Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

811.20/11–748

Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Paris,] November 7, 1948.

Since this is peculiarly a subject on which the Secretary would have his own personal views I do not believe that there is much that I can add to the general views worked out in Washington by Lovett and Kennan¹ with which I am in entire agreement.

I give below, however, a tentative draft reply to Forrestal’s question.

Draft Reply

There has been no improvement in the international situation which would warrant any reduction in the military forces planned for the end of the current fiscal year. There has as yet been no indication of any basic change in the policy of hostility towards the non-Soviet world, and in particular the United States, pursued by the Soviet Union.

The responsibility which this country bears in the world today cannot be expected to diminish until there has been a substantial return of strength and stability to the free nations of Europe. There are no grounds for expecting any decisive accretion of strength to the natura] Allies of the United States by the end of the current fiscal year.

The responsibilities of the United States as a factor restraining aggressive action on the part of the Soviet Union will remain unchanged insofar as any present estimates are concerned.

The only new element in the European situation since last spring is the situation in Berlin and the continuance of the Soviet blockade. As long as the Berlin situation continues in its present form—and there are no adequate grounds as yet for believing that a settlement is in sight—while not in itself an inevitable cause of armed conflict, given certain developments such as a possible failure of the airlift during the winter months it can result in a condition in which the United States might be compelled to employ armed force in order to maintain its position in Berlin.

In short, I would say that while there are certain optimistic portents for the long-range future, we must expect for the current fiscal year a situation which is neither better nor worse than that which we have faced in 1948 in so far as it affects the ceiling of our military establishment.

The larger question of the relationship of our military establishment to our responsibilities in the foreign field is, as you say, not a question susceptible of an easy answer. A variety of factors must be brought into relationship with the ultimate decision.

In my opinion there are two factors, however, which bear directly on the question which you put to me.

I regard it as essential, in order that we may continue to exercise the restraint upon possible Soviet aggressive action, that we should be in such a state of continuous readiness as to cause the Soviet Union to fear immediate retaliation on our part. This would involve the maintenance of a striking force, particularly in the field of air power with the necessary concomitants throughout the national defense establishment, which would permit us the possibility of swift and effective retaliation.

The second factor which must be considered is that in the last analysis it is the productive potential of the United States which constitutes the general restraining factor in the world today. It would be, in my opinion, unwise for the United States to devote such a proportion of our national production to the maintenance of an existing military establishment so as to impair the potential productivity of our national economy.

It is impossible for me from here to enter into any discussion as to the ceiling figure which would accomplish the first objective without impairing the second. I can only repeat that there is nothing in the world situation which, in my opinion, would justify the United States in reducing below the planned level the size of its military establishment. The psychological effect abroad of a reduction at this time would, I am confident, bring dismay to our friends and supporters in Europe who are looking to us to hold the line during the period in which their defense capabilities are brought up to the level which would permit a restoration of a natural balance of forces on the continent of Europe.²

C[harles] E. B[ohlen]

1. See Lovett’s letter to Marshall, November 2, p. 648.
2. The following handwritten postscript appears on the source text:

   “There is a further consideration which relates to the two factors just mentioned. Our policy should be to build up Western Europe ground forces which means the provision of munitions. We should not at this stage, proceed to build up U.S. ground forces for the express purpose of employing them in Western Europe.”