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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Following luncheon with Admiral Ramsey39 and in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State in connection with the threatened Dominican revolutionary invasion launched from Cuba, I showed Admiral Ramsey the full file of telegrams and went over them with him. Following the Secretary’s conversation with Mr. Forrestal40 the Navy Department had already prepared a message to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, requesting reconnaissance in an effort to locate the vessels which had sailed from Cuban ports, and ordering prompt reports, whether affirmative or negative in character. This message was dispatched immediately after it was shown to me at 1:15 P.M.
In discussing the situation with Admiral Ramsey it was emphasized that there should be no interference of any type with the operation at this stage and no show of force. The only thing that we wished at present was intelligence reports and such information as could be obtained through reconnaissance supplemented by some sort of continuous supervision of these boats if located by small craft such as PT’s. The Navy expressed full agreement with the program, offered complete cooperation, and agreed with the approach suggested as well as with the sense of urgency which we felt.
The Navy Department showed me the full disposition of its vessels in the Guantánamo area which, by pure coincidence, represent some of the most powerful Fleet units because the Midshipmen’s cruise arrived at Guantánamo yesterday and expects to be there until August 6. The vessels include, among others, two aircraft carriers, a couple of battleships, two divisions of destroyers, etc., etc. Admiral Ramsey indicated that the air reconnaissance was a simple matter and that they fully understood the necessity for exercising caution. He stated further that the training maneuvers being undertaken thereabouts would provide in his opinion a cover plan if needed.
We further discussed the next logical steps in the event the boats were discovered in Haitian waters or in landing operations.
I told Admiral Ramsey that it was our present feeling that we must avoid anything approaching interference and that it was our [Page 650] present intent to move through the United Nations machinery, using either Article 39, Chapter VII, or Article 51,41 or both, and that we might simultaneously or alternatively move through the Havana Conventions42 or under the Act of Chapultepec.43 I explained to him that it was my personal feeling, with the Rio Conference coming up, that the Havana and Chapultepec routes might be an embarrassment and that other United Nations procedures might be more immediately effective or less embarrassing.
Admiral Ramsey agreed to keep me posted by telephone of any intelligence reports, either affirmative or negative.
It was also agreed that Admiral Ramsey would telephone Admiral Leahy44 on behalf of both Departments and inform him of the situation and steps we had taken, in view of the fact that Admiral Leahy on hearing that the matter had been brought to the attention of the White House by the State Department had requested the Navy Department to keep him posted.
- Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.↩
- James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.↩
- United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.↩
- Signed at the Sixth International Conference of American States, Habana, January 16–February 20, 1928 (Department of State Treaty Series No. 814, or 46 Stat. (pt. 2) 2749), and at the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21–30, 1940 (Resolution VI, Report of the Secretary of State … Department of State publication No. 1575, p. 64).↩
- Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1543, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1831.↩
- Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.↩