International Trade Files: Lot 57D284, Box 106

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the United States Delegation (Nufer)

secret

If I interpreted correctly the sense of this morning’s Delegation meeting, it was that in view of the intransigent attitude of the majority of the Latin American Delegations with respect to QR and the seeming futility of our trying to convince them of the error of their ways by making concessions to them on other issues, the time is approaching when our Delegation will have to make a definite and unequivocal statement regarding our position, even at the risk of an open break with the Latinos.

I sympathize fully with the feelings of the Delegation in this respect and I have the greatest admiration for the infinite tact and patience which all the Delegates have shown during the long weeks of the Conference in trying to induce the Latinos to recede from their position and to adopt a more constructive attitude towards the Charter. I realize, moreover, that the time may come when a showdown may be unavoidable but I would like strongly to recommend that any such action be postponed until we have explored every possibility of reaching some agreement with the Latinos on QRs without receding from our position with regard to prior approval.

Despite the arguments advanced this morning, I wonder if it would not be possible to establish some mutually acceptable criteria under Article 13 which would govern the decisions of the Conference in passing on applications from Member countries to use QR for development purposes and whether it would not also be possible to establish some time limit within which the Organization would have to hand down its decisions with regard to such applications. I understand that Article 13 is now being discussed by a Subcommittee or Working Party and that Mr. Fowler1 believes that the procedure with regard to QRs can be streamlined and made more acceptable (or perhaps it would be better to say less unacceptable) to the Latin Americans. I also personally feel that our position vis-à-vis the Latin American Delegations would be much strengthened if we could amend Chapter 20, paragraph 2, item (e), so as to make it applicable to industrial products as well as agricultural and fisheries products. The Latinos have argued time and again that, while we reserve the right under certain specified conditions to use QRs without prior approval on agricultural and fisheries products, we refuse to make this extensive to industrial products and that as they are primarily exporters of agricultural [Page 850] products and importers of industrial products, it places them in a disadvantageous position.

If we can establish some acceptable criteria under Article 13 (without sacrificing the principle of prior approval on QRs) and meet the Latinos views on Article 20, it might prevent an open break and if in spite of our efforts along these lines, a break should occur, our position would, I feel, be stronger than it is at present. I am frankly much concerned over the possibility of such a break for several reasons, among which (in addition to the rift in hemispheric solidarity and the possible effects thereof on the Bogotá Conference) are the following:

1)
In the event we force a showdown it seems at best doubtful that our views on QR will prevail and that we will not be voted down. It does not seem impossible that if the Latin American countries, the Arab League, China, Ceylon and others line up against us, that they will be able to muster a majority. Should such a contingency arise, we would be forced into the position of either accepting this decision or of refusing to abide by the majority rule.
2)
An open break with the Latinos, on the other hand, would have far-reaching political consequences in the Western Hemisphere. Also, it would inevitably be exploited by the Soviet Union and by the Communist groups and opposition parties in the several Latin American countries, as well as in other parts of the world. They would endeavor by every means at their disposal to convince the peoples of those countries and the world at large that the Conference failed because the “Capitalist” powers in general and the U.S. in particular had tried to force their views upon the small underdeveloped countries in order to keep them in a semi-colonial state and to prevent them from industrializing. I believe, unfortunately, that such a campaign would win a lot of followers among the peoples of Latin America, who, despite all we have done for them during the last fifteen years, still have a lurking suspicion in their minds of the bona fides of our intentions toward them.

  1. William A. Fowler, a United States Treasury specialist.