862.20235/10–3147
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
No. 11208
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 10826, dated August 30, 1947, which enclosed an interim report on the interrogation of the three principal deportees who were brought from Argentina aboard the SS Río Teuco: Hans Harnisch, Josef Schroell alias Alfonso Chantrain, and Wolf Emil Franczok alias Gustav Utzinger. A final report on the interrogation of Hans Harnisch is submitted herewith, in various enclosures.69 His testimony was lengthy, and in matters involving possibly controversial statements he was required [Page 214] to sign a series of affidavits. In view of the rather detailed nature of these sworn declarations, the subject matter has first been summarized in a single all-over report (enclosure no. 1).
At the outset the interrogator was rather taken aback when the prisoner refused to admit what had until then been considered an established premise—that Harnisch was a ranking operative of the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst. He did not deny his dealings with Johannes Siegfried Becker nor with highly placed members of the Argentine government, but he denied any regular affiliation with German intelligence other than his 1941–1942 relations with the Cologne office of the Abwehr (Abwehrstelle-Köln). As the matter was gone into and explanations made, it began to appear that Harnisch might be telling the truth: that he was involved in the Argentine rather than the German side. There were fairly strong indications that the information which was being sent to Berlin under Harnisch’s name was being transmitted by Becker and Werner Könnecke on their own initiative. (It is possibly pertinent to note that at the same time Becker and Könnecke were gulling their respective principals in Germany with the cock-and-bull story of their radio “network,” which in reality was no more than a single transmitter operated by Gustav Utzinger—vide the latter’s interrogation, my despatch no. 11158 of October 24, 1947.)
When Argentina’s ill-founded plans to solicit German aid in furnishing replacements for her industry were nipped in the bud by the arrest of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth in Trinidad, Harnisch was made a scapegoat and thrown into jail. At first this move was manifestly no more than a measure to save the very red face of the regime; but when General Pedro P. Ramírez and Colonel Enrique P. González took the further step of breaking diplomatic relations with Germany, the element led by Colonel Juan D. Perón promptly intervened and ousted Ramirez. Harnisch’s expectations of preferential treatment thus dwindled to almost nil, since his patron had been González; and when his arch enemy Ludwig Freude gained the current ascendancy over Perón, the prisoner realized that his eventual sacrifice to deportation was merely a matter of time and political expediency.
Gustav Utzinger further pointed out that from the time of Harnisch’s first arrest in January 1944 until his deportation in May 1947 he was regularly referred to in official Argentine press releases as a “master spy” and a “chief Nazi agent,” and that this circumstance was taken advantage of by Könnecke and others to shift onto Harnisch a number of the counts against themselves; and the police were privy to this arrangement. Utzinger asserted, however, that it was absurd to speak of Harnisch’s having played a leading role in German espionage—he became implicated through his Argentine connections on the latter’s behalf, but he was practically unknown to Germany. [Page 215] Becker himself confirmed to Utzinger that in Buenos Aires Harnisch was in bad odor with both the Party and the German Embassy, adding that he “was more an Argentine than a Hamburger.”
The prisoner’s experiences with Argentine police interrogation followed the classic pattern observed in most deportation cases to date. When first summoned to declare he told the bald truth concerning his relations with the régime, and this resulted in his being thrown into solitary confinement, in the immediate suppression of his testimony, and in the summary disciplining of the police officials responsible for allowing him so to declare. A year later he was persuaded to subscribe to two further statements, tailored to fit the exigencies of governmental policy, on the solemn “word of honor” of the Foreign Minister Peluffo that if he signed he would be released. Harnisch was, of course, not released until the espionage agents were freed en masse following the habeas corpus proceedings of June 1946.
Harnisch’s retailing of Eduardo Bravo Casares’ first-hand account of the ruse by which Perón obtained Argentine citizenship for Ludwig Freude may be of interest as corroboration of what was already known or suspected. It will be recalled that Argentina had “committed herself” not to naturalize any Germans during the war, for which reason it was necessary to manufacture evidence that Freude had applied for naturalization ten years ago.
Since he is not subject to automatic arrest it is proposed to release Harnisch from internment conditionally and to put him under “town arrest” (obligation to remain in a certain city) in case the Department desires a follow-up interrogation. It would therefore be appreciated if the Department would indicate as soon as is convenient whether the present report is sufficient.
Respectfully yours,
- None printed.↩