Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Clarence A. Wendel of the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] September 30, 1948.

Subject: U.K. Atomic Energy Program

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador;
	Sir Gordon Munro, Minister, British Embassy;
	Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State;
	Mr. Wendel, Department of State.

The British Ambassador prefaced that he was bringing to Mr. Lovett’s attention in a paper which he would leave, certain worries of the London Committee on Atomic Energy. In presenting the paper (attached herewith as part of the record of the subject conversation) he explained that it was purposely entitled “Note for the Ambassador’s talk with Mr. Lovett on atomic energy”.

Before briefly summarizing the contents of the note, the Ambassador stated that it was intended to convey London’s genuine worry on two points but that it did not necessarily reflect the British viewpoint here.

Mr. Lovett replied that regarding the first point of misunderstanding raised in the paper he could furnish some comfort. Regarding the second, he found difficulty in agreeing with some statements which, in his opinion, do not conform to the record.

Returning to the first point, Mr. Lovett elaborated that he thought that Mr. Carpenter’s comments to Dr. Woodward may have been misunderstood. He assured the Ambassador that the British had complied with their obligations under CPC understandings by informing the U.S. regarding their weapons program as was done by Mr. Maclean on March 19 of this year. Mr. Lovett stated categorically that the British were not obligated to consult with the U.S. prior to the initiation of this program. He hoped that this point was now clarified and assured the British that steps would be taken to avoid any further complications.

With reference to the more basic worry of the British regarding the areas of exchange of information, Mr. Lovett did not think that the London position was correct. To this Sir Oliver indicated concurrence, Mr. Lovett referred to the note left with Mr. Forrestal by Sir Henry Moore on September 1 [2] and commented that the inclusion of the basic metallurgy of plutonium as one of the items which the British thought might be helpful in facilitating their development of weapons, practically constituted an admission that the subject was beyond the scope of the agreed areas for exchange of information. Mr. Lovett stated that he and members of his staff had carefully reviewed the record of the conversations leading up to the modus vivendi of January 7, 1948 and nothing could be found to indicate that, as contended in paragraph four of the British note, information on the military uses of atomic energy were envisaged as included in the nine areas. Moreover, Mr. Lovett recalled that Dr. Bush’s attitude, in conversations with members of the Congressional Joint Committee, was clearly one considering information on weapons as outside the scope of the modus vivendi.

Mr. Lovett, in concluding this phase of the conversation, stated that discussion of these matters was an appropriate function under CPC partnership and hoped that his remarks might be helpful in clarifying the misunderstandings.

To give some background on the attitude existing in Congress and within Government circles with respect to furnishing assistance to other countries in the field of weapons, Mr. Lovett briefly reviewed the record regarding the subject of the basic metallurgy of plutonium commencing with a meeting in the AEC on July 6.¹ He recounted the concern expressed by the Chairman of the Joint Committee at the time he became aware of the decision of the General Manager of the AEC authorizing discussion of plutonium under area 6.² The Commission, on reviewing the case, he continued, reversed the position of the General Manager and sent definite instructions to the delegation then in London not to engage in discussions regarding plutonium. Mr. Lovett referred to the ten-page letter of explanation sent on September 24 by the Commission to the Joint Committee³ as an indication of the seriousness of the matter.

After furnishing this background, Mr. Lovett read the instruction now being given to all U.S. scientists who are delegated to engage in discussions in the nine areas. In view of the general attitude now prevailing in the military, the Congressional and perhaps in the public mind, Mr. Lovett cautioned the British not to press for a decision on their request since he felt that it would not be desirable from their point of view to force the Joint Chiefs of Staff to crystallize the position in the negative. It might also, he added, prejudice continuance of the existing areas of exchange.

Mr. Lovett then mentioned the feeling in military circles that a British weapon project would be vulnerable to Russian attack and that Canada would appear to be a much safer location. He observed that although a British weapon project might appear inconsistent with the British financial position, that, of course, ERP should not necessarily be related to the British atomic energy effort.

Mr. Lovett asked Sir Oliver if it would not be possible for the British to think of other means through which they might enhance their security rather than place such dependence on an independent weapon project. Sir Oliver’s reaction indicated that this would be given consideration.

At the British Ambassador’s request, he and Mr. Lovett then exchanged their personal views on this matter. At the conclusion of this discussion, which was much along the lines explored during the earlier part of the conversation, Sir Oliver suggested as the next step he would write to Sir Roger Makins⁴ in London to pass on Mr. Lovett’s views. Sir Oliver hoped that this might serve to eliminate some of the misunderstanding apparently existing in certain quarters of his Government in London. It was understood that the note left with Mr. Lovett did not call for an official reply.

