Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 20 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State

top secret

Washington, August 25, 1948.

NSC 20/2

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Factors Affecting the Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies

Reference: NSC Action No. 88

The enclosed paper on the above subject, prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State [PPS/33, June 23, 1948], is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with NSC 20,¹ “Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation”.

At the request of the Department of State, the enclosure is being referred to the National Security Council Staff for consideration and the preparation of a report to the Council in accordance with NSC Action No. 88.²

Sidney W. Souers

[Enclosure]

Factors Affecting the Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies

The following report is designed to clarify the factors bearing on the question as to the nature which the U.S. defense effort should assume in the light of Soviet policies and attitudes (with particular relation to the question whether U.S. defense preparations should be pointed to meet an expected conflict at a given probable time or whether they should be planned on a basis which could and would be permanently maintained).

The discussion is divided into the following headings:

		Page
A.	Degree of probability of military complications at the present time	1
B.	Extent to which Soviet intentions are apt to be influenced by successful developments of the atomic weapon in the U.S.R.R.	5
C.	Functions of the U.S. armed forces in the light of Soviet attitudes	6
D.	Probable effects of the respective courses under consideration	8

The conclusions of this report were arrived at independently before the Staff had seen despatch no. 315 of April 1, 1948³ from Moscow, transmitting a report on the subject of “Soviet Intentions” prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, American Embassy, Moscow. The Staff recommends, however, that the Moscow report also be given most careful attention and be taken into consideration as an important and authoritative document in any decisions involving the questions discussed below.

a. degree of probability of military complications at the present time

1. The following factors militate against the likelihood at this juncture of international, planned Soviet armed action which would involve this country.

(a) The events of the past two wars have demonstrated that unless a European aggressor can be sure of dealing a decisive blow to the North American military-industrial potential in the initial phase of his effort to dominate the European continent, he can never be sure of final victory.

[The Russians could not be sure of being able to deal such a blow in present circumstances.]⁴

(b) The physical destruction on Soviet territory during the recent war was far more severe than is generally realized in the west, and has not yet been by any means made good by new construction.

[In this connection, we should not be misled by reports that in certain key items the Soviet industrial effort has reached the pre-war level. This does not alter the fact that a huge reconstruction problem still remains and that important sectors of Soviet economy—including particularly transport—are in a state of serious backwardness and obsolescence.]

(c) The war-weariness of the Soviet peoples is as great, if not greater, than in the case of any other of the major countries. This factor has to be seriously considered by the Soviet Government.

(d) In seeking control over foreign territories, Soviet leaders have a strong traditional preference for political means as opposed to direct military action. This preference stems not from moral considerations, but from communist ideology and from Russian national tradition.

[It should be noted that the Russians are traditionally cautious in planning military actions, and the Soviet leaders particularly so. The Finnish War was the only instance in which they have chosen to resort to direct military aggression to gain their objectives and there is every reason to believe that they had cause to regret this experiment.]

(e) Direct military action would not assure to the Soviet Government the type of control which it seeks in the western European countries.

[The Kremlin strives in principle for a maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility. By invading the countries of western Europe and raisins: the red flag over those territories it would obtain an open responsibility which could not be easily liquidated. This would be certain, as the Russians know from their recent experiences in western Europe, to produce profound antagonisms among the western European peoples which would be a burden to any permanent communist control. It must be remembered that the Russians are interested in long-term political power over the western European countries, not short-term. Military occupation may be good means for assuring short-term domination, but it is not an auspicious beginning to a long-term, permanent control.]

(f) It is doubtful whether Red Army morale would stand up well under any action which called for stationing of large numbers of Soviet troops in western European countries for any period of time.

[Even service in the relatively primitive and partially war-torn: areas of eastern Europe proved disruptive of morale in most Soviet units at the close of the recent war, and was attended by a disgraceful percentage of desertions. The effect of contact with the highly developed countries of western Europe would be still greater. The Soviet leaders are conscious of this danger.]

(g) The official Russian mind is dominated by the conviction, deeply rooted in communist ideology, that this country is bound sooner or later to suffer another economic depression similar to that of 1929—30. Clearly, such a depression could be expected to have the effect of weakening the U.S. defense establishment, at least temporarily, and of diverting the attention of the U.S. public from world affairs, thus providing a more convenient occasion than the present one, in certain respects, for Soviet expansion.

