The Chargé d’Affaires ad interim refers to the Department’s secret
telegram No. 376 of April 9, 1947, and has the honor to enclose herewith
[Page 495]
the draft of a note
prepared for submittal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been
considered desirable to prepare the note in draft form as some
clarification may be required in connection with the statement to the
effect that the United States cannot cede any part of its reparations
and the indication that the Government of the United States is
contemplating the cession of one large torpedo boat. The Embassy
presumes that vessels received as the United States share of the German
Navy are not to be considered as reparations and has so stated in the
appended note.
. . . . . . .
[Enclosure]
Draft Note From the American
Embassy to the Brazilian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the
Ministry’s note (DPC/DPO/48/949.4(00) dated January 31, 1947), the
Embassy’s reply, Note No. 336 of February 11, 1947,98 and previous
communications concerning the reparations which the Brazilian
Government feels it can rightfully demand from Germany.
The Embassy has been instructed by the Department of State to point
out that at the time that plans were being made for holding the
Paris Separations Conference, it was recognized that nations which
declared war against Germany would have an interest in obtaining
reparations from Germany. It was also recognized that certain of
these countries, particularly those which were overrun by Germany
and those which had devoted a totality of their resources, human and
material, to the waging of war, would have claims against Germany
for reparations which would be so extensive as to prohibit anything
approximating a reasonable satisfaction of such claims. It was also
clear that certain countries could satisfy a comparatively large
share of their claims against Germany out of German assets located
within their borders. Countries in this latter situation, if invited
to participate in the Paris Reparations Conference, would have been
in a position of having to yield up certain of the German assets
within their borders in order that the percentage of total
satisfaction that they would realize would equal the percentage
realized by other countries with considerably larger claims. This
would have seriously interfered with the establishment of uniform
procedures and mechanisms of reparations by the countries
participating in the Conference, since it would have divided
participants into those who would have to yield a certain proportion
of assets within their borders and a second category
[Page 496]
of those who would have to obtain
assets from other sources in addition to the German assets within
their borders. It was therefore believed equitable and, from the
point of view of formulating procedure, desirable not to ask Brazil
to participate in a conference wherein she would lose rather than
gain by such participation.
The Brazilian Government in an earlier note suggested that the
Government of the United States might be able to devote part of its
reparations share to the satisfaction of Brazil’s claims. Under the
reparations agreement this is, unfortunately, not possible as the
United States when it relinquished, prior to the formulation of
shares, a portion of the shares of Category B assets to which it
would have been entitled on a statistical basis, left itself no
recourses to that part which it had sacrificed. Nor is the United
States authorized to devote any part of the reparations which it
obtains through the removal procedure to any nationals other than
its own.
The attention of the Brazilian Government is invited to the current
negotiations with reference to the possible sharing of the proceeds
of German assets in the American Republics. The Department of State
believes that such sharing will increase Brazil’s total
receipts.
The Embassy has been instructed to stress to the Brazilian Government
that the United States of America, for its part, has not forgotten
the contributions which Brazil made during the war to the common
cause. On the contrary as stated above the Government of Brazil was
not invited to the Paris Reparations Conference in order, within the
terms of the Mexico City Conference, to protect her interests and to
assure her a greater satisfaction of her claims than she could
others-wise secure.
Furthermore consideration is currently being given to the possibility
of delivery to Brazil of one large torpedo boat from the United
States share of the German Navy—a measure which may be feasible as
the United States share of the German Navy was not considered as
part of the reparations agreement. The vessel under consideration is
approximately 1100 tons and is reported to be in excellent
condition. The Department of State, however, has requested that the
tentative nature of this possibility be emphasized.99
The Embassy takes this opportunity [etc.]
