Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Subject: Status of Technical Cooperation under the January 7 Modus Vivendi
The modus vivendi incorporated in the Minutes of the CPC meeting of January 7 states:
“It is recognized that there are areas of information and experience in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries. They will, therefore, cooperate in respect of such areas as may from time to time be agreed upon by the CPC and insofar as this is permitted by the laws of the respective countries.”
At this same meeting the CPC agreed that the nine areas of technical cooperation found to be mutually advantageous by the Sub-Group on Technical Cooperation should come into effect. In the discussion at the December 15 meeting1 at which this report had first been examined it was understood that the list of areas was not exclusive and would be subject to more precise definition as exchange actually took place.
It was indicated that new areas of exchange might be opened up in the light of a continuous process of interpretation in actual operation.
At the January 7 meeting the Committee agreed to establish a standing
Sub-Group of Scientific Advisers with the following terms of reference:
In this connection Mr. Lilienthal pointed out that the initial list of subjects for technical cooperation was necessarily rather widely defined and that separate topics in each of these areas would require consideration in the light of the laws of the three countries. Accordingly the U.S. member of the Sub-Group could not be given full discretionary authority. Mr. Makins responded that it was understood that the members of the Sub-Group would be guided by the restrictions of their respective national authorities which in the case of the U.S. [Page 782] would presumably be the Atomic Energy Commission. It was his understanding that the Sub-Group would not normally need to refer to the CPC except in case of disagreement or difficulty in effecting cooperation or for the purpose of seeking authority to add fresh areas of information and exchange.
The Sub-Group on Technical Cooperation, as originally appointed, consisted on the American side of Dr. Bush and Dr. Fisk, the latter Director of Research of AEC. Both being scientists they were in a position to give technical judgments concerning the subject matter at hand. In July Dr. Bush was replaced by Mr. Carpenter, not a technical man, who has recently been replaced by Mr. Webster, also without technical knowledge in this field. Dr. Fisk recently resigned from the Atomic Energy Commission and his place as Director of Research and as member of this Sub-Group has been taken by a Dr. Johnson.2
In consequence not only the membership but the complexion of the American side of the Technical Sub-Group has changed. On the side of Defense Establishment representation, present membership does not possess the requisite technical knowledge for an informed appraisal of areas proposed for exchange. Both Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Webster, who would be the first to admit lack of technical knowledge, have increasingly relied upon the advice of the military members of the Military Liaison Committee in passing judgment on the appropriateness of exchange of information in the nine agreed areas. Because the nine areas have been defined in rather broad terms there has been much room for administrative and operational interpretation. In general, it is fair to say that the AEC technical representative has inclined toward a more liberal definition, whereas the Defense Establishment representative has tended toward a very restrictive interpretation.
In part as a result of the episode concerning “the basic metallurgy of plutonium”, the Military Liaison Committee has taken on the role of the “watch dog” of technical exchange and has insisted on rather extensive clearance and review functions with regard to the subject matter for discussion between U.S., U.K., and Canadian members.
The AEC considers that these review functions are being exercised in a very restrictive and narrow manner. It is concerned that exchange may be becoming so niggardly and reluctant that neither the spirit nor intent of the modus vivendi will be carried out. Apart from the moral question of honoring a firm commitment to the U.K. and Canada under the modus vivendi of January 7, the Commission is concerned that the increasingly narrow interpretation given to the areas of exchange may have a serious adverse effect on our raw materials situation.
[Page 783]The allocations made under the modus vivendi were for 1948 and 1949. Consideration must soon be given to allocations for 1950 and 1951. It seems quite evident that should the British come to feel that we were not carrying out our obligations with respect to exchange of information as provided in the modus vivendi, it could not help having an adverse effect on their approach to the allocation problem for the new period.
Negotiations with South Africa are in prospect for early 1949 to secure uranium in eventual quantities that are likely to be quite large. A falling out between the U.S. and the U.K. over the exchange of information aspect of our undertakings could very well sour the prospects of successful negotiations with the South Africans. It is expected that the United States will take the lead in those negotiations with the active support and assistance of the U.K. While the new Government of South Africa under Malan is ostensibly rather anti-British, there are nevertheless certain Commonwealth ties that are not easily unloosened. In fact, reports on the Commonwealth conference indicate that South Africa is moving back into the family a bit more closely.
It has been asserted in some military quarters that the United States should flex its muscles and be prepared if necessary to go it alone on the question of securing raw materials. These quarters argue that the U.K. is hopelessly dependent upon the United States in so many matters that the United States is in a position to dictate a junior role to the United Kingdom. By means of the club of ECA the U.K. could be told that she must not proceed with the production of plutonium or atomic weapons and that the United States will take unilateral action to assure adequate raw material supply from South Africa and the Congo. From these assumptions—which appear to me to be most dubious—it is then argued that exchange of information under the January 7 modus vivendi should be cut to the merest trickle or stopped altogether.
Setting aside the broader question of acceding to the request made to Secretary Forrestal by Admiral Sir Henry Moore on September 1 for exchange of information on the production of atomic weapons, on which everyone including the U.K. is agreed no action should be taken at this time, the immediate problem is the manner in which the United States should carry out its present undertakings as regards exchange of information. When a team of U.S. scientists reported back from a conference in London on Area 8, “The Design of Natural Uranium Reactors in which the Power Generated is not Wasted”, that U.K. activities in this field seem to confirm an emphasis on plutonium production for eventual weapon use, Mr. Lilienthal asked for a meeting of the American side CPC to discuss whether this information [Page 784] should affect existing arrangements for interchange. The minutes of that meeting which was held on July 6 record the following:
“The consensus of the Committee was that cooperation should continue as presently laid down. No initiative should be taken by the U.S. to add to the nine agreed areas of technical cooperation. If, however, the British made a formal approach to this effect the Committee should seriously consider doing so, subject of course to discussions with appropriate Congressional Committees.”
At that time you stated your view that the information brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense by the AEC should not in any way affect existing arrangements. You also pointed out that the question of plutonium production had not been raised at the December–January talks, but it was your view that it was not assumed on our side that the British would not produce weapons. You went on to say that the British had in fact confirmed to the Department of State on March 19 last that they would produce weapons. Mr. Carpenter stated that he had mentioned this problem briefly to Secretary Forrestal and went on to say that in his own view the information contained in the Commission’s letter should not in any way affect existing arrangements.
The record is, therefore, clear that exchange of information in nine agreed areas was originally approved on January 7 and subsequently reaffirmed by the American side members of CPC on July 6. Nevertheless the AEC considers that the actual carrying out of this undertaking has become so seriously circumscribed by methods and procedures demanded by the Defense Establishment through the Military Liaison Committee that it is doubtful whether the undertaking is in fact being honored. It is probable that Mr. Lilienthal will wish to be in touch with you to discuss this matter and may request a meeting of the American side members of CPC to thrash out the whole problem.
In view of the high raw materials stakes involved—let alone the question of honoring the spirit and letter of our undertakings—it is recommended that the Department of State should throw its weight in favor of a more relaxed method of cooperation within the nine agreed areas, without prejudice to the larger issue of whether the areas should be extended to include the information requested by Admiral Sir Henry Moore on September 1.
- For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, December 15, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, p. 897.↩
- Dr. Ralph P. Johnson.↩