(h) Similar calculations may arise in the Russian mind with respect to the prospects for a relaxation of U.S. pressure as a result of the coming election. There is strong evidence that the Russians overrate the political prospects of the Wallace movement⁵ and the isolationist wing of the Republican Party, and feel that an accretion of strength on the part of either one would be to their advantage.

2. The following factors militate for the likelihood of international, planned Soviet armed action, involving this country, in the immediate forthcoming period.

(a) The Soviet leaders might reckon that their military strength will never again stand in so favorable a relationship to the military strength of the western powers.

[The effects of the recent war left central and western Europe practically devoid of military strength. The period of demobilization and readjustment of our own armed forces meant that their effectiveness has recently been in many respects at an abnormally low ebb. It must now be expected in Moscow that the general tendency in this country in the coming period will be toward the strengthening of our armed establishment revival of armed strength will also take place in western Europe. This expectation must be balanced, however, in the minds of the Soviet leaders, against a planned continued increase in the strength of the Soviet forces, and against the stubborn Soviet conviction that a future economic crisis is sooner or later going to weaken the economic strength of this country.]

(b) The Soviet leaders must recognize that their political plans have already suffered a severe set-back in Europe and that if the European recovery program progresses successfully the growing strength: and prosperity of western Europe will put a severe strain on communist political control in eastern Europe. They know that this strain would hold long-term dangers for Soviet power. If they take a sufficiently serious view of these prospects, they might prefer to resort to armed action at this juncture, in order to prevent recovery in the west and to ensure an immediate extension of communist power in that region, as a means of defending Soviet power in eastern Europe.

(c) The Soviet leaders may calculate that in the present changed circumstances certain further political positions, such as complete control of Berlin or of Vienna, are essential to the political defense of their satellite zone in eastern Europe, and they may feel themselves obliged to strike for the achievement of these objectives regardless of the resulting danger of war.

[In this connection there is always the possibility that the Soviet leaders may miscalculate the determination of this Government and its willingness to resort to force to protect the integrity of existing international agreements.]

(d) It is always possible, although not probable, that internal conflicts and pressures may impel the Soviet Government to attitudes and policies which would carry it in the direction of armed involvement.

(e) The possibility of further military booty may be an incentive to war for a government which has in effect elected to forego, in favor of political projects which now look doubtful, the possible advantages of economic cooperation with the U.S.

3. Possible fortuitous circumstances.

(a) Where forces of mutually antagonistic great powers are operating in such close proximity as is the case in Europe with the forces of the Soviet Union and of the western powers, and particularly where the fanatical and relatively unrestrained Soviet police element is so strongly involved, there is always a danger of incidents which, although not so intended, would lead directly to military complications.

4. Conclusion:

Weighing these various factors the evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action of this nature and is still seeking to achieve its aims predominantly by political means, accompanied—of course—by the factor of military intimidation. The tactics which it is employing, however, themselves heighten the danger that military complications may arise from fortuitous causes or from miscalculation. War must therefore be regarded, if not as a probability, at least as a possibility, and one serious enough to be taken account of fully in our military and political planning.

b. extent to which soviet intentions are apt to be influenced by successful developments of the atomic weapon in the u.s.s.r.

1. Political factors would be apt to militate against use of the atomic weapon by the Soviet Government against major urban and industrial areas in other countries, except by way of retaliation for attacks made on Russia.

[The Soviet leaders think in political rather than military terms, and regard themselves as the leaders not only of the Soviet population but of important elements in western countries, particularly in the large cities and industrial areas. Their basic aim is to achieve concealed political domination over those areas, not to destroy them. During the last war, they took little part in the air effort directed against the German population, and have since tried to make political capital with the Germans out of this fact. While this was probably partly a case of making virtue out of necessity, the available evidence speaks for a certain political reluctance on the Soviet side to resort without provocation to methods of mass destruction aimed against civilian elements in other countries.]

2. If the Soviet leaders felt that there would be a strong probability of retaliation, this would be an important factor in dissuading them from taking the initiative in the use of the atomic weapon against western cities.

