Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The British Ambassador (Franks) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, December 21, 1948.

Dear Mr. Lovett: In my recent absence from Washington Munro informed the British Government of the substance of your letter of the 2nd of December¹ in which you expressed the opposition of the United States Government to the proposal made by the British Government that they should inform the Norwegian Government of their willingness to assist in purifying a small quantity of uranium oxide.

I have now heard that the British Government have not yet said anything to the Norwegians. They consider, however, that the United States Government may have read more into their proposal than was intended. The British Government were not proposing to make any firm commitment to the Norwegians but merely to encourage them with the hope that they would be able to assist them. They hoped thereby to avert an immediate approach by the Norwegians to the French, for they believed that the French had facilities to refine oxide for the Norwegians in France and that the Norwegians would be likely to apply to them if no prospect of help from the United Kingdom was forthcoming.

The authorities concerned in London have again emphasized that there is no question of starting to refine oxide for the Norwegians for some time. Indeed they have informed me that the work might not be put into effect for two years. In these circumstances they cannot see what security risk is involved.

If I might sum up the position: The British Government have not so far sent any reply to the Norwegian approach which was made last August; they are reluctant to continue to leave the situation open for if they do so, they consider that the Norwegians may well turn for help to the French; they would like, therefore, to give some response to the Norwegians of a reasonably forthcoming kind but which would be quite non-committal. This would help to hold the situation and could not be of any danger to security. I would add that such an interim reply would not prevent the British Government from refusing the Norwegian request later if the United States Government decided, after reviewing the whole question of atomic energy development in Western Europe, that they could not give their consent.

Perhaps you would kindly let me know whether the course of action outlined above is agreeable to you.²

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Franks

1. Ante, p. 789.
2. In a memorandum to Lovett, December 23, Arneson stated the following: “I am at a loss to know what form of words can accomplish what Sir Oliver refers to as a response which is both ‘reasonably forthcoming’ and also ‘quite noncommittal,’ but perhaps the subtleties of British diplomacy can cook that one up.” (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

   Also on December 23, the Under Secretary of State replied to the British Ambassador in a note which stated the following: “Your note of December 21 expressed London’s concern that a negative reply to the Norwegians might drive them immediately into the arms of the French. I agree that cooperation between the French and Norwegians in this matter should be forestalled. I agree also that any reply to the Norwegians that can accomplish this without committing the United Kingdom Government actually to take on the work is desirable.” (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)