[Annex]

Note for the Ambassador’s Talk With Mr. Lovett on Atomic Energy

1. The Official Committee on Atomic Energy in London has been seriously concerned by evidences of misunderstandings on the part of certain United States authorities about

(a) the intention of the United Kingdom Government to produce plutonium for atomic bombs and

(b) the general understanding between the United States and British governments on the subject of cooperation on atomic energy questions.

2. In a talk with Dr. Woodward at the Pentagon on the 17th [16th] of August 1948, Mr. Carpenter (Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee and Deputy to Mr. Forrestal on atomic energy questions) said that some members of the Atomic Energy Commission and of Senator Hickenlooper’s Joint Congressional Committee had been astonished at the concentration of British effort on the production of plutonium. This reaction had arisen as a result of a report made by Drs. Zinn and Weil (physicists sent by the Atomic Energy Commission to the United Kingdom to obtain information on British atomic energy development). Mr. Carpenter had also told Dr. Woodward that he had heard that the United Kingdom were shortly going to ask the Americans to extend the topics upon which an exchange of information was permitted under the modus vivendi. Mr. Carpenter had stated categorically that if such a request were made the answer would be a definite no.

3. On the 2nd of September, Admiral Moore, Chairman of the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, saw Mr. Forrestal and handed him a memorandum from the Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom suggesting an exchange of information on atomic weapons. In the course of their talk, Mr. Forrestal said that when the Combined Policy Committee had had their meetings last autumn stress had been laid on the general humanitarian aspect of the use of atomic power, rather than on the military side. He also mentioned that differences of opinion might arise on the American side as to whether the building of a plant for the production of bombs in the United Kingdom could be justified (a) in view of the danger, should the United Kingdom be over-run, and (b) as regards the heavy cost in relation to E.R.P.

4. According to the British Government’s understanding, the conversations leading to the modus vivendi were concerned not mainly with the humanitarian aspect of the use of atomic energy. On the contrary, the United States representatives made it clear that their programme was a military one; the British representatives gave full particulars of British plans for two large piles, and the magnitude of the operation made it clear that the United Kingdom planned to make plutonium on a scale which, in the present state of scientific knowledge, could only be for bomb production. The British Government were under the impression that this had been fully understood by the United States authorities. In March of this year the British Embassy informed the State Department, and Admiral Moore spoke to Mr. Forrestal, to the effect that the British Government would shortly be announcing that they were engaged on the development of atomic weapons. Neither the State Department nor Mr. Forrestal expressed any concern, and, indeed, Mr. Forrestal said he was surprised that the existence of such work was not already publicly known in the United Kingdom as it was in the United States.

5. As regards Mr. Forrestal’s reference to the cost in relation to E.R.P. of establishing a plant in the United Kingdom for the production of bombs, the British Government recall the former views of the United States authorities on the relation between E.R.P. and atomic energy. The United States representatives pressed for the conclusion of an agreement on atomic energy in January of this year with the avowed purpose of keeping the question of atomic energy divorced from E.R.P., especially on the raw materials side.

6. On the question of cooperation between the two governments on atomic energy, the British Government have noted that whereas several useful exchanges of information have taken place on matters originally considered to fall under Area 8 (this was one of the areas about which it was agreed under the modus vivendi that there should be an exchange of information; it is concerned with the design of natural uranium reactors in which the power generated is not wasted) the Atomic Energy Commission have recently decided that these matters could no longer be discussed under this heading. Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Commission have indicated that they cannot agree that the subject of plutonium metallurgy should be included for discussion under Area 6. The Atomic Energy Commission at first agreed with Sir John Cockcroft’s⁵ suggestion that Dr. Cyril Smith of the Atomic Energy Commission should discuss basic metallurgy of plutonium during a recent visit to Harwell. They indicated that this would be covered by Area 6 but, before Dr. Smith left America, the Atomic Energy Commission wrote saying that they had reconsidered the matter and could no longer agree to this. The British Government are seriously concerned at these developments and request that arrangements should be made so that an exchange of information can take place on this subject.

7. In a conversation with Mr. Roger Makins after the conclusion of the modus vivendi in January of this year, Mr. George Kennan expressly asked that the British Government should not hesitate to bring forward any doubts which might arise about the way in which the arrangement for collaboration under the modus vivendi was working.⁶ The British Government now wish to draw the attention of Mr. Lovett to the above mentioned points.

1. For the minutes of the meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, July 6, see p. 719.
2. For Carpenter’s memorandum of meeting with Senator Hickenlooper and others, August 12, see p. 734.
3. Letter not found in Department of State files.
4. Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
5. Director of the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment.
6. No record of the conversation under reference has been found in Department of State files.