[Russia has few cities to lose. Only Moscow and Leningrad could conceivably house the highly centralized administrative services of the Soviet Government for any length of time; and they, like all other Soviet cities, are desperately over-crowded. Similarly, Soviet industry is highly vulnerable to air attack by virtue of

(a) the relative concentration of many of its important branches in a few large enterprises;

(b) the great intensity with which existing plant is exploited, and the corresponding lack of reserve strength and flexibility in the event of damage by atomic weapons.

There is no slack in the Soviet economic effort. A relatively small number of atomic bombs could, if properly and effectively directed, set the entire Soviet industrialization program back by years and have an extremely severe effect on any Soviet military effort. This is not to speak of the psychological effect on the Soviet people.]

3. In view of the considerations brought out in point 2, mere possession of atomic weapons will not alone determine Soviet thinking. The Soviet leaders will also have to take into account the head start we have enjoyed in this respect, the respective raw material situations, the probable number of bombs on both sides, the possibilities of delivery, etc.

4. The fact that they have not been able to dispose over [had at their disposal?] atomic weapons, whereas we have, has probably been, if anything, a contributing factor in Soviet intransigence in the past in matters of the international control of atomic energy and possibly in other matters as well.

[To the Soviet mind it is unthinkable that we, enjoying this factor of military superiority, are not taking it into account in our plans and attempting to exploit it for political purposes. They therefore must assume that our international positions, particularly in matters of the control of atomic energy, are predicated on this superiority and contain a margin of excessive demand, which would not be there if a better balance existed in the power of disposal over the weapon. For this reason, they may actually prove to be more tractable in negotiation when they have gained some measure of power of disposal over the weapon, and no longer feel that they are negotiating at so great a disadvantage.]

5. Conclusion:

It is not probable that the pattern of Soviet intentions as outlined above would be appreciably altered in the direction of greater aggressiveness by the development of the atomic weapon in Russia.

c. functions of the u.s. armed forces in the light of soviet attitudes

The following are the requirements, arising from the attitudes and policies of the Soviet Government, for which it is necessary that this Government maintain armed strength.

1. As an indispensable background of our own political attitude with respect to the U.S.S.R. In dealing with a Government so highly centralized, so incorrigibly conspiratorial in its methods, so hostile traditionally towards its world environment, so despotic at home, and so unpredictable in foreign affairs, it is necessary that we keep ourselves in a state of unvacillating mental preparedness. Without military preparedness, this would be a sham.

2. As a deterrent.

This is of outstanding importance. There is no question but that if the opposing strength is estimated to be so great that there would be little possibility of final victory, the Russians will not deliberately resort to the use of armed force. On the other hand, excessive military weakness here and in western Europe might indeed create a factor which would operate to overcome the other reasons why the Soviet Government would not be inclined to use armed force, and might thus constitute a compelling invitation to aggression.

There is no evidence that anything likely to occur in Russia within the foreseeable future will in any way alter this situation. We must reckon that the necessity for the maintenance of armed forces as a deterrent will continue undiminished as long as the Soviet power, as we know it today, continues to be dominant in Russia, and probably even longer.

3. As a source of encouragement to nations endeavoring to resist Soviet political aggression.

The peoples who consider themselves as lying between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and who are endeavoring to resist Soviet political pressures are strongly influenced by what may be called the shadows of the armed strength maintained by the two great powers. If the shadow of the Soviet armed strength remains too formidable, in comparison with ours, this may well have a paralyzing effect on the will to resist in western Europe and may become an important factor in enabling the Russians to achieve their aims by political rather than military means. It is therefore necessary for this country to maintain the outward evidences of firm armed strength and resolution as a means of stiffening the attitude of those peoples who would like to resist Soviet political pressures.

Like the requirement of armed force as a deterrent, this requirement may be expected to endure at least as long as the communist party remains the dominant power in Russia. There is no reason to expect the achievement of any political understanding with the Soviet leaders which could appreciably offset the need for strong U.S. forces as a factor of encouragement to the peoples in western Europe. This necessity is not likely to pass even with the termination of the present Soviet regime.

4. As a means of (waging war successfully in case war should develop as a result of an accident or miscalculation or any other cause.

