Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Donald F. Carpenter, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) on Atomic Energy Matters

top secret

Washington, September 16, 1948.

Memorandum of Conversation With Dr. F. N. Woodward, Director of U.K. Scientific Mission and Scientific Director Attaché at the British Embassy

Present: Dr. Woodward, D. F. Carpenter, William Webster, Lt. Col. Wm. Burke¹

Subjects:

I. Request for Expansion of Exchange of Technical Information, to Include Design of Weapons

II. Comments on Current Exchange Within the 9 Areas

III. Raw Materials

i. subject: request for expansion of exchange of technical information to include design of weapons

I advised Dr. Woodward that at the time of our last conversation² he assured me that weapons manufacture would not commence in England without prior discussion with us. He indicated that that was not his understanding, but rather that it was the national policy on atomic energy matters that they should not take any important steps in the development of their program without giving us notice in advance, and that they felt that they had operated consistently, in accord with this policy, and cited information given to us, which has been referred to in previous memoranda.

He advised that he was not aware of the extent to which weapons were actually being produced at present.

I asked about the U.S.-British attitude towards manufacturing weapons in Canada rather than in England. He did not have an official opinion on this subject, but believed that the general attitude was that England is as safe as Canada. He stated that this definitely was Admiral Sir Henry Moore’s attitude. He pointed out that if England had decentralized critical operations prior to World War II they could not have survived. In response to my question, he indicated that manufacture of the bomb in England might be an important factor in the holding together of the British Empire.

In spite of the above, Dr. Woodward indicated that the door was not definitely closed on further discussions along this line.

I expressed some surprise that the request for weapons information was submitted to Secretary Forrestal,³ in view of my recent statement to Dr. Woodward that there was a growing attitude in this country that we should not expand the areas of exchange of technical information. He advised that immediately after our last conversation (16 August), he cabled England advising that we were tightening up on exchange of information. This cable crossed with the cable from England asking that exchange on weapons be instituted. The matter was discussed in high circles in England and finally came to the attention of the Prime Minister, and in spite of the information that I had given Dr. Woodward and Dr. Woodward’s resulting recommendation, which was supported by the Ambassador, the Prime Minister requested that the request be submitted through the Military Establishment. There was an inference, however, that if Secretary Forrestal indicated that he did not desire to have the request made at this time, it would have been withdrawn, but Admiral Sir Henry Moore considered that no such desire was expressed. Dr. Woodward asked if it was our feeling that the Secretary did not wish to have the request made at this time.

I advised that I was not aware that the Secretary had indicated that the request should not be made but that I was aware that he had advised Admiral Moore that this was inappropriate time to push such a decision and that it would be unwise to crowd for a prompt answer.

Dr. Woodward gave us repeated assurance that information would not be disseminated to the Dominions other than Canada. He advised that a military meeting of the members of the Commonwealth was scheduled for next February. He understood that certain members would ask for information on atomic weapons. He assured us, however, that this information would not be given without prior acquiesence of the U.S.

I advised Dr. Woodward that there was considerable apprehension that the giving of information on weapons would weaken U.S. security; first, because naturally giving information to more people automatically weakens security; and second, because there was apprehension in some circles that information might leak through British sources to Moscow.

Dr. Woodward expressed considerable surprise at this statement, indicating that he was aware that there had been apprehension in other areas, mentioning specifically guided missiles, but he was not aware of any apprehension on atomic energy. He assured us that atomic energy was handled in an entirely different manner from all other matters, and that he felt security provisions were adequate, and there was some feeling that they were better than ours. He stated that an invitation had been extended to any of our security representatives to visit England to review all aspects of their security precautions, but to the best of his knowledge no representative had called upon them. He wished to issue the invitation again.

He asked if there was anything further that he could do at the present time in securing information for us, and we advised that we knew of nothing at the moment, but would contact him further. We advised him that the request was currently being studied in the Military Establishment.

We asked the urgency of a response. He indicated that it was very important to them, largely from the standpoint of their preparedness activities.

I advised that there would be considerable discussion as to the merits as to acceding to this request, and asked him to be prepared to give us reasons why we should acquiesce. He replied that he felt that the two countries were partners, that they had considerable information on the manufacture of bombs anyway, that they were fully determined to proceed with their manufacture, and that he felt that it would be to the interests of both countries if the manufacture were guided by the latest technical information. He stated that these reasons were pointed out in the communication from Sir Admiral Moore.

He advised that it was not contemplated to discuss this matter at the forthcoming meeting of the Sub-Group of Scientific Advisors on Exchange of Technical Information scheduled for October 19th or 21st, but that it was felt preferable to wait until the next meeting of C.P.C. which would probably come at a later date. I agreed that this seemed desirable.

I advised that one possibility might be that U.K. would discontinue manufacture of weapons and that U.S. might earmark a few for use by the U.K. in an emergency. This would assure the U.K. that they would have the most up to date weapons available in the U.S. and would save a great deal of expense and technical effort on their part. Dr. Woodward took cognizance of this suggestion. He did not express a definite opinion but it would appear worthy of further exploration.

ii. subject: comments on current exchange within the 9 areas

We handed to Dr. Woodward a copy of the qualifying paragraph under discussion which would be used in the instructions to all scientific representatives, but contained in all agenda and in the definition of all areas of exchange.

“While recognizing that a distinction between atomic energy matters of military significance and of non-military significance cannot be clearly made, all exchanges shall be further governed by the general criterion that information specifically relating to weapons or to the design or operation of present plants for production of weapons materials or weapons parts is not subject for discussion.”

Dr. Woodward concurred that it was the initial understanding at the time of the adoption of the Modus Vivendi that it was not the purpose to exchange technical information which would convey information to the U.K. on the manufacture of weapons.

It being recognized, however, that any information conveyed to U.K. may be somewhat helpful, he felt that the proposed program seemed logical, but he wished to study it further and he recognized that it would be difficult to interpret. He will advise us further on this subject.

He indicated that at the next Sub-Group meeting requests would be filed for the establishment of two additional areas unrelated to weapons. We agreed that it would be logical to file them at this meeting and for the Sub-Group to make recommendations to C.P.C. on this subject.

iii. subject: raw materials

I asked Dr. Woodward’s opinion as to the U.K. attitude on allocation of raw materials following the expiration of the present schedule. He indicated that he was not familiar with the subject.

I asked if he were the proper representative of the U.K. for the discussion of all these matters, and he indicated that he was, but that in December he was to be replaced by another representative, but that there would be a one month overlap.

D[onald] F. Carpenter

1. Lt. Col. William Burke, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Military Liaison Committee to the United States Atomic Energy Commission.
2. The memorandum of the conversation under reference, August 16, is not printed.
3. For the memorandum transmitted by Adm. Sir Henry Moore to the Secretary of Defense on September 2, see p. 750.