Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The American Republics, Volume VIII

810.24/11–447

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs (Dreier)³⁹

secret

[Washington,] November 4, 1947.

Arms Policy for Other American Republics

The following is presented as a basis for discussion:

1. Present Policy Questions

The Department’s Arms Policy Committee has before it two important questions regarding the other American republics raised by two letters received from the Departments of the Army and the Air Force:

a. Should any ceilings be placed on the acquisition of arms by other American republics from commercial sources in the U.S.?

b. Should the U.S. Government now offer to the other American republics a second and larger “interim program” of surplus equipment without waiting for Congressional action on the Inter-American Military Bill?

Closely associated with these questions is the practical problem presented by a request from the Dominican Republic for permission to purchase 20 B–25’s (medium bombers), 4 B–17’s (Flying Fortresses), and 18 P–38’s (pursuit planes), none of which have been considered suitable or necessary for the Dominican army by our armed services on the basis of the bilateral staff conversations held in 1945.

2. Background

The Department of the Army has a considerable amount of surplus armament which is reserved for disposal to Latin America under the standardization program. Because passage of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill has been so delayed, and because demands for arms in Greece, Turkey and elsewhere have threatened to make inroads on this reserve supply, the Army wishes to sell much of the remaining equipment to Latin America as soon as possible and to limit commercial purchases of similar types of arms by the other American republics until the Government surplus has been disposed of. The Army furthermore favors an over-all ceiling on all arms purchases by the other American republics consisting of the amounts stipulated in the studies based upon the bilateral staff conversations (except for small arms).

On the other hand, the Air Force has only ground equipment for airfields available in surplus, plus some surplus aircraft in poor condition. The Air Force therefore recommends that the other American republics be allowed to purchase any airplanes in any amount from U.S. manufacturers except when such purchases might interfere with the U.S. Air Force’s own procurement or plans for military defense.

Prior to June of this year, ARA and the Department followed a policy of restricting, insofar as possible, the transfers of arms to Latin America. An “interim” program of surplus arms sales was authorized, and additional purchases from commercial sources were discouraged. When the policy of permitting no arms transfers to Argentina was changed, a new policy towards all the other American republics was adopted: all Latin American countries were to receive equal treatment in respect to arms; commercial sales were not to be prohibited if they appeared to be “reasonable and necessary” for the legitimate requirements of the purchasing government. The Arms Policy Committee adopted the practice of using the Army’s plans, based on the staff conversations, as the ceiling for judging the “reasonableness” and “necessity”. Sales of government surplus arms have not been increased beyond the approved interim program which is still being consummated.

Generally ARA has, in recent months, taken a position of “no political objection” to any arms sales to Latin America, leaving final decision to the Arms Policy Committee.

3. Main Considerations

In taking a position on the current and long range issues, the following considerations are important:

a. This Government favors as a general objective the regulation of armaments and, with special reference to Latin America, the prevention of an armaments race.

b. The U.S. also seeks to achieve a standardization of the military organization and equipment of the Latin American forces with those of this country. This objective has a two-fold purpose: primarily to keep out non-American missions in Latin America, and secondarily to facilitate coordination of supply and tactical operations in the Americas in the event of war.

c. International control of arms traffic is not an immediate possibility. In the absence thereof, unless some self-denying regulation is adopted by the Latin American states, there is no way for the U.S. effectively to limit acquisition of arms by the other American republics. If they cannot buy arms here at satisfactory prices, they will buy from Britain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Sweden or others,

d. Any increases in cost of maintaining Latin American armed forces cannot fail in most countries to impose added handicaps on the national economies and make more difficult the solution of Latin American economic problems with which the U.S. is faced.

e. Any substantial increase in the strength and influence of military forces in Latin America presents political implications of considerable importance.

f. U.S. manufacturers, especially in the aviation industry, wish to take full advantage of the Latin American market.

g. The British have suggested conversations with us on supplying armaments to Latin America, and the U.S. has so far not replied. The British are actively in the Latin American market.

4. Conclusions

a. Unilateral efforts of the U.S. to limit acquisition of arms by other American republics will, so long as other sources of arms are open, jeopardize the objective of standardization. If, for political and economic reasons, we wish to achieve some sort of limitation on armaments in Latin America, and also prevent the introduction of non-standardized arms, the cooperation of the Latin American countries is essential. This cooperation might be sought in the following ways:

Emphasis, in economic discussions, on the importance of holding down military expenditures;

Increasing the effectiveness of military and naval missions in counseling against unwise expenditures supporting the standardization policy, and in developing effective training programs within the economic capacity of the host countries;

Consideration of the possibility of negotiating through political channels some kind of arms agreement which would provide for the publicizing, and possibly review, of all armaments traffic by an inter-American agency.

b. Pending the development of such a program, we should continue to judge individual requests for export licenses on their merits, granting them if the amounts involved are considered “reasonable and necessary”. The staff conversation studies should be used as a general but flexible guide.

c. Agree to have the Army make its surplus available for sale, in response to requests, but not to promote its sale in any way. The limits of the staff conversation studies should be applied to these sales.

39. Addressed to the Director (Daniels) and the Deputy Director (Woodward) of the Office of American Republic Affairs.