It is impossible to state at this time how long the relatively high degree of danger implicit in the present dispositions of Soviet and western forces in Europe will endure or what will be the general development of the probability of planned Soviet military aggression. It is possible, but by no means certain, that within two or three years the danger of military complications arising from accidental causes may be reduced by changes in the dispositions of armed forces in Europe. However, these is no likelihood of any reduction in the general power of Soviet armed forces; on the contrary, this may be expected to increase steadily in the next few years. In view of the long time-lags involved in any basic alterations of a major military establishment, our defense policy cannot take into account minor fluctuations in the degree of danger. From the political standpoint, therefore, the only safe deduction would be that for at least the next five or ten years we will require such an establishment as would make it possible for us to wage war successfully if it should be forced upon us. What would constitute waging war “successfully” is a question which can be answered only in the light of U.S. national objectives.

5. Conclusions:

None of the purposes for which we must maintain armed forces, in the light of Soviet attitudes and policies, are ones Which may be expected to undergo any material alteration at any specific predictable time in the future, and they must all be considered as being of an enduring nature.

d. probable effects of the respective courses under consideration

1. A U.S. defense effort founded on the principle of a long-term state of readiness.

(a) This type of effort would have the greatest effect as a deterrent, since it would be evident to the Soviet leaders that they were dealing with a permanent factor on their political horizon and not with a temporary one which they could expect to disappear again within a relatively short time.

(b) This type of effort would have the greatest effect in encouraging countries endeavoring to resist Soviet political pressures. The anxieties of people in western Europe and elsewhere as to the U.S. ability and will to defend them in the event they should become militarily involved with the U.S.S.R. relate in large measure to their doubts as to the stability and long-term consistency of U.S. policy. A U.S. defense effort laid out on long-term lines will be much more apt to reassure them than one aimed at a given peak of probable likelihood of war but subject to later downward fluctuations.

(c) From the standpoint of the possibility of an actual waging of war with Russia, a defense effort laid out on a permanent basis would lack the advantages of being able to meet a particular peak danger by a peak effort in military preparedness; but it would have distinct advantages if military complications were to occur at a time other than that which we had calculated to be the most likely one.

2. A U.S. defense effort founded on the idea of meeting a peak of war danger by a peak of military preparedness.

(a) As a deterrent to the Soviet Union, this type of effort would be effective only for the period toward which it was directed; for the subsequent period it would have the reverse effect. If the Soviet leaders knew that we were undertaking a defense effort of this nature (and it is certain that they would know it), they would be able to plan for maximum military and political pressure at a date when our own military effort might be expected to have subsided.

(b) From the standpoint of encouragement to peoples resisting Soviet pressures, this type of defense effort would have only a limited value. To the extent that it gave the impression that U.S., plans were sporadic and undependable, it might do more harm than good.

(c) From the standpoint of actual waging of war, such a defense effort could conceivably have advantages only in the event that our calculations as to the likely timing of Soviet military aggression were correct. At present, we have no adequate means of arriving at a correct calculation of such a factor. But in any case we must always bear in mind that the defense effort itself would undoubtedly alter the situation on which our expectancy had been based; for it would probably act as an effective deterrent for that particular period and we would probably not be called upon actually to use our forces at the time for which we had planned their maximum strength. This means that there would be relatively little likelihood of our forces being used for waging of a war against Russia at the moment of their maximum efficiency if they were shaped to meet an anticipated danger peak. We must always bear in mind here the extreme flexibility and patience of Soviet policy.

3. Conclusions:

In general, the factors cited above indicate that a U.S. defense policy based on the maintenance of a permanent state of adequate military preparation meets better the requirements of the situation, insofar as these arise out of Soviet policies and attitudes, than a defense effort pointed toward a given estimated peak of war danger.

1. Of July 12, p. 589.
2. Action No. 88 provided for the preparation of a report of the nature requested by the Secretary of Defense in NSC 20 (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions).
3. For portions of this despatch, see ante, pp. 550–557.
4. Brackets throughout this document appear in the source text.
5. Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, 1933–1940; Vice President, 1941—1945; Secretary of Commerce, 1945–1946; candidate for President in 1948, advocating a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union.