893.00/3–2747
The Consul General at Changchun (Clubb) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)47
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my current telegraphic reports of developments in connection with the Chinese Communist drive across the Sungari River in the first half of the present month, and to enclose as of possible interest in this general connection a copy of a memorandum48 of a brief trip made on March 20, 1947, by myself and Assistant Military Attaché Edward T. Cowen to Nungan and Tehhui, which by press report had been respectively surrounded by “tens of thousands” of Communist troops in the course of that Communist campaign.
The outstanding features of the campaign were that 1) the Communists evidently retained the initiative throughout, excepting at the last moment at Nungan; 2) if some 10,000 Communists were surrounded by Nationalist relief forces east of Nungan as reported by the Kuomintang press the major part of that group apparently succeeded in escaping; 3) Kuomintang reports of both numbers of participating Communist forces and their casualties seem to have been exaggerated; and 4) the outstanding loss to the Nationalist side was a munitions convoy destroyed and considerable damage inflicted by the Communists on rail and telegraph communications, as well as reputedly heavy Communist looting of the peasantry of the affected area. In short, no decisive battles were fought, but attrition was more severe on the Nationalist side, whose area was invaded and ravaged, than on the raiding Communist side. The Communists failed to achieve any major tactical success, but their drive had the following strategic results: 1) with the delay of any projected Nationalist advance across the [Page 89] Sungari to the date of withdrawal, which antedated only briefly the break-up of the Sungari, a Nationalist drive against Harbin becomes impracticable for the immediate future; 2) the diversion of Nationalist reinforcements to the Nungan–Tehhui front from the Saup’ing-T’ungliao line and south Manchuria weakened temporarily the garrison points from which these relief troops were drawn; and 3) the further wrecking of communications and removal to Communist territory of grain supplies strengthens the Communist supply position and proportionately weakens the Government position. The absolute importance of these strategic results can be determined only by reference to future events.
Respectfully yours,