893.00/5–847
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit for your consideration a few impressions of recent trends in China. It may be fitting to take as a text for these the request of President Chiang K’ai-shek that there be a cotton and wheat credit, that ammunition be supplied, that the 8⅓ group aviation agreement be promptly and fully effected, and that a highly qualified military adviser be assigned. The text of this request has been transmitted in the Embassy’s telegram no. 916 dated April 28, midnight.82
Mr. Butterworth83 and I called on the Generalissimo on the evening of April 28 and in agreement with me he pointed out questions or objections that might be raised in Washington as to one or another of these items and suggested further consideration on his part, to which he finally agreed. This had as its objects both to postpone such widespread requests being formally made and to suggest to the Generalissimo that available resources were not being properly employed. The morning after that interview I left for Tsingtao and Tientsin and have not as yet seen the Generalissimo since my return.
- 1.
- Although President Chiang holds firmly to his confident expectation that his military objectives will have been attained by September at the latest, yet this is regarded as entirely too optimistic by many Chinese whose sympathies are all with him. This seems also to be the judgment of our own experts. One factor is the inadequate pay for the officers and men and the hardships in general from traditional treatment of Chinese soldiers, aggravated by war-weariness, Communist propaganda, the lack of an inspiring motive, etc., all of which weaken morale. There seem to be desertions to the Communists and at times even the disintegration of entire units. Another explanation for the lack of progress is that there is a difference of opinion among the High Command as to overall strategy. The Chief-of-Staff (General Ch’en Ch’eng) is supposed to advocate wide encirclement, forcing the Communists to retire to the mountains and waiting for them to break through into the plain in search for food and supplies at which time they can be destroyed or scattered. The Minister for National Defense (General Pai Ch’ung-hsi) and the two National Commissioners for the former Executive Headquarters argue on the other hand for segregating the Communist armies into smaller bands confined in different regions and dealing with them piece-meal. In any [Page 115] case, the news from the various fronts has of late not been reassuring. The situation in Manchuria seems especially critical and the popular discontent even more widespread than within the Wall. General Tu Li-ming is dangerously incompetent, all the more so perhaps because of his arrogant conceit.
- 2.
- The Communist leaders appear confident that—whatever their reverses and deficiencies—the situation will work out increasingly to their advantage. In so far as they base this upon purely internal conditions they probably have good reason for assuming that economic and fiscal difficulties will reinforce the deepening opposition to the Government to the point of forcing it to renew the negotiations for peace. They are counting on preventing American aid to the Government while the civil war continues and are intensifying their vituperative propaganda to this end. They have succeeded in this at least to the extent of instilling into their own people a belief that we are allied with the Kuomintang against them, so that anti-American sentiment is more than ever a reality wherever the Communist Party influence has spread. Chinese Communists share the Russian dialectic theory that a capitalistic economy must have the cycle of recurrent depressions and that this will soon happen again in the United States with the consequent necessity of curtailing our activities in foreign countries. Evidence from widely-separated regions and through unrelated sources all seems to confirm the cruelly authoritarian nature of Communist domination and the revulsion of the populace in many localities against their leadership. “Military necessity” seems to be driving them to oppressive measures not unlike those which have always been prevalent in typical Chinese local administration. By and large perhaps the sufferings of the common people do not vary greatly under either system, and are of course made more acute by the war, especially where the control is constantly shifting. On the whole it would seem that the earlier disillusionment as to the Kuomintang is now becoming no less true of the Communist Party, alike among the intellectuals and the rural masses.
- There is another aspect of the Communist Party problem which has an important bearing on any further efforts to effect a reconciliation. They have always, in my opinion, been quite sincere in desiring a Coalition Government—provided that terms satisfactory to them could be agreed upon. But they have thought of this as a somewhat permanent arrangement rather than as an interim device pending the establishment of a constitutional system by which one party or another would be in power as decided by popular vote. In the earlier discussions it would have been a needless complication to introduce this issue. Once the fighting had been stopped and a working government had been organized [Page 116] this might have been left to a happier future. Perhaps this still holds true. But with the present impasse in peace negotiations and the determination to put the Constitution into effect on December 25, 1947, the period for a temporary coalition would at best be very brief. In my view the Communist Party will have the intention if it should enter into a Coalition Government after the inauguration of the Constitution of maintaining that coalition for a considerable period while it worked from within.
- 3.
- We are now witnessing some of the practical difficulties of a Coalition Government without Communist Party representation. The Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry were allotted to Youth Party members. The former is one of the most thankless tasks in the list and it is not surprising that Mr. Li Huang has steadily refused to accept it. There is a vacancy among the Social Democrat membership on the State Council. One of the three who have taken office (Hu Hai-men) has now been expelled from the Party which creates a perplexing dilemma. From the Government standpoint the minority party members are inexperienced and are in no way superior to the seasoned workers they must displace, thus tending to reduce efficiency. The Youth Party especially is anxious for as many jobs as can be secured for its members, and those of both parties are disgruntled at not having a more responsible share in administration. The new Premier has tact and strength of purpose and should be able to weld together these disparate elements. Part of the difficulty is inherent in the numerical superiority of the party in power.
- 4.
- During the past week or two there have been frequent news items in the local press concerned in one way or another with prospective American loans. These have served to dramatize both the desperate predicament which the Government feels itself to be facing and the extent to which our country has become enmeshed in this confused situation. The consciousness that some such assistance is essential in order to avert disaster exists throughout Government circles though a note of bitterness that this is the case and a desire not to be interfered with in the use of it are almost as prevalent. These can be detected in intimate conversations even with one as friendly to us as Premier Chang. President Chiang almost alone among the leaders has recognized with cold realism the inherent weaknesses of his country both human and material and has disciplined himself to paying the price for American monetary aid in having it accompanied by a large measure of American control. This may not be quite fair to him, for I have the impression that—even more than before your departure—he is deeply aware of this need. It might almost be said of him that he [Page 117] is forced by fiscal and economic exigencies to seek for relief through credits or loans, but that in the field of his own primary interest he is increasingly aware of the practical value of American specialists as advisers. In any case, we can count on a measure of support from him in the matter of control in the event of our decision to give financial assistance for specific projects.
- 5.
- The essence of the problem seems to be as to whether the financial structure of the country can endure until the military operations will have opened the way for a negotiated peace. If President Chiang is correct in his confidence that this will be achieved by September, our experts think that there will be no financial collapse before then. General Cheng Kai-min (formerly of Executive Headquarters) modifies President Chiang’s forecast to the effect that, if needed ammunition can be obtained, the Tientsin–Pukow Railway zone and all of Shantung Province could be recovered by September, but that it would be toward the end of the year before this could be done for the Peking–Hankow Railway and Shansi.
Whenever the leaders of the Communist Party can be persuaded that it would be to their interest to renew the efforts for a peaceful settlement, all that was originally contemplated for the welfare of this country could be undertaken with the confidence that it will be welcomed more than ever by the inarticulate masses and by all whose sensitive pride or selfish interests are not injured in the process. We will ourselves have probably gained experience for supervising such aid more wisely. Meanwhile, the situation is fluid. How long this will continue cannot be predicted but our policy may have a determinative influence. Mob violence may break out at any time and spread rapidly in the worsening economic conditions and with the attempts to arouse this which are undoubtedly being made. Apart from this there is not apt to be collapse so much as disintegration.
Respectfully yours,