchuria and those countries from which transshipment is considered likely.

List A^* comprises most items now controlled under formal export regulations issued publicly by the AEC pursuant to its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There is, of course, no objection to the disclosure of this list to the representatives of other govts and Dept suggests that all items on List A be given frank and open discussion. As objective of such discussions, it is desired that other govts institute procedures over List A items similar to those now practiced by the US to embargo shipment of these materials to countries in the Soviet orbit and to lessen the likelihood of trans-shipment to Soviet dominated countries through careful screening of reliability of consignees and of reasonable requirements for such materials in the country of destination.

For the information and use of the Missions in connection with this airgram, there are being transmitted under cover of a separate instruction, copies of the two basic regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission specifying List A items, namely Part 40 and Part 50 of Title II, Atomic Energy, Code of Federal Regulations entitled respectively, “Control of Source Materials” and “Control of Facilities for Production of Fissionable Material”.

List B⁶ includes those items which have some general industrial application but which also have utility in the atomic energy field. Export of the subject items from the US are controlled by the AEC in collaboration with the Dept of Commerce through use of the licensing authority of the latter, supplemented by the voluntary compliance of US manufacturers which is deemed essential to the maintenance of any close control.

Because of the especial importance of materials and equipment on List B in possible facilitation of Soviet atomic energy production program it is desired that insofar as possible all exports to the USSR or its satellite areas should also be completely embargoed.

It is probable that the various European govts may be unaware of the significance of some of the items on List B. As it is undesirable to disseminate list on wider basis than required, Dept suggests the Officer in Charge be guided by the following in conducting his investigations: (1) List B in its entirety is intended for the Mission’s info only, and is to be handled solely by the Officer in Charge. However, at his discretion, he may reveal its contents to designated officers in his Mission. (2) Individual items should not be disclosed to the other Govts unless it becomes apparent that a specific material or item is or potentially may be produced or manufactured in the country. (3) In order to develop info without unnecessary disclosure of List B items, it is suggested that the initial inquiries of the Officer in Charge be of a general and broad nature and that, depending on the response, he subsequently narrow the discussion toward the specific List B items of interest.

List A

(Requiring AEC Export License)

Materials

1. Uranium metal, thorium metal, metals and alloys containing uranium and thorium.

2. Uranium compounds, including the following:

a. Uranium (or uranyl) acetate

b. Uranium (or uranyl) nitrate

c. Sodium uranate

d. Uranium oxide or dioxide

3. Thorium compounds including the following:

a. Thorium nitrate

b. Thorium dioxide (thoria)

4. Monazite sand or other thorium containing ores

5. Carnotite, pitchblende or other uranium containing ores

Facilities and Equipment

1. Class I Facilities (Facilities capable of producing fissionable material)

a. Nuclear reactors or piles

b. Facilities capable of separating isotopes of uranium, e.g., by electro-magnetic or gaseous diffusion processes

c. Electronuclear machines

1) Cyclotrons

2) Betatrons

3) Synchrotrons

4) Synchro-cyclotrons

5) Van de Graaff machines (electrostatic generators)

6) Linear accelerators

2. Class II Facilities

a. Radiation detection instruments and their components

1) Geiger Mueller, proportional or parallel plate counter scalers

2) Geiger Mueller or proportional counter rate meters

3) Scalers, all types adaptable to radiation detection

4) Geiger Mueller, proportional audio, or mechanical detectors

5) Integrating ionization chamber meters and ionization chamber rate meters

6) Geiger Mueller, proportional, or parallel plate counter detector components

7) Micromicroammeters capable of measuring currents of less than 1.0 micromicroampere

8) Counter pluse rate meters

9) High gain, high impedance linear pulse amplifiers

10) Geiger Mueller quenching units

11) Geiger Mueller or proportional coincidence units

12) Electroscopes and electrometers, pocket and survey types, including dosimeters

13) Chambers, pocket-type, with electrometer charger-reader

14) Electrometer-type electronic tubes with input grid currents of less than 1 micromicroampere

15) Resistors, values above 1,000 megohms

b. Mass spectrometers and mass spectrographs including components

1) Ion sources, mass spectrometer or spectrograph types

2) Acceleration and focusing tubes

3) Ionization chambers

4) Micromicroammeters

5) Electrometer-type tubes as above

6) Resistors, values over 1,000 megohms

c. Leak detectors, mass spectrometer type

d. Vacuum diffusion pumps 12 inches diameter and larger (diameter measured inside the barrel at inlet jet)

List B

(Controlled Through OIT, Department of Commerce)

Materials

1. Beryl, beryllium metal, beryllium alloys, beryllium oxides and other beryllium compounds, in all forms, except fabricated alloys.

2. Elemental fluorine, fluorocarbons and fluorine compounds, except hydrofluoric acid and fluorspar.

3. Zirconium oxide in all forms.

4. Graphite, artificial (excluding integral parte of equipment).

5. Diffusion pump oils (oils enabling the attainment of vacuum of .0001 millimeters of mercury pressure absolute in a single stage diffusion pump; including silicone diffusion pump fluids).

6. The following metals and their compounds: germanium, indium, rhenium, rhodium. Also cerium except in lighter flints and abrasives, lanthanum, and all other rare earths.

7. Heavy water. (Applicable to Norway and Italy only.)

Equipment

1. Mechanical (dry) vacuum pumps, with capacities of 20 cfm or more and capable of producing a vacuum of 1 mm of mercury pressure.

2. Diffusion vacuum pumps, mercury and oil types, 5″ to 12″ in diameter at inlet jet.

3. Induction furnaces for melting metals under vacuum.

4. The following high precision laboratory instruments:

• Spectrophotometers
• Microphotometers
• Spectrometer, optical
• Galvanometers (except student types)

5. Vacuum gauges (ionization type).

6. Valves, bellows type, except as integral parts of equipment.

7. Stainless steel pumps.

8. Centrifuges, stainless steel industrial process type.

9. Glass working lathes.

10. Insulators of especially high dielectric strength at elevated temperatures (such as those with high zirconia and high alumina content).

11. Electrolytic cells for the production of fluorine.

12. Especially pure refractory materials for exceptionally high temperatures, including fabricated forms. (Such as beryllia, zirconia, and alumina.)

Marshall

1. This circular airgram was sent for action to the following missions: 1. Bern, 2. Stockholm, 3. Brussels, 4. The Hague, 5. Rome, 6. Oslo; the airgram was sent for the information and comments of the following missions: 7. Paris, 8. Copenhagen, 9. Vienna, 10. Luxembourg, 11. Dublin, 12. Reykjavik, 13. Athens, 14. Ankara, 15. Lisbon, 16. London, 17. Frankfurt, 18. Berlin; it was sent for the information only of the following missions: 19. Moscow, 20. Warsaw, 21. Helsinki, 22. Prague, 23. Belgrade, 24. Budapest, 25. Trieste, 26. Bucharest, 27. Sofia, 28. Madrid.
2. For documentation on general United States policy on trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see vol. iv, pp. 489 ff.
3. Not printed.
4. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of the United States Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe.
5. Public Law 188, 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 15, 1947 (61 Stat. 821).
6. (Officers who have seen ECA cable Torep 183, July 15, with supplementary Airgram Torep A–3, July 19, will note that the latter includes some items also appearing on Lists A and B of this communication. Steps are being taken here to reconcile such conflicts, and, pending further clarification, Dept-AEC Lists herewith should govern in all instances.) [Footnote in the source text. Neither telegram 183 nor airgram Torep A–3 is printed.]
6. See footnote *, above.