893.24/11–147

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

After the meeting this morning, Colonel Byroade sought me out to hand me the attached memorandum which, you will note, contains a suggestion that General Marshall be apprised of its contents before the meeting of the Committee of Two82 on Monday, November 3.

W. W[alton] B[utterworth]
[Annex]

Memorandum by Brigadier General C. V. R. Schuyler 83 of the Department of the Army, to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper)

Subject: Transfer of Munitions to the Chinese.

In light of the recent increased concern on the Secretarial level over the problem of the transfer of munitions to the Chinese, it is felt that complete understanding should govern further considerations of the disposition of surplus munitions in the Pacific, including the “dangerous and unstable” factor.

[Page 903]

Excluding the Philippines, where current negotiations with that Republic entail disposition of ammunition surpluses therein, there is an estimated potential surplus of over 100,000 long tons of air and ground ammunition in the Pacific. In the Marianas, there exists an estimated surplus of 78,000 tons of bombs ranging in size from 100# to 2000#; an undetermined quantity of 50 cal. ammunition is available with the extent of ground ammunition also unknown. Ammunition surpluses elsewhere in the Pacific and excluding the Philippines would not, in all probability, exceed 50,000 tons. Undoubtedly, these stocks are somewhat unbalanced. Considerable time, funds and personnel would have to be expended to make a complete inventory. Conversely, should transfer of title as a future course of action continue to be precluded, considerable funds and personnel will also be required for the Army to dispose properly of these stocks. Short of disposition by surplus declarations, the most appropriate methods of liquidating these stocks would be by controlled detonation, burning or dumping at sea. As a matter of fact, Pacific overseas commanders are now disposing of ammunition surpluses in this manner on a scale limited only by their meager capabilities.

The disposition of “dangerous and unstable” ammunition is governed by Army Technical Regulations. These provide in general for the appropriate certification by the local commanding officer as to quantity, location and condition, recommended action and, normally, three successive indorsements approving the action. Accompanying the report is a statement by an officer witnessing the destruction which serves as the property voucher completing the transaction. In cases, however, where the stocks are extremely hazardous to life and property, the commander on the spot may order immediate destruction and approve his own action.

Any “abandonment” of “dangerous and unstable” ammunition is without precedent in the Army and, it is feared, might lead to grave repercussions. Moreover, it is felt that declaring ammunition “dangerous and unstable” within range of the Chinese would, in effect, compound an indefensible subterfuge. Army representatives would be required to act against their better judgment and, in fact, their conscience in compliance with the spirit of the requirement. In addition, some densely populated port like Shanghai might become exposed to the risk of a catastrophic explosion with the onus of the responsibility squarely on the United States, and specifically on the Army. The Department of the Army cannot concur in any such arrangements. The issue is not concerned with the condition of the ammunition but rather with the principle of transfer of usable ammunition to the Chinese. No less unsavory, but with air of legality surrounding it, [Page 904] would be the negotiation by the FLC of a contract with the Chinese providing for demilitarization by the Chinese of all ammunition surpluses transferred to them.

Without additional enabling legislation, there exists no legal means other than the Surplus Property Act by which the Army can transfer ammunition to the Chinese through governmental channels. Under that Act, the most expedient method would be a supplemental agreement to the existing Bulk Sale Contract with China permitting the transfer of munitions. Similar arrangements could be applied to the 8⅓ Group program. FLC could also be legally empowered to write new contracts specifically for the sale of munitions.

Chinese procurement through American industry of a limited amount of 50 cal ammunition has motivated the application by the Army, with the sanction of the Department of State, of Public Law 703 which provides for the exchange with a manufacturer of obsolescent or surplus etc. munitions for other munitions of which there is a shortage. Implementation has not yet reached the determination of time and place of transfer since approval was only granted on 20 October. This method of supply is, of course, limited by the financial capabilities of the Chinese National Government.

The Department of the Army stands ready and willing, within the limits of its capabilities and legal authority, to assist in the implementation of programs of military assistance to the Chinese. It is felt that ammunition transfer considerations at this time, pending development of an overall policy toward China, should only include lifting of restrictions on transfer of military type items as could be accomplished by the FLC and continued facilitating of Chinese procurement through American industry.

P&O Recommends

In view of the continued concern on high levels over the problem of the transfer of munitions to the Chinese and to foster a more complete understanding among the Secretaries that:

a.
You present the above considerations to Mr. Lovett today with the request that it be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State prior to the meeting of the Secretaries on 3 November.
b.
Unless the Secretary of State has indicated otherwise by 3 November, that the above be presented at the aforementioned meeting of the Secretaries.

Coordination

General Lutes,84 SS&P.

C. V. R. S[chuyler]
  1. The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) was the other member.
  2. Plans and Operations Division, General Staff, U. S. Army.
  3. Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, General Staff, U. S. Army.