839.00/6–1947
The Ambassador in the Dominican Republic (Butler) to the Secretary of State
No. 886
Sir: Referring to my secret despatch No. 790 of May 28, 1947, I have the honor to supplement my report regarding the Dominican political situation, foreign policy, and relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic. The Embassy’s secret telegrams 119, June 1, 3 p.m. and 125, June 11, 4 p.m.14 contain similar additional information.
1. Developments during the past several months furnish justification for questioning the good faith of the Dominican Government in its relations with the United States and in its foreign policy:
The Venezuelan Case
In secret despatch No. 812 of June 3, 1947,15 reference is made to a Navy Department report regarding statements of General Eleazar Lopez Contreras … This report clearly implicates President Trujillo and the Dominican Government in plans for an armed attack against the Betancourt Government.16 Yet my secret telegram 10 of [Page 639] January 10, 1947, 11 a.m.17 reports the categorical assurance given me by the Dominican Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Dominican Government was not intervening in any way in Venezuelan affairs. It seems to be established beyond reasonable doubt that General Lopez Contreras actually was in the Dominican Republic a few weeks prior to this assurance, and that he came in connection with a force being assembled here to attack Venezuela.
Meanwhile, the Dominican Government was throwing up a great smoke screen of charges that there were plots, encouraged abroad, to overthrow the Trujillo Government. Preparations were supposed to include activities in the United States, Puerto Rico, Canada, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Dutch West Indies, and Venezuela. This Embassy and the Department made a conscientious effort—at no small cost—to investigate these rumors and to prevent any illegal operations in the United States. …
. . . . . . .
Arms from the U.S.:
The Dominican Government is trying by all sorts of devious means to obtain arms and munitions from the United States. Some of these may be for use against the Betancourt Government. The considered opinion of this Embassy is that there is no justification for additional armament for the Dominican Republic. Its armed forces are larger and better equipped than those of Haiti. Inter-American commitments provide assurance of aid in case of foreign aggression against the country. The unarmed Dominican people are completely at the mercy of the well armed and well treated police and army. The Embassy’s attitude has been reasonable and in accord with the Department’s policy. …
Cooperation between U.S. and Dominican Republic:
This Embassy believes that President Trujillo’s idea of cooperation with the United States involves: (a) acceptance of his government as democratic, in spite of substantial evidence that it is a ruthless dictatorship; (b) the same treatment in all respects by the United States as that accorded to other American Republics including, of course, such democratic countries as Uruguay and Colombia; (c) a joint anti-communism campaign on the basis of accepting the mere statement of the Dominican police that individuals are communists, when it is fairly certain that the label “communist” is indiscriminately applied to any political opponents of Trujillo; and (d) participation in the sickening campaign of adulation of Trujillo as a great “democrat”, “statesman”, savior of his country, and admired friend of the United States.
[Page 640]With President Truman’s approval, I made clear in an interview with President Trujillo, shortly after my arrival last September, the basis for cooperation, namely, along the lines of President Truman’s Pan American Day address in 1946. Nothing resembling that basis exists (see, for example, confidential despatch no. 885 of June 19, 194719), as I intimated rather clearly to the Dominican Foreign Minister recently when he made the astounding request that I try to bring about a more sympathetic attitude toward the Trujillo Government on the part of the resident diplomatic corps (confidential telegram 97, May 6, 10 a.m.). The latest despatches referring to the attitude of the diplomatic corps are No. 878 of June 18, 1947,19 regarding my conversation with the Colombian Minister, and No. 885 of June 19, 1947, referred to above.
The subject of communism has been thoroughly covered in the Embassy’s despatches. It is extremely unlikely that any serious communist threat exists in the Dominican Republic. Articles in La Nación of Ciudad Trujillo make suspect the motives and measures of the Trujillo regime. Nothing of importance would be published in this newspaper—the principal one in the country—without government approval. Recent articles have accused Mr. Braden, Assistant Secretary of State, of encouraging communism in Latin America, and have made similar charges against reputable American newspaper correspondents who wrote critically of the Trujillo regime.
. . . . . . .
2. The position of U.S. business is an important factor in the Dominican situation (see specific reference in despatch 790, May 28, 1947).
There has been a consistent effort by the Trujillo regime to use U.S. firms and citizens for political ends. Now there is the case of a Dominican police warning to a reputable U.S. businessman for alleged derogatory remarks about Trujillo (see despatch 877 of June 18, 194719).
. . . . . . .
Since the May 16 elections I have been trying to assess the importance of factors having a bearing on our relations with the Trujillo Government. On the evening of June 18, I talked with one of the most reliable and best informed American businessmen in the Dominican Republic. Mr. McArdle of the Embassy staff20 was present during the interview. I outlined the situation described in the preceding paragraph. I said that I knew that business has to go along to [Page 641] a substantial extent with the established government here if it is to avoid trouble. I then asked for a frank opinion regarding the extent to which American business thought it necessary to cooperate with Trujillo.
The American businessman replied that he would be entirely frank. He agreed about the necessity of getting along with the local government. He said that, in general, American business experiences little difficulty during the initial period of a substantial investment in a foreign country. Once established, however, and faced with the necessity of protecting the investment and earning a profit, relations with the local government become much more important and difficult. He expressed the opinion that, in spite of what businessmen had told me about their attitude toward the Department’s policy, an honest answer from the majority would be that American business prefers to deal with foreign governments itself. The implication, of course, is that business and economic conditions should not be interfered with for political or ideological reasons. That confirms the opinion expressed in despatch No. 555.21 While the opinion expressed by this one man does not necessarily reflect the majority view, I suspect that it does. At any rate, I respect the man’s honesty and good judgment.
. . . . . . .
Concluding the conversation, I made the following observations: (a) that I did not think Trujillo could afford to make things difficult for American business if his regime were to come under scrutiny on the basis of international protection of individual rights and civil liberties, or if the Government of the United States made it officially and publicly clear that its cooperation would be limited to that in accord with such a democratic inter-American system as President Truman outlined in his April 14, 1946 speech at the Pan American Union; (b) that I thought either of these two courses of action might mean some temporary inconvenience to U.S. business but would be to its long range advantage; and (c) that I thought dictatorships and economic and political oppression made for the spread of communism, and that our own national interests would best be served by measures which might gain for us the support and confidence of Latin American labor rather than the opportunistic cooperation of “strong men” and of an indifferent array of armed forces. I added that the development of Latin American national economies probably would have to be the job of private enterprise rather than government; that this would require assurance to U.S. business of fair treatment and the opportunity to make a reasonable profit, and that this in turn would almost certainly involve intergovernmental relations and assistance by our government [Page 642] to U.S. business abroad. While the American businessman listened attentively, he made no comment.
Conclusion:
The factors discussed in this despatch may make it more difficult for the Department to reach a decision regarding the alternative courses of action suggested in my despatch No. 790 of May 28, 1947. I regret that I have no other more constructive recommendations to make.
Respectfully yours,