893.00/7–1147: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 11—10 a.m.]
1506. Following is General Lucas’ memorandum of conversation with Generalissimo on June 30, 1947:
“This afternoon, the Generalissimo sent for me and asked me to repeat a conversation I had had 2 days before with the Chief of Staff40 with regard to the military situation. The Chief of Staff was present. I asked the Generalissimo if I could speak frankly and assured him that I would always do so, and must insist that any remarks of mine must be limited to military subjects as I could give no advice on political matters. He said that he appreciated my point of view.
I told the Generalissimo that, in my opinion, the struggle with the Communists was not going to be completed in a month or in 3 months and perhaps not in a year. I told him that I believe he should consider this a long war and should prepare accordingly. I told him that one of the great difficulties at the present time of the Chinese Army was its lack of training. He had a number of divisions which he liked to speak of as ‘American trained’, but at the present time he had very few divisions that were actually trained at all. Those that had been trained under American supervision were well-trained 2 or 3 years ago but were not at the present time.
I told him that it had been my personal experience in World War II that a military unit deteriorated very rapidly in battle. In the first place, such a unit had losses in personnel and new men who took the place of the casualties had, in many cases, not received a great deal of training as replacements. In the second place, there was a distinct loss of morale due to continuous action. In the third place, men in battle lost, in a very short time, the military knowledge they had acquired in the training period. It, therefore, became necessary to relieve divisions from action periodically and put them through a course of training of limited duration in order to make them effective units again. I then told the Generalissimo that, in my opinion, some such method of retraining was necessary for the Chinese Army if it was ever going to be effective in the field.
I then handed him a program for the training of divisions. This program covered in general what should be taught in a retraining project of 13 weeks’ duration. It assumed that a school was being run for officer replacements by which these replacements had 3 months’ training before entering the division. It assumed that a replacement system for enlisted personnel would be established as rapidly as possible.
I told the Generalissimo that, as he knows, I was at present time limited in the advice that I could give to the Chinese Armed Forces. My mission, as it presently exists, was to organize the higher echelons of the Chinese Army and to establish and assist in the establishment [Page 875] of schools for the training of officer and enlisted personnel for the Armed Forces; that I was prohibited from assisting in any way in the actual training of those forces which were fighting the civil war; that even if this restriction were removed, I was so limited in personnel that it would be difficult for me to be of a great deal of assistance in such a project; that I was willing to request the removal of this restriction so far as regards advice on the retraining of divisions in the training center that I would suggest that he set up. If this restriction were not removed, I would still be able to assist by the influence of the advisory group on the ground forces headquarters; that I was not willing to suggest that the restriction be removed allowing the participation my advisory personnel in advice given to troops actually in the field.
I then pointed out to the Generalissimo that it was difficult for me to work with the ground forces headquarters because of the misconception on the part of the Chinese as to the function of that headquarters. The advice of the advisory group had been to the effect that the ground forces headquarters was a zone of interior organization and was responsible for the training, shipping and supplying of ground troops in the zone of interior; and that it had no functions with any theater of operations except to supply that theater with trained, organized and equipped units and replacements. I pointed out to the Generalissimo that in spite of the fact, he had taken the commanding general of the ground forces and had sent him up to command in a theater of operations and had furnished no replacement for him in the ground forces; that, in addition to this, he had allowed the commanding general of the ground forces to take with him a considerable number of the staff of the ground forces and that no replacements had been furnished for these officers. Under these conditions, therefore, it was impossible for me to work with the ground forces and I could take no part in the organization of this training center. The Generalissimo stated that he would appoint a commander and staff to work with me on this matter. I answered that that was not all that was necessary. The thing that was absolutely necessary was to reorganize the headquarters of the ground forces because I was organized to work with this headquarters and could not change my organizations and I could not take the responsibility of assisting in this matter except through the headquarters of the army ground forces. He stated that he would send a deputy commander to the army ground forces and would replace the staff officers that had been removed therefrom for duty in the theater of operations.
I did not suggest any location for this training center but I had suggested to the Chief of Staff that it be placed in Formosa, as the climate was suitable there for year-round training and there were facilities established by the Japanese that would allow such a center to be set up with a minimum of new construction. The Generalissimo asked me how many divisions should be trained. I told him that we could start off with 1. Until that was pretty well along in its training, I did not think we should attempt to expand. I did think, however, that we could expand so as to take 2 or 3 at a time ultimately, until approximately 10 divisions had been through the training center. He suggested 9 instead of 10, to which I had no objection.
[Page 876]He asked me what type of division we should have. I told him that this program I had given him was drawn up for the ‘Alpha’41 type, but that it could be easily changed and the schedules drawn up so as to apply to any other type of division. I added that the advisory group had under consideration the type of division organization that would best suit the Chinese; that this would give us an opportunity to test this organization and make a final recommendation to him. I stated that the training given in the training center should be limited to that which we considered necessary to fight the present civil war and this did not mean that when that war was over and the Chinese Army was being re-organized and retrained, that a different type of training would not be necessary.
The Generalissimo spoke at length to the Chief of Staff but, as this was not translated, I do not know what he said. He finally said that he approved of what I had suggested. I thanked him for listening to me and departed.
My liaison officer with the Chief of Staff came to me the next day and said that the Generalissimo and the Chief of Staff were contemplating establishing three such training centers. I told him to tell the Chief of Staff that in that case I could be of no assistance as the personnel of the advisory group which I could place on this duty was so limited that it could not possibly be divided into three sections. I told him that I would do the best I could by conferences and with advice to the army ground forces headquarters to be of some assistance. I have heard nothing more about the project.”
Additional developments and Embassy’s comment follow.