S/SNSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 30 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett )1

top secret

Subject: NSC 302

The conclusion of this paper that no action should now be taken to obtain a decision whether or not to use atomic weapons in any possible future conflict appears to be completely sound. I also agree that we should not now attempt to reach a final decision as to the time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might or might not be employed. It seems to me, however, that it would be extremely useful at least to study the pros and cons involved and to have information readily available upon which to base immediate recommendations to the President in the event of war. The following considerations seem pertinent:

1.
I understand it is the contention of the Air Forces that if such weapons are to be employed it is almost essential that they be used in the opening stages of any conflict. Clearly, we need now only to consider the Soviet Union as a potential enemy. If in the event of war the enemy is given time to perfect his fighter defense and radar nets atomic bombing operations will be made more difficult. Even more important some of our best air bases might be overrun or captured by Air Borne troops. In these circumstances, unless there is much advanced planning, there appears to be danger that a decision might be taken by the President or the Cabinet on a very few hours’ notice without full consideration of all the factors involved, as the pressure would undoubtedly be very great.
2.
Not only military planning is involved in this decision. Plans for psychological warfare should be worked out to cover both alternatives. In the event of war, the Russians would certainly again take up the radio sets of their citizens. We might, however, have a few hours or even days before such action could be completed and it would be essential that we take advantage of this period to inform the Russian and satellite peoples of our policy with respect to atomic warfare.
3.
While it is clear that there should be no public debate on this matter at this time, I see no reason why plans should not be carried out for the use of atomic weapons, in the event such a decision were made, and I believe careful study should be prepared of the advantages and disadvantages of their use. For the reason set forth in the NSC paper, [Page 630] however, such studies should be handled on a top secret basis by as limited a group as possible. Such a group however should contain persons competent to judge psychological reactions of the Russian people.

  1. Drafted by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs
  2. Of September 10, p. 624.