711.93/4–2247
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment further upon some of the causes and possible consequences of the augmenting anti-American feeling in this country. The matter was referred to in my despatch no. 206 of October 17, 194668 in connection with Dr. Nathaniel Peffer’s69 memorandum. As I remarked then, this feeling seemed to me on the whole latent though widespread and easily capable of becoming more pronounced. The trend is now somewhat more obviously in that direction.
In view of our long record of both governmental and private contributions for Chinese welfare, especially our abundant assistance in the winning of the war, we may well feel a pained surprise at this apparent ingratitude. My observation is, however, that Chinese are fully conscious of all this and extremely appreciative. The explanation must be looked for elsewhere, except in so far as all that we have done for China in the past and our repeated assertions of practical goodwill have tended to raise false hopes in their present distress. Disillusionment naturally stimulates embittered complaint. Chinese also have the instinct for relying on others and even for claiming this as their right. This lack of self-reliance may be partially accounted for by the family system and other age-long social patterns. At any rate, we are the people to whom they have learned to look for help and when we fail to meet their sense of need the reaction is unfavorable to us.
Apart from this the most palpable factor is the insistent Communist propaganda to the effect that we have been perpetuating the civil war by aiding a corrupt and reactionary one-party government. Their assertions, and doubtless their own beliefs, greatly exaggerate the extent of this aid and completely misconstrue its motives. This amounts to the deliberate forging of a weapon with which to weaken their hated enemy by compelling our withdrawal. The constant reiteration and the popular lack of knowledge as to the real facts impress many, more especially those who are already critical of their Government.
A variant of this mood is the discontent over the lengthened civil war and the questionings as to our attempted mediation. The Communists and their radical sympathizers blame us, of course, for enabling the Government to carry on. Conversely, the Kuomintang extremists argue that if we had only given them free rein they could have long since forced a military settlement. Between these two [Page 106] extremes are those who in differing degrees resent our interference or wonder why we could not finish what we had attempted, or suspect our exploitation of their country as an integral part of our designs against Russia, or more vaguely still in despair over their mounting economic and other ills cannot understand why we with all our wealth and power and profession of friendship have watched their suffering and done nothing about it. Such an attitude is perhaps accentuated by the Chinese trait of denouncing some other person for one’s own mishaps. This is not confined to Chinese but it is perhaps more highly developed among them as part of the “face” complex. It undoubtedly enters into their sentiments about American policy toward their country.
The misbehavior of individual Americans toward Chinese has at times provoked indignation or angry amazement. But this in itself would have been tolerantly regarded as a matter of personal bad manners or morals were there not a basis of general dissatisfaction. The nationwide demonstrations over the Peiping rape case69a were symptomatic, for instance, of festering grievances seeking an outlet. Such sporadic occurrences, regrettable as they are, could never have aroused so extensively a volume of anti-American feeling. This is due primarily to the causes mentioned in the previous paragraphs.
The growth of anti-American sentiment assumes practical importance in the shaping of future American policy. If or when internal conditions in China may seem to justify substantial assistance to a reorganized Government or to private enterprise would this be a serious deterrent? It is to be expected that the Communist Party will indulge in profuse vituperation, charging us with economic imperialism, etc. This will be taken up at the outset by leftist groups and perhaps by students under organized instigation. Any blunders on our part or misdeeds of individuals may lead to violent demonstrations. But I am confirmed in my opinion that the responsible leaders will welcome not only the material benefits but the most thoroughgoing supervision of these as well, and that they will have the support of public-spirited citizens generally. This may not at first be vocal but as such a program begins to show results the social timidity so characteristic of Chinese will in my opinion dissolve. Much will depend upon our procedure. In China what is done is rarely as important as the way in which it is done. A full and frank preliminary statement of our intentions and the limits of our participation would be very helpful. It would seem preferable that all advisers be selected and maintained by us and that they be chosen not merely for their professional competence but also with a view to their personal characteristics, attitude to China, etc.
[Page 107]With an adventurous faith in the purity of our purpose and in the capacity of the Chinese people to master modern techniques and to acquire truly democratic standards of public morality, I feel confident that we shall have the heartiest cooperation of the leaders in the Government and of the liberals, with an increasing endorsement from the general public including students, and that this will tend to neutralize anti-American feeling except among those whose political aims or selfish interests are injured by our efforts to serve their nation.
The Chancery here, however, cautions against optimism, the feeling being that we should not expect too much in the way of dissipation of anti-American feeling in China as a result of substantial American assistance to China. While our assistance would serve to bolster up and alleviate the unfavorable economic situation, it could not by itself remove the causes for this situation. And as long as this unfavorable situation continues, the United States will remain the most convenient universal scapegoat; we will be accused simultaneously of having given too much and too little, of interfering too much and too little, of strengthening the moderates and the reactionaries, and of not letting the Chinese settle matters in their own way. The Communists will, of course, attack us whatever we do. An influential and vocal section of the Kuomintang, which is basically anti-foreign, feels that our assistance—and substantial assistance at that—will in any case be forthcoming, and it is this section which tends to be most anti-foreign and to utilize foreigners as scapegoats for China’s innumerable ills. There is little reason to believe that their ideology will undergo any basic transformations as a result of American aid.
Respectfully yours,
[For statement by the Chinese Minister of Information regarding reorganization of the Executive Yuan and for inaugural radio address by General Chang Chun as President of the Executive Yuan on April 23, see United States Relations With China, pages 741 and 742, respectively.]
- Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. x, p. 387.↩
- Professor of international relations at Columbia University, New York, N. Y.↩
- See pp. 1 ff.↩