Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

811.20200(d)/7–2048

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

confidential

Washington, July 20, 1948.

The Secretary of State refers to the information and educational exchange programs² and in particular to recent communications concerning United States information policy with regard to anti-American propaganda. There is enclosed for the information of the Officers in Charge and other appropriate officers, particularly those concerned with the information and educational exchange programs, a statement of the objectives of United States information policy with regard to anti-American propaganda. There is also enclosed a statement of guidance for the selection and preparation of information materials with regard to anti-American propaganda prepared by the Department primarily for the use of its media divisions but which, it is felt may be useful to officers concerned with the activities of the information and educational exchange programs in the field.

The Department appreciates the suggestions and recommendations received to date from various missions on the subject under reference and will appreciate further comments which the Officers in Charge may wish to make, either on the general subject under reference or on any particular aspect of this subject as it relates to conditions in the country to which he is accredited.

[Enclosure 1]

United States Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda

The objectives of U.S. information policy with regard to anti-American propaganda are:

1. To report the truth objectively and factually in the dissemination of information through all media available.

2. To influence opinion in third countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.

3. To win more positive support abroad for U.S. policies and to gain a more sympathetic understanding of U.S. actions.

4. To counteract the effectiveness of the anti-American propaganda campaign in third countries.

5. To diminish the acceptance of and belief in, false or distorted concepts about the U.S. in third countries.

6. To gain acceptance, among the peoples of third countries, of the truth about the policies and actions of the USSR and its satellites with a view to strengthening opposition to the USSR and to Communist organizations.

7. To increase materially knowledge among the peoples of third countries concerning the United States, its policies, actions, life and institutions.

[Enclosure 2]

Guidance por the Selection and Preparation of Information Materials To Implement the Objectives of U.S. Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda

1. We should continue to report the truth about U.S. life, institutions, policies and actions, but with greater attention to those facts which will more effectively serve to implement our information objectives.

2. We should continue always to affirm U.S. policy, emphasizing its constructive aspects, its support of the principles of freedom, prosperity, and independence implicit in the Charter of the United Nations. We should avoid giving the impression it is on the defensive or is vulnerable to hostile charges.

3. We should use all our resources to correct, as far as possible, the false or distorted sterotypes concerning the U.S. which are widely held among the people of third countries. The most widely-held sterotypes include:

a. The belief that the U.S. and its citizens have unlimited wealth.

b. The belief that the U.S. is imperialistic and desires to “dominate” other nations.

c. The belief that the U.S. government is run by “Wall Street” and by “the monopoly capitalists.”

d. The belief that Americans are wholly materialistic, have no culture worthy of mention, and judge everything by its value in dollars.

e. The belief that Americans are generally “immoral”, have little “family life” and condone “loose living.”

f. The belief that American democratic principles are loudly proclaimed as a cloak for undemocratic practices and for the purpose of concealing wide-spread racial and economic discriminations and extensive concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the few.

4. We should use all our information resources to create confidence in the political and economic stability of the U.S., its government and institutions.

5. We should use our information resources to convince the people of third countries that achievement of their own aspirations will be significantly advanced with the realization of U.S. national objectives.

6. We should expose Soviet policies and actions that directly or indirectly jeopardize the interests of third countries, their independence or the aspirations of free men in those countries. This should be done only when hard facts can be used that will be acceptable as truth by the people of third countries in the face of Soviet and Communist counter-charges. Criticisms of Soviet policies and actions should be confined to important issues or situations, should be specific, and supported by good evidence.

7. We should openly take cognizance of the major themes of anti-American propaganda, and impute their dissemination, when desirable, to Soviet or Communist sources throughout the world.

8. We should expose falsehoods, correct errors and state the motives for distortion, in significant cases and when hard facts and good evidence can be used.

9. We should expose the discrepancy between professed Soviet and Communist aims and actual Soviet and Communist practices on all major issues which illustrate the distinction between democratic and totalitarian government or which have a direct bearing on the vital interests of third countries. Specifically, we should use our information resources to demonstrate:

a. The difference between Soviet pretensions as a “peace-loving” estate and Soviet actions in obstructing efforts toward the peace settlements, toward control of atomic energy and similar problems.

b. The difference between Soviet pretensions as a state interested in economic well-being of all peoples and Soviet action in obstructing efforts toward world economic recovery.

c. The difference between Soviet pretensions in support of the sovereignty and independence of smaller nations and Soviet actions resulting in the domination and exploitation of smaller nations.

10. We should only permit ourselves to be drawn into accusations and counter-accusations with respect to the USSR or countries with Communist regimes when the advantages of such a propaganda exchange are clear. They should be clear when the issue directly involves the vital interests of a third country or a vital issue in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and when accusations can be carefully documented.

11. We should abstain from using the propaganda patterns of the USSR and Communist organizations and we should abstain from personal vilification of Soviet and Communist leaders.

12. We should bear in mind that the people of third countries do not react with shock, anger or indignation to the charges made in anti-American propaganda as do some Americans.

13. We should bear in mind that anti-American attitudes often exist within strongly nationalist but non-Communist groups in third countries who, because of this, are susceptible to Soviet and Communist propaganda, but who can and should be won over to a more friendly and sympathetic attitude toward the U.S.

14. We should bear in mind that the people of most third countries are primarily interested in those U.S. policies, actions and internal developments that directly affect their welfare, their immediate economic prospects and their immediate individual interests.

15. We should bear in mind that the people of most third countries are little concerned with pretentions of the righteousness of U.S. aims or the sincerity of U.S. motives unless there is concrete supporting evidence that specific U.S. aims and motives are directly beneficial to their interests.

16. We should bear in mind that the people of most third countries have little conception of American democratic principles and practices and that their interest in our democratic principles and practices is likely to be in direct proportion to the demonstrated value of our experience in the solution of their immediate problems.

1. Sent to 84 United States Embassies, Legations, Consulates, and Political Advisers.
2. On January 27, 1948, President Truman signed the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith–Mundt Act); Public Law 402, 80th Cong., 2nd sess.; 62 Stat. 6). This measure authorized a broad, permanent information and cultural exchange program which was to be administered by the Department of State.