S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 30 Series
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)1
Subject: NSC Paper no. 30 on U.S. Policy on Atomic Warfare
This paper reached FE only a few hours before the deadline set for receiving recommendations and comments. I have therefore been able to give the paper only a brief and cursory examination.
The paper poses the problem whether at this time we should determine policies regarding the use of atomic weapons. The conclusions reached are that full preparation should be made for the prompt utilization of atomic weapons but that no action should be taken now to obtain a decision either to use or not to use atomic weapons or as to the time and circumstances governing possible use of such weapons.
While apparently taking no decision on the question whether or not atomic weapons should be used, as a practical matter the paper would in large part foreclose the issue. The National Military Establishment, in making its plans, will have to proceed on the basis that atomic weapons are to be used. If war of major proportions breaks out, the Military Establishment will have little alternative but to recommend [Page 631] to the Chief Executive that atomic weapons be used, and he will have no alternative but to go along. Thus, in effect, the paper actually decides the issue.
To my mind, the question to be decided is not whether we should or should not use atomic weapons, for in the absence of any internationally-accepted system of supervision and control of such weapons we must assume that they will be used. The question is rather when and how such weapons should be used. Should we, for example, in the event of war, begin by bombing major centers of population in enemy territory or start with smaller centers important for transportation or specific industries? This question should be answered not so much on the basis of humanitarian principles as from a practical weighing of the long-run advantage to this country. Depending upon conditions in the enemy country, the bombing of major population centers or centers having special sentimental significance might mobilize popular sentiment for resistance in a manner to prolong the war. Similarly, should we bomb the territory of enemy allies—especially unwilling enemy allies—and territory occupied by the enemy?
A suggestion that political as well as strategic issues may be involved is contained in the last sentence of paragraph 11. I wonder if it would not be helpful to our National Military Establishment if this thought were more fully developed and guide lines—if any are possible—laid out for aid in strategic planning.
- Directed to James Q. Reber of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.↩